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Abstract
In the wake of the resurgence of ethnic tensions, the last twenty years 
saw the development of a burgeoning interest in the origin of 
nationalism. The argument that the growth of the modem state was a 
decisive factor in precipitating nationalism commands wide consensus 
across the ethnosymbolist/modemist divide. The exact nature of the 
relationship between nationalism and state formation, on the other 
hand, is yet to be adequately understood. The centrality of state 
schooling systems in defining the modem state as an institution and 
nationalism as a practice renders it a privileged standpoint to address 
the relationship between nationalism and state formation.
The thesis examines the relationship between the rise of Italian 
nationalism to dominant ideology and the growth of the state schooling 
system in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
The thesis shows that in the central part of the nineteenth century 
Piedmont witnessed an exceptional development of the state schooling 
system. Multi-causal analysis is employed to show that nationalism 
played a key role in explaining Piedmont’s particular trajectory of 
schooling development. The argument is supported through an analysis 
of the nationalist purposes behind schooling reform, including an 
examination of policy and practice of language as a medium of 
teaching and the teaching of history.
In accounting for the positive impact of Italian nationalism on 
Piedmont’s schooling developments, the thesis seeks to move beyond 
the limitations of arguments relying on the constructed nature of 
modem nations, and shows that the development of nationalist 
ideology and associated conceptions of citizenship was instrumental to 
legitimise the development of the state schooling system amid 
difficulties experienced by Piedmont with legitimising the practice with 
the language of the social contract. These difficulties are traced to
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tensions between the logic of state formation entailed by post­
mercantilist thought, underlying the growth of the state schooling 
system, and the definitions of society and subjective rights associated 
to the tradition of the social contract.
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Preface
My interest in nationalism dates back to 1997, when, as part of my 
degree in economics and econometrics, I participated to a research on 
the relationship between economic diversity and nationalist 
movements, under the supervision of S. Goyal. The research was later 
developed in my final project at the University of Essex, under the 
supervision of R. Bailey. Beside my experience as a school-child, a 
spell as statistician at the Department for Education and Employment 
represented my only background on schooling before starting this 
research. While studying the history of Italian nationalism, I became 
interested in the role played by the schooling system in the construction 
of the Italian nation. The thesis gradually developed in a comparative 
study of nationalism and schooling in modem England and Italy. The 
political divisions characterising Italy’s past offer a rich working 
ground for the comparativist. For the same reason it represents a 
nightmare for the historian. For most of the period under analysis Italy 
was divided in about ten states, each with its own schooling system, 
and it has been necessary to narrow down the focus. The role of 
leadership played by Piedmont in the period leading and in the 
aftermath of the unification made it the obvious choice. As the research 
went on, I became more and more aware of my ignorance of the past, 
and how the contested and conflicting nature of historical accounts 
prevents one from taking secondary sources at face value. To address 
these concerns, I felt the need to further narrow down the scope of the 
research to one case. I was raised in Italy, and to this day national 
history constitutes the great bulk of the history taught in school. My 
lack of background in history at the academic level meant that the 
advantages of having greater familiarity with the context outweighed 
the drawback of possessing a preconceived idea about it.
The thesis is meant to be read as an integrated whole, but different 
chapter? engage with different aspects of the question. In particular,
those who are interested in how historical sociology can approach the 
question of schooling and nationalism can focus on chapters 3 and 4. 
Those interested in the particular development of schooling and 
nationalism in Piedmont can concentrate on chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 1 
outlines the research question and the research method. Chapter 2 
introduces the reader to the setting of the research, Piedmont. Chapter 3 
provides a critical summary of the main theories informing the 
research, by comparing different approaches taken by the historical 
sociology of nationalism and that of schooling. Chapter 4 discusses 
historical sociology and the research method. The empirical analysis is 
carried out in chapter 5 and 6. The former focuses on the growth of 
schooling in modem Piedmont. The latter discusses the process 
whereby the Piedmontese schooling system became aimed at 
constructing a nation. In conclusion, chapter 7 summarises the main 
argument and findings of the thesis.
I would like to thank the Sirovich family for their kind hospitality while 
doing library and archive research in Turin, my supervisors, Martin 
Bulmer and Victoria Alexander, for their support throughout the 
writing of the thesis, Chris Smaje for introducing me to historical 
sociology, and my family, the ESRC and the department of sociology 
of the University of Surrey for funding the research.
David Chilosi
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1 Introduction
Introduction
Once upon a time...
A king! -  Will shout my little readers.
No, kids, you are wrong. Once upon a time there was a piece of
wood.
Collodi ([1883] 1924: 5).
The beginning of Collodi’s The adventures o f Pinocchio can be read as 
summary of the prevailing positions on the question of nationalism in 
sociological theory. The question of nationalism has been dominated by 
the relationship between nationalism and the origin of nations. The 
major debate produced by nationalist studies has sprung from the claim 
that, against the grain of nationalist narratives, the state constructed the 
symbols of the nation in modem times. Similarly to Collodi’s 
Pinocchio, at the origins of nationalism, the modernist argument goes 
(Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1994; Breuilly, 1995; Anderson, 2000), did 
not lie a conscious subject, but an amorphous network of overlapping 
and contextual loyalties. Contrary to received wisdom, the symbols of 
the nation are not rooted in the distant past, but the result of deliberate 
forgery on the part of the state. Ethnosymbolism (Smith, 1991; Llobera, 
1996; Hastings, 1997), the major source of opposition to this argument, 
admits a certain degree of forgery and that the emergence of mass 
nations was a modem phenomenon. On the other hand, as if inverting 
Pinocchio’s incipit, ethnosymbolists assert that proto-national forms of 
identification among an elite was a pre-condition for nationalism to 
develop. Once upon a time, ethnosymbolists maintain, there was a king 
waiting to be crowned.
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Without taking away anything from the fundamental contribution of the 
ethnosymbolism/modemist debate to furthering our understanding of 
nationalism, I would argue that it has come to a standstill. We cannot 
but share the ethnosymbolist claim that nationalism did not come out of 
the blue, and nationalists drew upon a symbolic repertoire which 
evolved over the long period. The change in political language brought 
by nationalism was more subtle than implied by the modernist position. 
And yet the explanatory advantages of moving the origin of nations 
back to the middle-ages, or sometime between then and the nineteenth 
century, are dubious. The accusation moved against modernists that 
there are antecedents to the symbols of the nation does not challenge 
the fundamentals of their argument. There is no denying that starting 
from the nineteenth century the symbols of the nation acquired 
unprecedented centrality, and this cannot be explained either primarily 
or solely in terms of the force of pre-existing ethnic feelings. Many 
proto-nations did not turn into nations, and the eventual success of 
proto-nations is only weakly related to how wide and deep-rooted was 
their appeal in early modem times. The modernist arguments that pre­
existing ethnic feelings, on the whole, were a poor predictor of 
nationalism and the state was a more important actor than proto-nations 
in precipitating nationalism, hold firm against the ethnosymbolists’ 
objections.
There is therefore a case for shifting the focus from the relationship 
between nation and nationalism to that between state and nationalism. 
The aim of this thesis is to develop the argument that nationalism was a 
political ideology which emergence was related to the growth of the 
modem state through an analysis of relationship between growth of a 
state schooling system and rise of nationalism in Piedmont between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
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Method
The empirical analysis is based upon the development of nationalism 
and that of a state schooling system in Piedmont between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Piedmont, a present day region 
lying at the north-west of Italy, was the core area of the Kingdom of 
Sardinia, the leader of the process of Italian unification. In particular, 
we shall attend at the interplay between rhythm of growth of state 
schooling, institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy, and rise of 
nationalist ideology. The conceptual tools employed in the analysis, the 
periodisation and the overall methodological approach are mainly 
drawn from two bodies of literature, the historical sociology of 
nationalism and the historical sociology of schooling, with a slight 
change of emphasis with respect to both.
With respect to the historical sociology of schooling (Archer, 1979; De 
Swaan, 1987; Smelser, 1991; Green, 1992), I shift the focus from 
institutional developments to quantitative growth. The institutional 
perspective is not abandoned but it is, as it were, placed in the 
background. In doing so, I seek to give greater relevance to the fact that 
institutional developments, while related to patterns of growth, do not 
mirror them in an univocal way. In particular, the Piedmontese case 
highlights how two assumptions implicitly made by the literature are 
inadequate. First, legal and actual schooling provision can differ 
markedly. To make an example, compulsory education was introduced 
in Lombardy as early as 1786. However, not until almost a century later 
was the great majority of the children in schooling age enrolled. By 
contrast, in Piedmont, at the time schooling attendance began to be 
compulsory, 1859, almost all the children in schooling age were 
enrolled in elementary education. Second, intensity of institutional 
intervention and processes of expansion do not necessarily follow
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parallel paths. Eighteenth-century Piedmont experienced the assertion 
of a strong secular leadership in education earlier and with more 
intensity than in most of Europe. Yet state intervention did not deliver 
growth and the provision remained amongst the lowest in Italy 
throughout the century. As stressed also by Meyer et al. (1979), there is 
something to be gained from keeping processes of bureaucratisation 
and expansion separately, while mapping the growth of state schooling.
I follow the approach indicated by Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990) 
and Breuilly (1995) of treating nationalism as a political ideology, 
whereby the legitimacy of the state is conditional upon it embodying 
the nation, but I push its logic further. In contrast with this approach, 
instead of addressing nationalism in a retrospective fashion, by 
mapping the development of modem nations, I take the perspective of 
the state, through an analysis of the transformations of the meaning of 
political legitimacy and associated institutional developments occurring 
in connection with the transition from absolutism to nation-state. In 
other words, the emphasis is on explaining changes in the mles of the 
game, rather than the identity of the players. By concentrating on the 
ways in which nineteenth-century nationalism is particular, rather than 
the extent to which Italian identity was constructed, I seek to move 
beyond the strictures of the debate between modernism and 
ethnosymbolism. In addition, the discussion is based on how nationalist 
ideology manifested itself in schooling, rather than nationalism in 
general. In focusing on a particular crystallisation of nationalism, I 
attempt to gain in precision what I lose in generality.
The empirical analysis is based upon a single case. This is by no means 
exceptional in works of historical sociology (e.g. Barbagli, 1976; 
Collins, 1979; Elias, 1983), however it is particular. The analysis has 
been restricted to one case in order to allow exploring the particular 
case with greater depth than it is usually the case in historical 
sociology. By doing that, I seek to address critiques moved against
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historical sociology of illegitimately treating interpretations produced 
by historians as facts (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1994). A comparative 
dimension is maintained directly through comparison of Piedmontese 
data with Italian and European data, and indirectly, by discussing 
theoretical arguments emerged from other contexts in relation to 
Piedmontese and Italian evidence.
The particular development of the nation-state in Piedmont, a case little 
explored by the comparative literature, renders it particularly apt to 
comparing the different ideological premises of absolutism and nation­
state and relate them to schooling developments. Piedmont provides 
substantial advantages compared to other better known cases, like 
England and France, where the development of a nation-state was more 
gradual, since it allows drawing sharper contrasts, and thus lends itself 
to a fuller characterisation of the ways in which the nation-state 
introduced an historical rupture. Piedmont, more unambiguously than 
the Italian core, followed the absolutist route to modernity. This aspect 
enhances its comparative value since makes it more representative of 
wider European trends than other Italian regional states. Finally, the 
role of leadership of Piedmont during and in the aftermath of the 
unification of Italy ensures greater continuity across the unification 
divide.
Outline
The thesis is organised as follows. After introducing the reader to the 
case study, Piedmont, in chapter 2, chapter 3 provides a critical 
summary of the main theories informing the research. Chapter 4 
discusses historical sociology and the research method. The two 
following chapters, 5 and 6, analyse the emergence of universal 
schooling and the development of a nationalist school in Piedmont 
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In conclusion, chapter 
7 summarises the main argument and results of the enquiry.
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2. Piedmont
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the setting of the 
research, Piedmont, particularly in relation to the development of the 
nation-state between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. The focus 
is on the comparative position of Piedmont within Europe and Italy in 
particular. The periodisation and scope of the presentation reflect those 
of the analytical chapters, where, while the analysis is focused upon 
Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, early 
modern developments and data from other parts of Italy and Europe are 
discussed as background and comparative material. The next section 
presents geopolitical developments (six maps have been added to the 
text). The following section addresses the growth of the modem state. 
Finally, I look at nationalism. The conclusion summarises the main 
lines of development of the nation-state in Piedmont.
Geopolitics
Literally, Piedmont means ‘at the feet of the mountain’. Piedmont’s 
geopolitical history would be better described as ‘at the feet at the 
volcano’. Living dangerously is the dominant trait of modem 
Piedmont. Between 1560 and 1861, the Principality of Piedmont was 
the core territory of the Savoyard State, Kingdom of Sardinia since 
1720. The present-day flag of Piedmont is modelled after the symbol of 
the Savoy House. Within the volatile climate of modem Italy, Piedmont 
exhibited exceptional political stability. The same dynasty, the Savoy 
House, ruled over Piedmont more or less uninterruptedly between the 
eleventh century and 1945, when a referendum gave birth to the 
Republic of Italy. However, this should not to be taken as meaning that 
Piedmont lived a quiet existence. Surrounded as it was by greater
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powers threatening to spill over the little Savoyard state (and 
occasionally doing so), it is only at the price of carefully planned 
betrayals and shady agreements externally, and a marked 
authoritarianism and militarism domestically, that Piedmont managed 
to maintain its autonomy for so long. In the nineteenth century, 
Piedmont led the military operation leading to the Italian unification.
After a brief discussion of the role of geography in Piedmontese 
political history, I shall present the main territorial changes and 
international relations of the Savoyard State between the fourteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, starting with the early modem period. In 
concluding the section, I briefly touch upon the role of regionalism in 
post-unification Italy, relevant to understanding the context within 
which Italian nation-builders were operating.
The territory of Piedmont owes its compactness to being surrounded by 
mountains. The North-Western Alps mark its boarders with France, 
Switzerland and Aosta. The beginning of the Alpine chain divides 
Piedmont from the Ligurian coastline southwards. The only exception 
to this rule is the Eastern side, where a river, the Ticino, marks the 
separation with Lombardy. Traditionally, the latter was also the most 
volatile frontier of the state.
Being surrounded by mountains helped to imagine the Piedmontese 
lands as a natural administrative unit at an early stage. The territorial 
integration of Piedmont was given a major spur between the end of the 
fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, when Amedeus 
VIII started the process of unification of the Piedmontese dominion of 
the Savoy House into a principality. After 1560, when the capital was 
transferred from Chambery to Turin, Piedmont became increasingly 
identified as the homeland of the ruling dynasty.
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The Alps acted as a hindering factor towards the formation of a unified 
state. The division imposed by the Alps were the main rationale behind 
the administrative organisation of the Savoyard State. The Alps 
separated the Duchy of Savoy, the Duchy of Aosta and the County of 
Nice from the Piedmontese mainland, leading to the construction of 
separate administrative, linguistic and legal communities (other 
territories under Savoyard dominion included Oneglia, a small enclave 
on the Ligurian coast purchased in 1576). Within Piedmont itself, the 
beautiful Alpine valleys around Torre Pellice provided refuge to the 
Valdese Heresy, unique example of a successful Protestant movement 
in the whole of Italy.
Before the unification, the most significant territorial gains for the 
Savoyard State were made at the beginning of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries (the most considerable loss was the territory 
around Geneva in 1536). In 1713, Vittorio Amedeo II was rewarded by 
the Emperor for his help in the war of Spanish succession (which 
Piedmont started with France, against the emperor) with the title of 
King, access to the international system of states almost at an equal 
level with the great powers, and dominion over Sicily and the province 
of Monferrato. The peace of Utrecht gave also the former Spanish 
territories of Lombardy and Naples to the Austrians. Before seven years 
had passed, the presence of the new power was felt by Vittorio Amedeo 
II, who was forced to exchange with Charles VI Sicily for Sardinia, to 
become King of Sardinia (see map 1).
In 1815, after the Congress of Wien, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Savoyard monarchy played a very limited role in ousting Napoleon 
from power (if any), the territory of the kingdom came out significantly 
enlarged from the post-war settlements (see map 2). In the wake of the 
royalist climate of post-Wien Europe, the Republic of Genoa ceased to 
be a sovereign state to be put under the authority of the Savoyard 
monarchy. Other reasons behind the enlargement of the Kingdom of
Sardinia included the attempt to simplify the administrative map of 
Italy, after the Napoleonic model, and the construction of a power 
which could counter the Austrian hegemony over the Italian peninsula 
(direct in Lombardy and Venice, indirect elsewhere).
Between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the Savoy House 
surrendered its sovereignty over Piedmont between the 1530s and 
1559, and between 1796 and 1814. Piedmont was invaded between the 
end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. 
All these events came at the hand of France. For the Savoyard State, 
France was at once an enemy to fear and a model to follow. French 
culture was traditionally very strong in the ‘territories beyond the 
mountains’, but also in the Piedmontese mainland. Until the sixteenth 
century, the dominant culture owed more to French than to Italian 
traditions. French influence remained strong throughout the 
seventeenth century, when, handicapped by the loss of Pinerolo, the 
Savoyard State acted as little more than a French satellite (Symcox, 
1983). The French hold was weakened in the following century, when, 
in Piedmont, a more markedly Italian identity started emerging 
(Ricuperati, 1989a). However, the apex of the French influence was yet 
to come. At the beginning of the nineteenth century (1802), together 
with Liguria and part of Emilia, Piedmont was annexed to the French 
empire, as its 29th division (eastern, central and southern Italy was 
divided in eight separate administrations). Being under the influence of 
France distinguished modem Piedmont from the Italian core, where 
Spain and, from the eighteenth century, Austria were the hegemonic 
powers.
Between the high middle ages and the Renaissance, Piedmont enjoyed 
less autonomy from imperial rule than the Renaissance core. Albeit 
with less intensity than in southern Italy, the Savoyard State was 
Catholic throughout the early modem period, with this aspect becoming 
particularly marked in the counter-reformation period between the
23
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Differently from the Italian core, 
the French influence meant that Gallican traditions were strong, 
particularly in the French speaking areas. Valdese and Jews were 
legally and institutionally discriminated and persecuted (until 1848). In 
the later seventeenth century, in the wake of the French religious wars, 
the Valdese were victim of massacre and enforced conversion at the 
hands of the Savoyard army (Symcox, 1983: ch. 6). The period between 
the seventeenth and, particularly, the eighteenth centuries witnessed the 
intensification of jurisdictional controversies between church and state, 
in the wake of the growth of absolutism. In the eighteenth century, the 
Kingdom of Sardinia experienced intense jurisdictional controversies 
about half a century earlier than the rest of absolutist Italy (Quazza, 
1957; Venturi, 1976). In the immediate aftermath of the Congress of 
Wien, the Kingdom of Sardinia distinguished itself for being 
particularly reactionary with respect to the innovative church/state 
relationship introduced by post-revolutionary France (Woolf, 1979: 
244-5).
In July 1859, the centuries long dynastic aspirations of extending the 
territory of the Savoyard State westwards over the Lombard plains 
finally materialised itself. On the other hand, the acquisition came at a 
price, for the Savoyard State surrendered the provinces of Nice and 
Savoy to France in exchange for its military aid against Austria. The 
conquest of Lombardy marked the beginning of the Italian unification, 
started in 1848 with the failed Savoyard attack on Austria. In the 
months following Lombardy’s conquest, Tuscany and Emilia were 
annexed by referendum. According to one interpretation, the 
government intended to stop the operation then. The south was ‘freed’ 
by Giuseppe Garibaldi, a freedom fighter leader of a voluntary army of 
untrained troops, the ‘one thousand’, as they were called. It was only 
after Garibaldi’s mission (initially opposed, but de facto tolerated by 
the Savoyard government; Garibaldi sailed from Genova, a Savoyard 
port) proved to be unexpectedly successful that the Savoyard monarchy
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seized the opportunity to further expand its dominion over the whole of 
the peninsula. The unification was more or less completed over the 
following decade. Before the end of 1860, Garibaldi surrendered its 
dominions in Southern Italy to the king, Vittorio Emanuele II. The 
regions of Venice and Rome were obtained in 1866 and 1870 (see 
maps 3 and 4). With the exceptions of Trentino Alto Adige, Istria and 
Friuli, added after the First World War (Istria was lost after the 
second), the domestic territory of Italy remains unchanged since 1870.
France was the only state, beside the Savoyard State, directly (with 
troops) contributing to the Italian unification (albeit at times it opposed 
it as well, in 1848 and to defend the papal states in the 1860s). Other 
foreign powers key to the success of the operation included Britain, 
through ‘diplomatic’ support to Garibaldi’s expedition (Britain sent the 
fleet to prevent France from intervening against Garibaldi), and 
Prussia, which, by waging war against Austria and France, rendered 
possible the annexation of Venice and Rome (Venice was an Austrian 
territory, and a French garrison was defending what was left of the 
papal territories). The main opponents of the unification were Austria 
and the Papal State, which both lost territories as a result (Seton- 
Watson, 1967; Woolf, 1979; Hearder, 1983; Duggan, 1994).
Amid a marked centralism, under the sign of a strong Piedmontese 
leadership, and ethnic diversity, the newly bom Italian state struggled 
to assert itself domestically, particularly in the south. These problems, 
for instance, found expression in the 1860-70 ‘war against brigandage’, 
which claimed more victims than the whole of the Risorgimento. 
According to Gramsci’s (1994: 154-8) account, the resistance to the 
process of state formation in post-unification Italy was elaborated and 
objectified with ethnic signifiers. He cites three such instances. First, 
southern autonomism, culminating in the 1920 ultimatum to the union 
of the Sicilian landowners. The latter were claiming that, since Italy 
was a contract between peoples and the terms of the contract had been
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broken, the Sicilian people had the right to recover self-determination. 
Second, the Lombard’s elite threatened to re-constitute the Duchy of 
Milan. Third, positivist sociologists blamed slow development in the 
south on the racial inferiority of its population. Gramsci’s observations 
invite to a reappraisal of Lyttleton’s (1996: 33) assessment that: ‘The 
real problem with Italian regionalism is why there was so little of it. In 
both political and cultural terms, down to 1922, it was a weak and 
declining force’.
The modern state
Going to Piedmont’s capital, Turin, one looks in vain for the narrow 
and tortuous alleys and pompous cathedrals and municipal buildings 
characteristic of the centre of other Italian cities such as Naples, Pisa, 
Rome and Florence. By contrast, Turin is filled with huge squares 
organised in a rigidly geometric fashion, and its symbol is an exhibition 
centre. This is not to say that the city is without its pomposity. Walking 
around the centre of Turin one is struck by the number of statues of 
members of the royal family and heroes of the Risorgimento standing, 
or sometimes riding horses, in a typically haughty posture. Turin’s 
most well known products are the FIAT, the car’s factory, and the 
football team associated to the company, Juventus. Unlike the Italian 
core, it is to nationalism and industrial capitalism, as opposed to the 
Renaissance, that Piedmont traces its golden age. The peripheral role 
played during the Renaissance had a long lasting legacy on the 
development of the modem state in Piedmont, and we shall start this 
section by briefly discussing the main features of the Renaissance state. 
I shall than proceed to map the development of the modem state in 
Piedmont, highlighting its particular features in comparison with 
Europe and Italy.
It is not a coincidence that Machiavelli’s famous study of the 
Renaissance state, The Prince (1995), is usually seen as the first
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example of modem political science. In many respects, the Renaissance 
city can be seen as a precursor in miniature of the modem nation-state. 
The Renaissance city is most famous for being the birthplace of 
modem individualism. However, an increased emphasis on the ethical 
value of man was not the only way in which the Renaissance 
anticipated the nineteenth century. The Renaissance city shared with 
the industrial society an economy based on long-distance trade, 
banking, and the development of rapidly changing proto-industrial 
production techniques (Kindelberger, 1996: ch. 4). In common with the 
bourgeois society, merchants and bankers were exercising significant 
influence in an increasingly dense and meritocratic institutional 
stmcture. As in nineteenth-century Italy, Renaissance cities were led by 
officials elected by a small minority of the male population (albeit by 
the fifteenth century despotism had become the norm). Like nineteenth- 
century nation-states, the Renaissance city celebrated the virtues of the 
patriot and the martyr (Llobera, 2000: 67).
On the other hand, one ought to resist the temptation of assimilating the 
Renaissance state to the modem state. On this, Kirshner (1995: 5) says:
The mlers of the Italian regional states tended to consolidate 
power in their own hands, especially in regard to judicial, fiscal 
and military matters. But this historical pattern ... should not be 
taken to mean that autonomous self-sustaining centralized 
administrative structures came into existence. Indeed, the notion 
of a centralizing state was literally inconceivable, and its use as a 
category of analysis for understanding the Italian regional states 
in this period is best avoided. Nor should these Italian regional 
states be represented by the figure of the sovereign, a juridical 
persona endowed with total control of all the available resources 
in the territory he administered. Nor should they be equated to 
with the monopolistic powers associated with sovereign states of 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which possessed the self­
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defining capacity to determine the legitimate scope of their own 
authority-what German jurists call Kompetenz-Kompetenz.
Moreover, if somewhat paradoxically, as Gramsci (1994: 267) was 
noticing sixty years ago or so, and, more recently stressed by Spruyt 
(1994), the Renaissance city acted as an obstacle to the development of 
the modem state, rather than a favouring factor (see also Anzilotti, 
1981). The failure to win over the countryside and the submitted cities 
prevented the regional states from achieving early territorial 
integration. The result that was that between the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, at the same time as in northern and western 
Europe territorial states were being increasingly successful at asserting 
sovereignty domestically, refeudalisation ensued throughout Italy (even 
though, the actual extent of the process of refeudalisation has recently 
been recently at the centre of historical revisionism). In addition, 
Stumpo (1984) argues, republican traditions hindered the development 
of the administrative state, in that they relied on patrimonialist 
conceptions of mle, thus preventing the assertion of an identification 
between public and state underpinning the process.
In Piedmont alone, where the Renaissance tradition was weak, did the 
development of the modem state follow the typical pattern observed in 
the European core. As predicted by Poggi’s (1978) typical model of 
state development, in Piedmont between the high middle-ages and the 
beginning of the early modem period, a feudal stmcture was gradually 
replaced by a system of estates regulating taxation and military policy 
together with the sovereign. The early modem period saw the 
development of a centralised administrative stmcture under the aegis of 
an absolute ruler, which gave way to a representative system in the 
post-revolutionary period.
A stronger feudal stmcture meant that, differently from the Renaissance 
core, in Piedmont there developed an influential system of estates.
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These were called for the last time in 1560, thereby marking the 
beginning of absolutism, anticipating the rest of the peninsula by two 
centuries. As Anderson (1974: 170) puts it: ‘there alone a rigorous, 
rigid and indigenous absolutism emerged’. In 1642, the dominion of 
the central authority over the feudal lords was sanctioned by the 
institution of the intendant, after the French model. The intendant, 
similarly to a present-day prefect, was entrusted with representing the 
authority of the monarchy in every province of the Savoyard State. A 
single revenue system was developed starting from the second half of 
the seventeenth century. A camera dei conti for Piedmont, alongside 
one for Savoy, was instituted in 1577 (a unified one for the whole of 
the kingdom was in place from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century). However, Symcox (1983: 60) remarks, ‘It is probably fair to 
say that until the reforms of 1717 Victor Amedeus had no exact idea of 
what his revenue totalled, nor of how much money was in the state 
treasury at any given moment’.
The extent to which absolutism progressed in the seventeenth century 
is at the centre of controversy. Stumpo (1979) has influentially 
challenged the traditional view that the seventeenth century was a 
period of refeudalisation. On the contrary, Stumpo argues, the central 
part of the century was a key period for the modernisation of Piedmont, 
marked by an intensification of processes of bourgeoisisation of the 
offices and growth of the state’s administrative intervention in society. 
In any case, there is a wide consensus about the fact that, to use 
Quazza’s (1957: 91-5) words, ‘the problem of the construction of a 
modem centralised state, in its fundamental aspects of personal 
government of the monarchy and bureaucratic regime with prevalence 
of the administrative over the judiciary ... in Piedmont reaches its 
solution with the eighteenth-century reforms’ (see also Symcox, 1983; 
Ricuperati, 1994). In this respect, Piedmont anticipated the rest of 
absolutist Italy (Lombardy, Tuscany, Naples, Modena and Parma) by 
about half a century, placing itself in line with Spain, Pmssia, and
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Austria. Another aspect of Vittorio Amedeo’s reign that we need 
mentioning is the development of an incipient militarism, with which 
Piedmontese culture came to be associated. In 1738 one every 75 
inhabitants was a soldier, the same as in Prussia and more than twice 
than in France in the same year (Barberis, 1988: 141). In addition, from 
the eighteenth century the state began to make regular use of statistics. 
The first full census was carried out in 1734 (Symcox, 1983: 198). 
More generally, in this period, the Savoyard elite started relying on the 
developing human sciences of economics and demography in guiding 
its policies. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 
monarchy started developing a centralised medical and educational 
structure, substituting church and municipalities, traditionally in charge 
of these fields (Roggero, 1981; Ricuperati, 1994; Cosmancini, 1997: 
297). Woolf (1979: 66) argues that the main impetus behind Vittorio 
Amedeo IPs administrative reforms was the war of Spanish succession. 
Amongst the Italian states, in fact, only the Savoyard State had an 
important role during the conflict. Barberis (1988) also stresses how the 
expansion and reform of the army had repercussions on the whole of 
the Piedmontese administrative structure. Other factors accounting for 
Piedmonts particular trajectory of state development within absolutist 
Italy in the eighteenth century include the early transition to absolutism 
(Stumpo, 1984; see also, Symcox, 1983).
Quazza (1957) identifies the beginning of the eighteenth century also 
the turning point towards a bourgeoisisation of the offices of the state. 
Ricuperati (1994) charges that Quazza fails to provide a satisfactory 
definition of bourgeoisie, and that, in the light of new data, the process 
is better viewed as one of amalgam between elements of the third estate 
and traditional nobility, leading to a construction of a more or less 
homogeneous nobility of office, under the sign of a strong 
subordination to the ruler and the state (within Italy, in Piedmont alone 
there developed a strong tradition of nobility of office). Similar 
remarks are made by Roggero (2002: 257-65), who stresses that there
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lacked a sense of distinction in opposition to the aristocracy amongst 
bourgeois functionaries and magistrates in eighteenth-century 
Piedmont. According to Barberis (1988), this started to be the case 
from the later eighteenth century.
A sense of bourgeois identity was developed throughout Italy with 
some force under the French administration, and, especially, under 
Napoleon. ‘In many respects’, Galasso (1981: 207) writes, ’the 
Napoleonic period simply developed the premises of the Jacobin’s 
years. The strengthening and enlargement of the bourgeoisie remain the 
basic theme of class relationships’. On the other hand, a weak 
economy, after the crises of the second half of the eighteenth century 
and the failure to embark on the industrial and agrarian revolution 
between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries (see Malanima, 2002), meant that in Piedmont and, even 
more, in the rest of Italy (particularly in the south), the bourgeoisie 
remained comparatively weak.
With Napoleon, for the first time, the bureaucracy starts to fully acquire 
the modem characteristics of impersonality, specialisation, nation-wide 
standardisation and meritocracy. After an initial retreat, the same 
principles were endorsed by the restoration governments, which sought 
to maintain the efficiency of Napoleon’s ‘administrative monarchy’, 
within the framework of the old order.
As recently shown by Nada and Notario (1993), notwithstanding an 
initial rejection, the maintenance and development of Napoleon’s 
administrative structure became the dominant trait of restoration 
Piedmont from the beginning of the 1820s, and, especially the 1830s 
(that was the general trend in the Italian states of the period; Riall, 
1994). Linguistic and legislative standardisation across the provinces of 
the kingdom, educational expansion, growth of sanitary and poor relief 
measures, including vaccinations and spreading of hygienic norms, and
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the institution of a standing police force incessantly surveilling the 
population were all pursued by the restoration government.
As in the eighteenth century, when the growth of administrative 
absolutism taxed the political and financial resources of the state to its 
limits, in the long run, the attempt to pursue a modernising policy 
remaining within the framework of the old regime proved too much to 
bear. On the one hand, it led to straining the relationship with church 
and aristocracy, attacked in their traditional areas of autonomy. On the 
other, it left unsatisfied the most ambitious reformers. Notwithstanding 
the economic success enjoyed by Piedmont in those years, the 
legitimacy of the absolute state was at an all time low. In 1820-1, like 
the rest of Italy, the Savoyard kingdom saw the explosion of 
insurrectional activities demanding the end of absolute rule. Even if the 
turmoil was defeated, it soon became clear that the French revolution 
had left an indelible mark. The insurrection exploded again in 1833, 
and, by 1848, in connection with yet more turmoil, the king, if 
somewhat reluctantly, gave in.
In 1848, Carlo Alberto issued the Statuto Albertino. The latter was the 
only Italian constitution surviving after 1849, and, with the unification, 
it became the Italian constitution (it remained so until 1948). The 
Subalpin parliament was divided in two chambers, the senate, 
appointed by the king, and the chamber of deputies elected by Italy. 
The intention, codified in the Statuto, of rigidly subordinating the 
Subalpin parliament to the executive and the monarchy was not 
enforced. ‘Particularly after 1852, when ... Cavour became prime 
minister’, Riall (1994: 14) writes, ‘parliament began successfully to 
assert its authority’ (see also Caracciolo, 1960: ch. 3).
The franchise was grounded in property and educational qualification. 
Initially it was very limited, about 2 percent of the male population at 
the time of the unification (1861). The share was expanded to about 7
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percent, to include the lower middle-class and the skilled workers, in 
1882. Universal male suffrage was introduced as late as 1913, to be 
revoked by fascism. Women had to wait until the end of the Second 
World War to start voting.
Although the constitution prescribed Catholic religion as the state 
religion, the formula soon became lettera morta, under the attacks of 
Cavour, the Savoyard’s prime minister in the Risorgimento’s years, in 
the name of ‘free church in a free state’ (Caracciolo, 1960). Secularism 
and anti-clericalism were dominant in Piedmont in the Risorgimento’s 
years and in Italy in the aftermath of the unification. The Church 
maintained an ambivalent position towards Italian nationalism in the 
early phases of the Risorgimento, when an influential sector of the 
nationalist intelligentsia saw the pope as the possible leader of an 
Italian confederation. However, starting from 1848 the official position 
of the pope was one of opposition. Political measures taken by the 
Catholic Church against Italy included failing to recognise Italy and the 
prohibition to participate to Italian political life for Catholics.
Sustained industrial development in Piedmont started from the 1830s 
(Italy as a whole, started catching up with the most industrially 
advanced countries from the end of the nineteenth century). By 1848, 
Bulferetti and Luraghi (1966: 117) claim, ‘the working class was bom 
in Piedmont, the industrial proletariat in the modem sense’. The latter 
movement was spurred by the intervention of Carlo Alberto, who, from 
the 1830s started pursuing a policy of economic liberalism, marked by 
the liberalisation of the export of silk, and infrastructural development. 
The trend intensified in the aftermath of 1848, when Piedmont 
unambiguously embraced a liberal economic policy, and became the 
most dynamic Italian economy. By the time of the unification half of 
the Italian railway was in Piedmont.
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Mann (1993: ch. 11) has shown that the distinctive characteristic of the 
nineteenth-century state compared to the eighteenth-century state is the 
predominance of the civilian scope over the military, rather than merely 
an expansion of size of the state (according to Mann’s measurement, 
actually the state’s size decreased in the course of the nineteenth 
century). At the time of the unification, Italy’s government compared to 
civil society, in monetary terms (budget/GNP), was about the same size 
as in Austria and Great Britain, and slightly lower than in France 
(Mann, 1993: 366-7; De Fort, 1996: 113). Even more markedly than in 
the European core, the Italian state was predominantly civilian. In 1883 
military and navy accounted for a mere 7.7 percent of the total wage 
expenditures. The number of their employees was just over a fourth of 
those employed by the treasury (greatest department) and about one 
half of the ministries of public works and education (Caracciolo, 1960: 
121).
The history of the Italian state has been traditionally described as the 
failure to achieve early state formation, amid the universalism of the 
Church and the territorial disintegration brought about by the 
Renaissance city. The development of the modem state in Piedmont 
confirms a hindering role for the Renaissance city in the development 
of the modem state. On the other hand, the Piedmontese case invites a 
reappraisal of the idea that the Church prevented Italy from achieving 
early state formation, and of the retrospective vision that the unification 
was a pre-condition to jump on the train of European development. 
Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the small size, the 
development of the Savoyard State was remarkably similar to that of 
absolutist Europe (France, Prussia).
Nationalism
Gramsci (1994) commented that a particularity of the Italian 
democratic revolution was that of being carried out by a state,
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Piedmont, rather than a class, as in France. There is little doubt about 
the fact that Piedmont played the outstanding role in the process of 
Italian unification. Indeed, it would not be too far from the truth to state 
that Italy was an extension of the Savoyard dominion. The holy trinity 
of the Italian Risorgimento, Cavour, the stateman, Garibaldi, the 
freedom fighter, and Mazzini, the ideologue, were all bom in Savoyard 
territories (even though most of Garibaldi’s ‘one thousand’ came from 
Brescia, in Lombardy). Piedmont was the only Italian state directly 
involved in the military operation leading to the unification of Italy and 
provided the model for the administrative stmcture of the newly bom 
Italian state, as well as the constitution. Understanding what factors 
made Piedmont the candidate for leading the construction of Italy is the 
first topic for discussion in this section. I will then address the role of 
Italian identity in explaining the unification of Italy.
Davies (1997: 638) calls Piedmont, ‘the unlikely leader of the 
movement for Italian unification’. Little about Piedmont’s history 
anticipates its role as ‘liberator’ of the Italian nation. Notwithstanding 
its long lasting autonomy, the strong influence of France meant that 
Piedmont was no less ‘polluted’ by foreign culture than other areas that 
experienced foreign rule directly. On the contrary, there is a case for 
arguing that Piedmontese culture was more foreign oriented than that of 
the Italian core.
Piedmont’s leadership is at odds with the nationalist idea of the Italian 
nation-state as heir of the Renaissance civilisation. As we have been 
discussing in the previous section, the Renaissance played a limited 
role in Piedmont’s history. When Machiavelli (1995: ch. 26) wrote the 
famous last chapter of The Prince, no doubt, he was not thinking of the 
Savoy Duke as he would free Italy from the ‘barbarians’.
Early state formation and sovereignty meant that a particularly strong 
affiliation to the Tittle patria’ was present in Piedmont. As one
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commentator, the abbot Compagnoni (cited in Ricuperati, 1994: 213), 
put it towards the end of the eighteenth century: ‘I have called the 
Piedmontese a nation and not an Italian tribe, and I believe this 
judgement to be well grounded. They have had for centuries their own 
dynasty and government. The culture, which they have acquired maybe 
later than the other Italians, is all their work’. And, more recently, as 
remarked by Broers (1997: 29): ‘there was, indeed, a deep feeling of 
political nationalism throughout subalpine society under the ancien 
regime, but it was specifically Piedmontese, not Italian in any sense’.
Much has been made of the impact of the French dominion over Italy in 
strengthening a sense of Italian identity, through the institution of the 
Kingdom of Italy and the associated army. Piedmont, however, was 
never part of this administrative unit. The national identity 
institutionalised under the French educational system was Piedmontese 
in the Jacobin years, and French in the Napoleonic ones, never Italian. 
If the French administration contributed to foster a sense of Italian 
identity in Piedmont, this came as a reaction to the imposition of 
French culture (the actual significance of this type of feeling is an 
object of controversy).
One aspect often invoked to explain the Piedmontese leadership was 
the fact that it was the only regional state ruled by a domestic dynasty. 
However, the Italianness of the Savoy House is an invented tradition. 
Their preferred language was French. It is only from the 1830s that the 
Savoy House sought to insert its history within a wider Italian context 
(Nada and Notario, 1993: 250). In the eighteenth century the monarchy 
saw itself as being of Saxon origins (Ricuperati, 1989b). The ethnic 
affiliations of the monarchy were considerably elastic, and the Savoy 
House’s comparative advantage with respect to other potential leaders, 
such as the Bourbons and the Habsburg Lorena, did not lie in a 
particularly deep-rooted Italian identity.
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The only ethnographic variable predicting a stronger nationalist 
movement in Piedmont than elsewhere in the peninsula was 
comparatively high literacy rates (Vigo, 1993: 42). But high literacy is 
a political variable as much as it is an ethnographic one, in that it 
signals advanced capitalism and state formation. The reason why in 
Piedmont Italian nationalism became dominant earlier than elsewhere 
were primarily geopolitical, social, and ideological, not ethnic. 
Piedmont, more than any other Italian state could claim independence 
from Austria, and thus was the obvious candidate to lead a war against 
it. As a corollary to this assertion, Piedmont was the only north-western 
state not under Austrian rule. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
the north-west became the stronghold of the Italian bourgeoisie, not 
least through early industrialisation and nationalism. Italian nationalism 
drew greater support from the middle-class (Gabaccia, 2000: 39) and 
was used as a vehicle to further its interests, not least the 
enfranchisement. Other factors include a good administrative record. 
Thanks to the early transition to liberalism, th e . Savoyard State 
managed to pursue a policy of modernisation more energetically than 
anywhere else, and this factor was key in legitimising the imposition of 
a Piedmontese model in the aftermath of the unification, as well as 
attracting support from the local elite for a union with Piedmont in the 
period leading to it. The early transition to liberalism also accounts for 
why Piedmont attracted the favour of the patriots, in that moderate and 
democratic nationalists alike were united under the banner of 
liberalism. Another crucial aspect was Piedmont’s particular 
relationship with France, the main model of the Italian patriots. This 
factor eased the early assertion of a constitutional monarchy which 
accompanied the rise to dominance of Italian nationalism in Piedmont. 
Summing up, geopolitical (vicinity to France, autonomy from Austria), 
ideological (the early transition to liberalism), and social factors (a 
strong bourgeoisie), not a particularly strong sense of Italianness, 
explain the leadership of Piedmont in the process of Italian unification. 
In short, the modernist argument that nineteenth-century nationalism
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was a political movement, which developed in the wake of the French 
revolution and the assertion of doctrines of popular sovereignty, rather 
than being the product of pre-existing ethnic affiliations, fits the 
Piedmontese case very well.
On the other hand, I am wary of taking the modernist argument too far. 
Gellner’s (1983) theory that nationalism tends to develop around units 
of similar industrial development and in tandem with industrialisation 
suits Italy well enough. Nationalism drew greater support in the north­
west, where industrialisation was comparatively more advanced, and 
the Italian regions shared a peripheral role in the early phases of the 
industrial revolution. In addition, the construction of a unified market 
was one of the main drives behind the unification. As Mittermaier (p. 
39) observed in 1845: ‘The complaints of the class of citizens refer 
principally to the impediments to industry and obstacles to commerce, 
and especially the grave excise duties, which, with the fragmentation of 
Italy in single states, affect negatively the traveller not less than the 
merchant’. And yet Llobera (1996: ch. 5) is correct in stressing that 
economic reductionism fails to account for the shape of national 
identity. Industrialisation was remarkably unevenly spread across 
regions, and patterns of industrialisation, by themselves, were more 
conducive to keeping territorial separations than abolishing them. Italy 
was not a customs league like Germany, and, as shown by Banti (2000: 
20-1), before the unification Italy hardly constituted a market. If it came 
to be seen as one, this has more to do with pre-existing linguistic and 
cultural ties, rather than with the ‘objective’ trajectories of industrial 
capitalism.
There is little doubt that in Italy, even more markedly than in France, 
the emergence of popular nationalism, was the result, rather than the 
cause of nationalism. The strength of the national bond amongst the 
masses at the time of the unification is best represented by the fact that 
the national language, traditionally the most important signifier of
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Italian identity, was intelligible only for a tiny minority of the 
population, with estimates ranging from 0.8% to about 10%, in the 
most conservative cases (Berruto, 1982: 905). These data compare with 
80% in France at the same time (Weber, 1976: 310).
Equally, there is no denying that sectors of the Risorgimento’s 
leadership used nationalism in an instrumental and opportunistic way. 
‘Few people’, Mack Smith (cited in Riall, 2000: 145) remarks, ‘were as 
surprised by Italian unification as Cavour’. Italian identity, as we have 
observed earlier, was hardly stronger in the ruling dynasty. Similar 
remarks can be made about the local elite, which, as we mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, did not hesitate to question Italian identity as a 
basis for state legitimacy, when their interests were at stake.
However, it would be reductive to view Italian identity as an invention 
of the nationalist leadership (see also Llobera, 1996: 63-70; Gabaccia, 
2000). Mettemich’s famous assertion that Italy was merely a 
geographical expression was most certainly off the mark. First, Italy as 
cultural and, at least in some sense, political community had a long 
history. Italy had a name since the classical times, and at various points 
of the low middle ages, it was used to designate kingdoms covering 
parts of its territory. Albeit divisive in the Risorgimento’s years, being 
home to the papacy was a key factor in giving Italy a sense of cultural 
distinction. It was in this spirit that, in 1347, Cola di Rienzo could 
appeal to all the communes of Italy to unite to obtain security and peace 
for Universa sacra italia. Italian was a codified language at least since 
the fourteenth century, when Dante wrote De vulgari eloquentia, to 
defend its usage, and The Divine Comedy to show how this could be 
done to some effect. At the same time, notwithstanding the political 
fragmentation that characterised it, Italy was seen by Petrarca as a 
‘patria’. Henceforth, Italy continued to compete with regional states 
and cities as a locus of primary allegiance. The success enjoyed by 
Renaissance culture contributed to further intensify a sense of cultural
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distinction, marked by Machiavelli’s final chapter of The Prince 
(1513), cited earlier, and Guicciardini’s History o f Italy (1536-40).
Second, as stressed by Mann (1996) and Anderson (2000), before the 
emergence of nationalism, the development of print capitalism and the 
growth of administrative states contributed to the crystallisation of 
modem national identities around notions of the public. Austrian 
administrators called Lombardy with names such as ‘Austrian states of 
Italy’, and Lombard children were taught to speak, write and read in 
Italian in school. In Piedmont, processes of linguistic standardisation of 
the administration gathered momentum starting with the eighteenth 
century and had an important role in precipitating the dominance of 
Italian over French cultural affiliations. Other agents included literary 
societies, accademie, such as the Filopatria and Sampaolina 
(Ricuperati, 1989a). In the eighteenth century there was a widespread 
feeling of Italianness amongst the ‘public’, across the regional states. 
Judging from the titles of eighteenth-century journals, at the time, the 
public felt the affiliation to Italy more strongly than to the regional 
states. Ricuperati (1976: 366-72) lists 119 journals published in Italy in 
the eighteenth century; 14 of them have Italy in the title, against only 9 
mentioning the region. Often eighteenth-century political treatises saw 
Italy as their audience (e.g. Pilati’s (1770) On the reform o f Italy and 
Carli’s ([1787] 1975) New method for the public schools o f Italy). The 
idea that Italy was a public found an influential codification at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century in Muratori’s ([1704], reproduced 
in Carpanetto, 1990: 38-43) First designs o f the literary republic o f  
Italy exposed to the public by Limindo Pritanio, where the Modenese 
abbot imagines the association of all Italian literate public, irrespective 
of their status, in one republic dedicated to the promotion of arts and 
sciences in the peninsula. By the end of the century, one of the most 
influential anti-absolutist treatises, Alfieri’s On tyranny ([1777] 1985), 
saw Italy as the prospective land of freedom, the patria, and did not feel
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the need to explain why his choice fell on Italy rather than Piedmont, 
where he was bom.
The growth of the eighteenth-century administrative state and the 
development of print capitalism and associated institutions, such as 
universities, publishing houses, literary societies and so on led to 
imagine also communities other than Italy. The same literary societies 
promoting the cultivation of Italian language were writing the history 
of Piedmont (Ricuperati, 1989a; 1989b). To Bogino (1966: 360), 
Piedmontese prime minister in the central part of the eighteenth 
century, Sardinia was a ‘nation full honour’. Italian identity represented 
one amongst many possible choices to direct the nationalist stmggle. 
As Galasso (cited in Llobera, 1996: 69) puts it, ‘there is nothing in 
Italian history that predestined the different republics to become a 
state’. Nevertheless, state formation and print capitalism, as well as a 
tradition of Italian patriotism, were key in providing the backdrop 
against which nineteenth-century nationalist ideologues, such as 
Mazzini, developed their theories about who was eligible for 
‘peoplehood’ and state builders, like Cavour, constructed their 
strategies of action.
To conclude this section, we can share Breuilly’s (1995: ch. 4) 
assessment that pre-existing ethnic feelings were not particularly 
important in explaining the unification of Italy only with some 
qualifications. A marked leadership of Piedmont was the result of 
ideological, social and geopolitical factors more than being the 
expression of stronger ethnic feelings than elsewhere in the peninsula. 
Equally, there is no denying that before the unification Italian identity 
was the domain of a few and that the emergence of popular nationalism 
was the result, not the cause of nationalism. On the other hand, Italian 
nationalists were successful at mobilising the public and the state 
against the old order also because they could rely on pre-existing ties of 
language and loyalty, and the ‘people’ and ‘the market’ came to be
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identified with Italy also because nationalist ideologues, state-builders 
and capitalists built upon a tradition of Italian patriotism, dating back at 
least to the high middle-ages, not simply out of sheer imagination and 
power.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have been presenting the development of the nation­
state in Piedmont. Modem Piedmont, homeland of the Savoy House 
between 1560 and 1861, exhibited remarkable political stability over 
the modem period, notwithstanding the small size and high dependence 
from its more powerful neighbours, particularly France. A peripheral 
role in the Renaissance meant that the development of the modem state 
in Piedmont departed from that of the Italian core and followed a path 
more similar to that of absolutist Europe (France, Pmssia). In the 
nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Sardinia was the first Italian state 
to become a constitutional monarchy. A marked leadership of the 
Kingdom of Sardinia in the process of Italian unification is more 
directly associated to geopolitical, ideological and social factors than to 
ethnographic variables. In Italy, popular nationalism, more evidently 
than in France, was the result, not the cause of nationalism. 
Nevertheless, the presence of pre-existing ties of loyalty and language, 
dating back at least to the high middle ages, was a key factor in shaping 
the process of unification of Italy.
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3. Theories of nationalism and schooling
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to summarise the main theoretical positions 
informing the empirical analysis. I mainly draw from the historical 
sociologies of nationalism and schooling. The question of nationalism 
often appears in works on the rise of state schooling systems, and the 
growth of schooling is routinely discussed in studies of nationalism, 
even though its importance tends to be restricted to its role in processes 
of nation-building. On the other hand, the level of interchange between 
these two bodies of literature remains limited. What follows compares 
the two perspectives.
The most well-known argument linking nationalism and nineteenth- 
century educational developments is that state schooling was 
instrumental to the construction of the nation. Accordingly, I start by 
discussing theories explaining the growth of state systems of education 
with reference to processes of nation-building. Alongside this 
perspective, the historical sociologies of nationalism and schooling 
have produced the position that state and schooling became nationalist 
as a result of ideological tensions brought about by the growth of the 
(educating) state. The third section covers theories associating the rise 
of nationalist ideology and the nationalist school to the emergence of 
state schooling systems organised along class lines. The following 
section discusses works relating the growth of the modem state, the 
emergence of modem conceptions of society and nationalist ideology. 
The final section discusses how Foucault’s work on bio-power can help 
us moving beyond some of the limitations of the historical sociology of 
schooling, and refine our understanding of the relationship between the 
growth of the modem state and nationalist ideology. In conclusion, I
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summarise the main issues emerging from the discussion, and locate 
the present research within the debate.
Schooling and nation-building
From the 1970s, various studies (e.g. Mosse 1975; Weber 1976; 
Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1994, 2000) have stressed 
that the concept of the nation as a community sharing common 
symbols, rituals, language and body cannot be meaningfully be applied 
to early nineteenth-century European societies, where national identity 
was the domain of a few. As it is routinely stressed in both historical 
and sociological literature on nationalism (e.g. Weber, 1976: ch. 5; 
Soldani and Turi, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1994: 91-2; Calhoun, 1997: 79- 
81; Green, 2001: ch.: 5), schooling was one of the basic sites where the 
masses of peasants made their encounter with the national language and 
culture with which they eventually learned to identify.
It is a short step from here to viewing the spread of schooling as being 
motivated by the need to ‘create’ homogeneous nations. This idea has 
been developed within traditions as diverse as American neo­
institutionalism, and British and French post-Marxism.
The position that schooling expansion and state intervention in 
education are a direct consequence of the need to forge nations is 
advanced in its most explicit form by Balibar (1991b). According to 
him, the legitimacy of modem nation-states implicitly relies upon the 
idea that there is an extra-political ethnic community of which the state 
represents an extension (no matter how civic nation-states claim to be). 
In addition, Balibar argues, ethnic identities are based upon arbitrary 
markers and are essentially fictive. As a consequence, they need to be 
‘created’ and maintained artificially.
Following Althusser (1972), Balibar identifies schools and families as 
the principal institutional sites assisting the process of maintenance and
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diffusion of the dominant ideology in capitalist societies. Differently 
from his mentor, however, for Balibar the main purpose of ‘the 
ideological state apparatus’ is not to reproduce the class structure, but 
to construct the national community. The ‘contemporary importance of 
schooling and the family unit’, Balibar (1991b: 102) writes, derives 
‘from the fact that they subordinate [the] reproduction [of labour 
power] to the constitution of a fictive ethnicity’.
Ever since Naim (1977) said that understanding nationalism constitutes 
the greatest failure of Marxism, few fail to notice Marxism’s problems 
with explaining the phenomenon (e.g. Halsey et al., 1997; Llobera, 
1996: ch. 3; Anderson, 2000: 3-4). Balibar (1991b: 89-90) addresses 
the difficulties Marxist theory has had with deriving nationalism from 
capitalism by endorsing the world system perspective (after Braudel 
and Wallerstein), and assumes that whereas the nation constitutes a 
form of bourgeois hegemony, it is not the only possible one. In 
addition, Balibar (1991b: 90) avoids the pitfalls of vulgar Marxism of 
granting the hegemonic subject unconditioned creative power of 
agency1 by framing himself in the tradition of structural Marxism (e.g. 
Poulantzas, 1978) and postulating that nation-states and bourgeoisie 
shaped one another in a process without a subject.
Balibar’s idea of viewing nationalism as a discursive formation has 
been influential in shaping the research agenda of nationalism studies 
in recent years (e.g. Duara, 1995: 15; Calhoun, 1997: 22-3; Ozkirimli, 
2003: 341). On the other hand, it is less clear whether Balibar is able to 
counter the charge, advanced, amongst others, by Breuilly (1993: ch. 1) 
and Llobera (1996: ch. 5), that nationalism was used to further the 
interests of diverse classes , and thus it makes little sense to view 
nationalism as a bourgeois ideology. More directly relevant to our 
present concerns, Balibar’s definition of fictive ethnicity remains 
problematic.
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As also stressed by himself (1991b: 93), any kind of social identity is 
imagined, and, therefore, in some sense ‘fictive’. The opposition 
between the ‘fiction’ of homogeneous trans-historical national 
communities and the ‘reality’ of class divided societies with no 
essential link to their ancestors is unsatisfactory. As stressed by Smaje 
(2000: 72-3), nations are not the arbitrary creation of the elite. While 
nationalism might rely on ‘invented traditions’ and the like, the context 
giving rise to these creations is real, and there is a need to attend at the 
particular features of the context, when accounting for the emergence 
of determinate ideological patterns (see also Calhoun 1997: 22-3; 
Anderson, 2000: 6).
In addition, the reliance of the state on mythical narratives to legitimise 
itself is an enduring feature of Western political trajectories, rather than 
being a peculiar feature of the age of nationalism. Retrospectively, the 
model of political legitimacy that nationalism replaced, divine right and 
law of descent, is grounded upon postulates which reality is at least as 
questionable as that of modem nations. Nations need to be ‘created’ as 
much as any other legitimising subject, and there is a need for 
specifying otherwise what is about the nation form which informs the 
emergence of state systems of education.
Finally, Balibar’s argument that state schooling is a consequence of 
national sovereignty is somewhat at odds with eighteenth-century 
educational developments, when reforms anticipating the nineteenth 
century were passed in absolutist states (cf.. Raeff, 1975: 1232-3; 
Green, 1992), such as Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Naples, and not in 
constitutional monarchies like England and Holland (cf. De Swaan, 
1988: 99-103), where, arguably, ideas of national sovereignty were 
more influential (Greenfeld, 1994: 14; Llobera, 1996: 220). An 
alternative explanation linking schooling to processes of nation- 
building without relying on the manufactured nature of nations is that 
advanced by neo-institutionalists.
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Neo-institutionalists (Meyer et al., 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987a, 
1987b, Meyer et al., 1991) draw from Bendix’s work on nation- 
building and world system theory to question the ideas that the growth 
of state systems of education correspond to changes in underlying 
technologies of production and distribution of resources. By looking at 
twentieth-century patterns of global educational expansion and modem 
developments in Western countries, they show that the emergence of 
national systems of education, when looked at from a comparative 
perspective, appears to be correlated with ideological changes much 
more closely than with either technological innovations or particular 
structures of interests.
In the course of the twentieth century, Boli and Ramirez (1987a) and 
Meyer et al. (1991) claim, state schooling has spread with remarkably 
low degrees of variation, with respect to both organisational stmcture 
and curricular practice, across countries with the most diverse socio­
economic conditions. In nineteenth-century America, Meyer et al. 
(1979) show, schooling expanded across both industrial and rural areas, 
suggesting that nation-building was a more important factor than the 
requirements of production in explaining the phenomenon . Finally, in 
early modem Europe, Boli and Ramirez (1987b: 192) stress, state 
schooling developed earlier in comparatively backward countries, such 
as Denmark, Sweden and Pmssia, casting doubts on theories reducing 
state intervention in education to the demands of the industrial society 
(either disciplinary (e.g. Thompson, 1967) or functional (e.g. Schultz, 
1977)).
According to Boli and Ramirez (1987a, 1987b), patterns of educational 
institutionalisation between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries are 
chiefly explained by modem conceptions of the individual and the 
state, which, with the global expansion of the nation-state form, came 
to involve virtually every human society. Processes of educational
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institutionalisation and govemmentalisation, they claim, result from the 
combined effects of individualism and statism, where the former refers 
to the idea that the individual constitutes the essential unit of ethical, 
religious and legal value, and the latter is defined as the ideology 
whereby ‘the constitution and the relative standing of the state is of 
great concern to all the elements of the nation’ (1987b: 195).
Individualism, Boli and Ramirez (1987a; 1987a: 192-7) argue, altered 
the material and social conception of the individual and demands that 
individuals are provided with the means to cultivate their self­
development. Statism implies that the formation of individuals ought to 
be directed towards the empowerment and integration of the 
association. For Boli and Ramirez (1987b: 193-5), these two 
ideological forces started informing European ontology with the 
Reformation and ‘reached a high degree of maturity by the end of the 
eighteenth century’, to find their full expression around nationalist 
ideology and modem conceptions of citizenship from the nineteenth 
century onwards. As a particular important factor in explaining the 
assertion of a statist model, Boli and Ramirez (1987b: 195-6) single out 
the presence of a crises of national integrity, whereby military events or 
economic decline lead societies to believe that ‘a fall to a lower status 
is imminent ... or that ascendancy to a higher status is about to be 
thwarted’.
Neo-institutionalists offer an original and interesting perspective to the 
question of explaining the growth of state schooling, and it is to their 
credit to have stressed the importance of nationalist ideology in shaping 
dominant forms of education at a time when the constructed nature of 
nations was yet to be adequately explored. However, some of their 
positions are not without problems. By their own admission, Boli and 
Ramirez (1987a: 192-3) attempt to construct a tentative explanation, 
rather than a fully-fledged theory, and it would be unfair to be
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excessively critical. Nevertheless, in the interest of future research, it is 
worth pointing out areas for improvement.
Smelser (1991: 360) contests the claim that nation-building and 
citizenship were important in explaining the expansion of popular 
schooling in the early nineteenth century on the grounds that the British 
elite was aiming at forging loyal subject, rather than conscious citizens. 
Personally, I would resist the temptation to draw such sharp contrasts 
between conceptions of subject-hood and citizenship at the time, and 
think that the main weaknesses of the argument lie elsewhere.
At the conceptual level, granting primacy to the ideological structure is 
an arbitrary operation and a multi-causal explanation would be apt. As 
Balibar’s (1991b: 89) shows, the conflictualist and world system 
perspective are not as incompatible as neo-institutionalists maintain. 
Similarly, Gellner (1983) indicates that industrialisation and 
nationalism do not necessarily need to be treated as separated 
phenomena.
At the empirical level, there are reasons to doubt that some of the links 
between individualism and state schooling adduced by Boli and 
Ramirez are, in fact, accurate. Green (1992: ch. 6, 1997: 57-61) and 
Morefield (2002) emphasise the extent to which the force of 
individualist traditions in England acted as an obstacle to the 
development of state education, rather than a favouring factor. At the 
very least, Boli and Ramirez argument on the effects of individualism 
upon educational developments need some qualifications.
Furthermore, Boli and Ramirez’s discussion of what leads societies to 
embark on a individualist and statist model is less than convincing, and 
ultimately they rely on teleology (the ‘coming to maturity of the ideas’). 
As an explanation for the assertion of statist ideology and subsequent
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state intervention in education, the concept of crisis of national 
integrity is weak in a number of respects.
A crisis of national integrity presupposes that the destinies of the nation 
are felt to be intrinsically linked to those of each individual member, to 
the effect that the definition of statist ideology is coterminous with its 
conditions of emergence. Their interpretation belies a presentist 
reading, in that societies are assumed to be capable of foreseeing their 
imminent decline or progress, and to be aware that greater 
govemmentalisation of education will lead to greater national welfare. 
Neither assumption is tenable, especially in view of the fact that the 
nineteenth century was when the principle found its first wide 
applications. If authoritarianism is a common trait of societies in crises, 
directing it towards schooling is a peculiarly modem phenomenon, and 
their characterisation of national crises is too vague to be useful.
Significant developments towards educational govemmentalisation also 
occurred in the absence of such conditions, as for instance it is the case 
with eighteenth century educational reforms, which, on the contrary, 
can be seen as being favoured from a period of prolonged peace. In the 
last instance, defeat and famine have a history long predating that of 
either nationalism or state education. In all likeness they will outlive 
them4.
More generally, neo-institutionalists tend to concentrate excessively on 
similarities across societies to the effect of failing to account for 
important differences. As highlighted by Archer and Vaughan (1971), 
Archer (1979), Smelser (1990, 1991) and Green (1992, 1997), 
nineteenth-century educational developments were remarkably 
unevenly spread. And, as stressed by Green (1992, 1997: chs. 3, 5), so 
were nation-building and individualist ideology.
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Green (1992, 1997: ch. 2) claims that the main variable accounting for 
the uneven educational development in Western countries between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the process of state formation. 
For Green, the emergence of state systems of education is to be 
understood as part of the wider process of institutionalisation of 
civilian life and the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus5 which 
accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie to hegemony. The fact that 
different countries experienced state formation differently implied that 
national systems of education grew unevenly.
In addition, Green (1992: 36-48, 1997) argues, variations cannot be 
derived in any easy way from the underlying socio-economic 
conditions, and consideration of military and political discipline were 
more important than the needs of the economy in explaining early 
educational developments. In England, for instance, the idea that the 
state is responsible for providing schooling struggled to assert itself 
significantly more than in continental Europe, notwithstanding the fact 
that it was the first country to industrialise. Green (1992: 74-5) also 
rejects Archer’s (1979) idea that the English particular development of 
state education is accounted for by the late enfranchisement of the 
bourgeoisie on the grounds that even after the middle-class was 
enfranchised the level of political intervention remained comparatively 
low.
To overcome this impasse without departing from a Marxist 
framework, Green (1992: 90-9) follows Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, 
and argues that pre-existing political traditions shape the process of 
change independently of socio-economic variables. There are here 
some similarities with Archer’s (1979) assumption that cross-cutting 
ideological ties might lead actors to act in a non-rational way. 
However, whereas for Archer (1979) this factor contributed to the 
delayed development of state education in England because the issue of 
secular education divided the English middle and working classes,
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Green (1992: 211) down-plays the importance religious sectionalism. 
Neither denominational competition was peculiarly English, Green 
argues, nor changing inter-denominational and state-church 
relationships can account for the English particular development in the 
intervening period. Instead, Green (1992: ch. 6; 1997: chs. 3, 5) claims 
that political intervention in education in nineteenth-century England 
remained at comparatively low levels because of two reasons6.
First, early national formation. Following the perspective that in 
England national identity developed earlier than in continental Europe 
(e.g. Colley, 1992; Greenfeld, 1994: ch. 1; Hastings, 1997: ch. 2), 
Green (1992: 241-2; 1997: 95) argues that this factor implied that the 
English state lacked one of the main reasons leading to educational 
developments elsewhere.
Second, liberal traditions were particularly entrenched in English 
society. The legacy of the seventeenth century anti-absolutist struggle, 
Green (1992: ch. 6, 1997: 57-61) maintains, implied that Lockean 
individualism and laissez faire liberalism were particularly strong in 
eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries England, and this factor prevented 
the early assertion of a statist model of development.
Green is somewhat imprecise when he associates Lockean 
individualism to laissez faire capitalism. As argued by chapter five, 
these two doctrines informed a different type of critique to state 
schooling systems, and had different effects upon schooling 
developments. But he is quite right in emphasising that state education 
is a difficult question for liberalism. In addition, the tradition of 
comparing England to France, where in the eighteenth century 
legislative intervention in education was considerably more timid than 
in Prussia, Austria-Hungary or absolutist Italy, has tended to obscure 
the fact that post-revolutionary England is quite distinctive in its lack of 
state schooling, and it is to Green’s credit to stress this fact. Equally,
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while I do not necessarily agree with Green’s assessment that economic 
factors were less important in the early phases of schooling expansion, 
I share Green’s view that the particular trajectories of state formation 
were an important factor in accounting for the uneven development of 
state schooling in nineteenth-century Europe, as chapter five shows in 
relation to Piedmont.
On the other hand, for all his comparative insight, Green essentialises 
state formation, thereby falling short of accounting for the transition 
from a type of state formation relying on the limitation of the access of 
the populace to schooling, to one whereby state formation is achieved 
through schooling expansion. As stressed also by himself the early 
phases of schooling expansion were centred in the Germanic states, 
rather than France and England, where, arguably, the middle-class was 
more influential. Hence, explaining the emergence of universal 
schooling in terms of the rise of the bourgeois state falls short of 
providing a satisfactory answer.
In addition, given the emphasis Green puts on liberal ideology in 
explaining the slow development of the state schooling system in 
nineteenth-century England, Green’s analysis would benefit from a 
fuller treatment of the reasons why liberalism acted as an obstacle 
towards the development of state schooling systems there, but it had an 
opposite effect in continental Europe, where the pace of governmental 
penetration in education greatly accelerated as the transition from 
absolutist to liberal forms of constitutional structure took place (Archer 
and Vaughan, 1971: 117-30; Green, 1992: 130-2). Finally, Green 
exaggerates the peculiarity of English schooling developments, by 
neglecting that liberal opposition to state schooling systems was found 
also in continental Europe, and taking a somewhat one-sided view on 
the comparatively low levels of schooling diffusion in nineteenth- 
century England. Other sources depict a different scenario (see West, 
1964; Laquer, 1976; Smelser, 1991).
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Nationalism, state schooling and the class society
As well as witnessing the rise of state systems of education and 
nationalism, the nineteenth century saw Europe turning its back on the 
traditions of the ancien regime. This movement involved the 
transformation from a society of estates, particularistic, organised 
hierarchically around markers of blood, to a society of classes, lateral 
and formally egalitarian and meritocratic. The ways in which this 
transition is linked to the growth of state schooling and nationalism is 
discussed by Archer and Vaughan (1971) and Gellner (1983).
These two works start from opposite theoretical standpoints on what
n
factors are responsible for the growth of state systems of education . 
Gellner (1983) considers state schooling as being a functional 
requirement of industrial societies. Archer and Vaughan (1971) 
emphasise the conflictual dimension, by stressing the impact of 
industrialisation and extension of the franchise on underlying structures 
of power.
On the other hand, there are substantial similarities in the way they link 
nationalism to the need to legitimise the transition from ancien regime 
to modem forms of educational provision. Discussing these parallels in 
the light of on-going debates on nationalism is the objective of this 
section.
Archer and Vaughan (1971) claim that nationalism was an important 
ideological weapon employed by French bourgeoisie to legitimise their 
bid to assert their dominion over schooling between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries against church and religious orders. According to 
their account, the blueprint of the nationalist school was originally 
conceived in the 1760s as part of the mounting stmggle of the French 
parliamentarians against the Jesuit monopoly on secondary education8.
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The parliamentarians did not rely on national sovereignty and framed 
themselves in the Gallican tradition of divine right. On the other hand, 
they anticipated nationalist ways of conceiving of education in terms of 
curriculum, institutional boundaries and ideology.
Parliamentarians demanded revisions of the curriculum involving the 
teaching of the mother tongue in place of Latin and the history of 
French kings instead of that of antiquity, and the introduction of 
subjects like national literature and regional geography (Archer and 
Vaughan, 1971: 156). They emphasised the importance of citizenship 
in defining the boundaries of the educational community and directing 
the ends of schooling (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 151-5). In defending 
the right of the state in the field, La Chatolois identifies in the nation 
the sole legitimate educating subject9.
The plan of the parliamentarians, Archer and Vaughan (1971: 135-6) 
say, were not implemented after the Jesuits were expelled and 
schooling remained under the direction of religious orders, albeit 
different ones, until the end of the century. Nationalism did not loom 
large in the educational imagination of revolutionary France either, for 
the emphasis was on individual rights and secularism was the 
predominant theme (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 188-9). It is only with 
Napoleon’s seizure of power that nationalist narratives became 
important in shaping the process of secularisation of post-primary 
education (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 180-1).
For Archer and Vaughan (1971: 151-9) the blueprint of the 
parliamentarians proved an attractive strategy for the French middle- 
class because of four main reasons. First, it stressed state leadership. 
This principle was used both against the church and individual 
freedom. Second, it informed a modernisation of the curriculum and 
pedagogical methods by identifying the end of education with 
maximising the power of the state in accordance with reason and
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secular ethics, as opposed to out-worldly salvation. Third, it promoted 
particularistic identities against the universalistic pretensions of the 
church. Fourth, it advocated the replacement of an education organised 
in orders with one defined along class lines.
All but the last involve processes of secularisation of the apparatus. On 
the other hand, their discussion of the transition from revolutionary to 
Napoleonic France indicates that they believe that secularism did not 
necessarily need to rely on nationalism (it was only at the moment 
etatism became important that nationalism started being influential). 
Neither, they argue that nationalism is always anti-clerical, as their 
discussion of England shows10 (1971: 92, 107-116).
According to Archer and Vaughan, in early nineteenth-century 
England, nationalism was a conservative ideology, employed by the 
Anglican Church to further its dominion in education and promote 
identity between religious morality and secular philosophy. In other 
words, in England, in sharp contrast to France, nationalism was 
opposed to processes of secularisation. There are, on the other hand, 
points of contact, in that English nationalism was anti-aristocratic and 
egalitarian and stressed the importance of inculcating a common 
morality through education for citizenship. Moreover, English 
nationalists like Arnold, in common with their French counterparts, 
advocated a proactive role for the government (as opposed to private 
associations and individuals) in the organisation and provision of 
schooling, in order to implement a standardised system. This 
requirement did not clash with the Anglican Church prerogatives in the 
field, for Arnold envisaged an identity between state and church.
It would be most certainly inappropriate to treat Archer and Vaughan’s 
account as a theory of nationalism. Archer and Vaughan’s interest lies 
primarily on explaining patterns of educational institutionalisation, 
rather than the emergence of particular ideological forces. And in a
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later rejoinder, where Archer (1979) expands the temporal and 
geographical scope of the analysis, the study of ideology is granted 
much less attention.
On the other hand, Archer and Vaughan’s reflections on the 
relationship between nationalism and education in England and France 
anticipate later developments in the historical sociology of nationalism 
in a number of ways. For instance, the presence of substantial analogies 
between English Anglicanism and nationalist ideology is one of the few 
points which meets general agreement in an otherwise very divided 
field (e.g. see Greenfeld, 1994: ch. 1; Llobera, 1996: 135-7; Gellner, 
1997: ch. 12; Calhoun, 1997: 72-3). Similarities between nationalist 
ideology and Gallicanism in eighteenth-century France have been 
detected by Greenfeld (1994: 109-13) and Llobera (1996: 138-9). The 
most striking parallels, however, are with Gellner (1983).
Gellner’s theory of nationalism is well-known and a short summary 
will suffice here. The organisation of culture in industrial societies, 
Gellner (1983: esp. ch. 2, 3) argues, differs sharply from that of 
agrarian societies, where the dominant model predicted a universal high 
culture centred upon the clergy and Latin, and a patch-work of more or 
less isolated context-based linguistic communities at the bottom. In 
addition, Gellner argues, agrarian societies rely on a rigidly stratified 
social order. By contrast, a functional requirement of industrial 
societies is to foster occupational mobility and endow individuals with 
the capacity for long-distance, impersonal communication. The 
consequence being that state systems of education promoting universal 
literacy and a common, egalitarian culture must be put in place. A 
corollary of this transformation is the assertion of the principle of 
identity between state and culture, underlying the rise of nationalist 
ideology.
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Gellner, like Archer and Vaughan, argues that nationalism is 
organically related to an educational system aimed at the production of 
a society of classes (albeit Archer and Vaughan, more than Gellner, 
stress the inegalitarian implications of such a principle), a role of 
leadership for the state in educational organisation and provision, and 
the promotion of particularistic and categorical identities around 
notions of citizenship.
On the other hand, one important difference between Archer and 
Vaughan and Gellner is that the former emphasise, in a way that 
Gellner does not, how nationalism in both nineteenth-century France 
and England was used to further the prerogatives of the state in 
education against private individuals, even more directly than against 
the church.
Gellner’s theory of nationalism has been widely criticised for being 
reductionist and functionalist (e.g. Calhoun, 1997: 80; Tambini, 2000: 
140-1). Archer and Vaughan (1971), Archer (1979), Neo­
institutionalists (Meyer et al., 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987a, 1987b, 
Meyer et al., 1991), and Green (1992, 1997) highlight how Gellner’s 
argument that state systems of education are a by-product of 
industrialisation involves similar problems. On their part, it less than 
clear whether Archer and Vaughan’s Weberian approach manage to
i i  1
avoid reification of the bourgeoisie and other actors , and, 
ultimately, they rely on instrumentalism in explaining the emergence of 
determinate institutional and ideological patterns.
On the other hand, Archer and Vaughan and Gellner’s argument that 
nationalism is fed by the rise of the egalitarian state continue to 
command wide influence. The fact that nationalism is grounded upon 
particularistic identities around the state emerging in opposition to the 
universalism of the church is emphasised also by Anderson (2000: 14- 
9) (see also Chabod, 1962: 3-4; Smith, 1991: 17-8; Llobera, 1996:
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221). And this is one of the most important reasons why, Rokkan 
(1999: 144) adds, processes of nation-building were delayed where the 
lack of Protestant movements and geographical proximity to Rome 
prevented an early crystallisation of particularistic identities.
However, the extent to which particularistic identities are a peculiarly 
modem phenomenon and Catholicism and universalism constitute an 
obstacle to the assertion of national identity is a matter for contention. 
For instance, Spruyt (1994: 55) agrees that the universalistic project of 
church and empire belongs to a different type of political imagination 
from the sovereign state. On the other hand, Spruyt (1994: ch. 7, 172-8) 
and Llobera (1996: 67) invite to a reappraisal of the force of Rokkan’s 
argument, by highlighting how in Italy particularistic identities 
developed in the high middle-ages around the free-cities. More 
generally, the recent trend in nationalism studies is to down-play the 
Catholic/Protestant distinction, and emphasise how in early modem 
period Catholic states started organising themselves along national 
lines too (Greenfeld, 1994: 51-4, Armstrong, cited in Llobera, 1996: 
134; Llobera, 1996: ch. 6). At a more radical level, the very opposition 
between universalism and particularism has recently being questioned 
by scholars such as Chatterjee (1993: ch. 11), Duara (1995: 8-9), 
Calhoun (1997: 19-20, ch. 6) and Balibar (1991a: 54-64), stressing 
discursive affinities between the universalistic project of modernity and 
nationalist ideology, which takes us to egalitarianism.
The fact that nationalism is based upon egalitarian and categorical 
identities around (or against) the state is stressed by Balibar (1991a: 54- 
64, 1991b: 100-1), Calhoun (1997: 42-8) and Anderson (2000: 15, 19). 
Smith (1991: 166) also emphasises the importance of the assertion of 
lateral identities in explaining nationalism. According to Greenfeld 
(1994), the single most important factor behind the rise of nationalist 
ideology is the identity crises brought about by the break-up of the 
society of orders and the rise of egalitarianism. The extent to which
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egalitarianism and categorical identities are modem, and nationalism is 
a by-product of egalitarian ideology, however, remains unsettled.
With respect to the latter question, at one side of the spectrum we have
those like Viroli (2000) and Greenfeld (1994), who stress differences
between ethnic and civic ways of imagining the nation, thereby
questioning the fact that egalitarianism is responsible for ethno- 
1 ^nationalism . From the opposite perspective Kapferer (1988) and 
Smaje (2000: 159) argue that ethno-nationalism is associated to 
tensions embedded into egalitarian ideology, particularly with respect 
to the relationship between individual and state sovereignty (see also 
Balibar, 1991a; Chatterjee, 1993: 227-34).
As for the putative modernity of categorical identities around the state, 
the opposition between traditional geimenschaft and modem 
gesselschaft upon which the concept rests has recently underwent 
severe criticisms. Smaje (2000: ch. 3), for instance, argues that the idea 
that sovereignty is essentially singular has been characterising Western 
political thought since the low middle-ages, and stresses how the 
eclipse of more particularistic status-based identities was already 
under-way from the high middle ages (after Habermas). More 
generally, the recent tendency in the historical sociology of the state 
(e.g. Spruyt, 1994; Rokkan, 1999), has been that of viewing the process 
of standardisation of legal and behavioural norms around the state as 
the precipitate of centuries long processes, rather than being strongly 
associated with the industrial order of things, thus vitiating too sharp 
distinctions between traditional and modem identities. This perspective 
would suggest that egalitarianism by itself falls short for accounting for 
the specificity of nineteenth-century nationalism.
The idea that nationalism is to be explained with reference to the 
impact the growth of the modem state on changing conceptions of 
political legitimacy, on the other hand, is shared by virtually all major
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works on nationalism published in recent years. It is to this perspective 
that we now turn.
Nationalism, state and society
This section focuses on Breuilly (1995) and Calhoun (1997). Education 
is not particularly important in either Breuilly’s (1995) or Calhoun’s 
(1997) discussions of nationalism. Breuilly does not touch the topic. 
Calhoun (1997: 68, 79-81) limits himself to stressing how the growth 
of schooling contributed to the formation of national identities both 
before (by favouring linguistic standardisation) and during the age of 
nationalism (when education was used to further processes of national 
integration). On the other hand, both these works attend at the interplay 
between the growth of the administrative capacity of the modem state 
and changing ideas of political legitimacy, and link the process to the 
rise of nationalism.
The expansion of the bureaucracy and the concomitant intensification 
of political intervention in the daily lives of subjects under absolutism, 
Breuilly (1993: 55, chs. 3, 18) argues, led to a revision of the dominant 
coordinates of political legitimacy. Somewhat paradoxically, at the 
same time as the crown was becoming a closer presence, societies 
started to imagine themselves as essentially different from the mler. 
This transformation introduced substantial innovations with respect to 
the traditional government and subjects distinction, in that it conceived 
of society as possessing an extra-political identity, to the implication 
that the legitimacy of state policies started to be measured against this 
subject.
For Breuilly, much of the success of nationalism in the intervening 
period is to be explained by the problem of giving content to this 
conceptual scheme, the promise of nationalism being that of
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transcending the separation between state and society. The nationalist 
idea took a while before taking over, though.
For instance, in France, Breuilly (1993: 88-91) argues, absolute kings 
were neither judged nor did they rely on nationalist arguments in 
legitimising the process of state formation. Until well into the 
eighteenth century, rulers continued to justify their actions with the 
traditional principles of divine and monarchical right, and insofar as the 
nation was mentioned, it was represented as a set of political 
arrangements14. However, in the course of the eighteenth century, the 
attempt and the subsequent failure to upset the traditional institutional 
structure on the part of the crown opened the way for the nationalist 
idea to assert itself.
On the one hand, the difficulties led the monarchy to rely ever more 
heavily on its image of distance from the sectional interests of society, 
as codified in the literature on enlightened despotism. On the other, the 
resistance organised itself around the discourse of the historical 
liberties of the nation. This double movement, Breuilly maintains, 
created the intellectual context for imagining a split between nation and 
state.
The latter concept was first explicitly proposed by the Third Estate in 
the meeting of the Estates-General in 1789, when ‘legal’ France, based 
upon historical privilege, was distinguished from ‘real’ France, 
grounded in natural rights. In the same year, the National Assembly 
declared the nation to be the source of all sovereignty15.
Calhoun (1997: 69-79) takes a less elitist perspective in explaining the 
rise of modem ideas of society, by emphasising the new opportunities 
for greater popular participation to political discourse and activity 
introduced by improved information technology and processes of 
integration of the institutional stmcture, rather than increased control.
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On the other hand, he shares with Breuilly the view that the rise of 
nationalism is closely associated to the break-up of traditional ideas of 
political legitimacy. In addition, in common with Breuilly, Calhoun 
stresses the importance of the emergence of ideas of non-political 
organisation.
According to Calhoun (1997: 73-4), an early anticipation of nationalist 
ideology is to be found in the thought of Hobbes. Hobbes, Calhoun 
stresses, introduced the principle that the legitimacy of power was 
grounded in the interests of the whole people of the kingdom, as 
opposed to divine right or law of descent. In addition, Hobbes made an 
important step towards nationalism by imagining that political 
identities were categorical (as opposed to being mediated). However, 
differently from nationalist ideology, Calhoun maintains, Hobbes did 
not conceive of the existence of a society, as opposed to an aggregation 
of isolated individuals, outside the state. Introducing the latter concept 
was the job of his critics, particularly Locke.
Modern conceptions of civil society, Calhoun (1997: 71-2) argues, 
found a first codification in the writings of the Scottish enlightenment 
(e.g. Ferguson and Smith; on this see also Keane, 1988; Perez-Diaz, 
1995). However, as stressed also by Taylor (1990: 104-5), Chatterjee 
(1993: 227-30) and Bobbio (1988: 74, 79), something similar was 
already present in Locke’s theory of the dual contract16.
For Calhoun (1997: 72-3), Locke anticipates nationalism insofar as he 
presupposes the existence of a community of interdependent 
individuals (a people) upon which the legitimacy of the state rests. 
Even though Locke himself was not aware of the importance of the 
change he introduced, Calhoun (1997: 74-5) claims, the idea that 
governments were to embody national aspirations to survive started 
becoming increasingly influential in tandem with the gradual assertion 
of democratic doctrines of political legitimacy. The principle found a
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first application amongst the English aristocracy, and was brought to its 
apotheosis by the French revolution.
Breuilly (1995) and Calhoun (1997: ch. 4) can account for why 
nationalism became influential from the later eighteenth century, when 
the process of state formation experienced a somewhat of an 
intensification (not least through educational reforms). Their idea that 
the crystallisation of national identities is closely associated to the 
emergence of notions of civil society is endorsed also by Taylor (1990: 
111-3), Chatterjee (1993) and Llobera (1996: ch. 5).
In addition, Calhoun’s and Breuilly’s insight that nationalism is about 
conceptualising the relationship between state and society goes some 
way in explaining why nationalism became important in legitimising 
state education in nineteenth-century liberal democracies at the same 
time as the social status of schooling was under particularly intense 
scrutiny. This line of interpretation is consistent with Archer and 
Vaughan (1971: 180-1, 188-9), Hobsbawm (1990: ch. 3, 2000: 263-9), 
Balibar (1991b: 101-2), Chatterjee (1993: 227-9) and Morefields 
(2002), who also link the emergence of organic ways of imagining the 
state to the difficulties of liberal thought with accommodating the 
interventionist state within the state/society framework17.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which Breuilly and Calhoun are 
too much and too little modernist at the same time. The extent to which 
eighteenth-century notions of civil society introduced a paradigmatic 
break is less clear than Breuilly and Calhoun maintain. For instance, 
Foucault (1998: 78-99) and Sahilins (cited in Smaje, 2000: 158) argue 
that Hobbes’s ‘warre of every man against every man’ is metaphorical, 
and Hobbes does conceive of a society in the state of nature. Similar 
indications emerge from Meinecke (1998), who stresses how the idea 
that the state possessed properties irreducible to the sum of its
4.
component part was central to Western political thought since the times
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of Machiavelli. From the opposite perspective, Breuilly and Calhoun 
are too quick to assimilate contractualistic thinking with nationalist 
ideology. This point is made apparent if we now turn to Foucault’s 
(1991a; 1991b; 1998; 2001a) writings on bio-power.
Bio-power, schooling and nationalism
Foucault is not a theorist of nationalism. As far as I know, the word 
nationalism never appears in any of his writings. Neither does Foucault 
manifest a specific interest for schooling (even though schooling is 
without doubts of central importance in characterising the disciplinary
1 Rsociety Foucault (1991a) describes in Discipline and punish ). 
Moreover, Foucault writings do not present an organic theory. Indeed, 
being against theory is what he is most famous for. Hence, Foucault’s 
presence in a survey of theories on nationalism and schooling might 
seem odd, and an explanation is apt. The reason I included Foucault in 
the selection is that in the empirical analysis I am going to apply ideas 
drawn from his writings on bio-power in order to refine our 
understanding of the relationship between growth of the state and rise 
of nationalism, and his thought is tricky enough to deserve a separate 
treatment.
But, first of all, let us introduce bio-power19. Foucault (2001a: 121) 
describes bio-power as ‘a power which is exercised positively on life, 
which ... manages it, empower it, multiplies it, and exercise upon it 
precise controls and aggregate regulations’. Bio-power is at once set of 
prescriptions and a set of practices, a discourse. Bio-power involves the 
detailed knowledge and systematic intervention on the functioning of 
the individual body and the aggregate dynamics of the population. The 
aim of bio-power is to render bodies and populations governable, or, to 
use Foucault’s more famous expression, disciplined. Unlike the slave, 
who obeys amid the threat of force, the disciplined body conforms to
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the demands put before him/her through spontaneous bodily reactions. 
In addition, a disciplined body is empowered, as opposed to being 
simply subjugated, through the development of a detailed knowledge 
about the type of resistance and, by implication, opportunity exhibited 
by it. The body is conceived of as an organic substance exhibiting 
regular patterns of reaction to a determinate set of incentives. The latter 
are aimed at rendering bodies docile, healthy, strong and useful, and are 
applied unwittingly, in such away that the disciplined body, like 
Pinocchio, the puppet without strings, is not aware of being governed. 
The other pole of application of bio-power, together with the body, is 
the population, conceived as a network of life chances which dynamics 
are irreducible to that of the sum of its component parts. Similarly to 
the body, the population is governed through detailed knowledge of its 
organic properties, such as rate of births, deaths and diseases, economic 
cycles and systematic interventions upon them.
According to Foucault (1991b), the development of bio-power in 
modem Europe followed two main phases. A first phase, beginning 
around the sixteenth century, witnessing a first development of the 
theory, as it were, of bio-power in a body of literature written around 
the problematic of how to govern the state (e.g. Peruta, Botero), in the 
wake of the early stages of formation of the modem administrative 
state. However, Foucault argues, its actual application remained 
limited. The second phase, starting from the second half of the 
eighteenth and particularly the nineteenth centuries witnessed the 
spread of this type of technique with unprecedented levels of intensity. 
Foucault traces this transition to two main factors.
First, the emergence of notions of population. The development of 
statistics, Foucault (1991b) argues, led to fundamental shift in 
perspective, whereby aggregate dynamics of health, wealth and 
reproduction appear to be irreducible to those of its component parts, 
and particularly the family. This movement coincided with a
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transformation in economic thought with the model of the family 
giving way to that of the population (until the eighteenth century, 
economy was synonymous with management of the household). For 
Foucault (1991b), this passage for crucial for explaining the rise to 
dominance of a model of political rule which ceases to be centred upon 
the welfare of the sovereign, like in mercantilism, to one principally 
concerned with that of the population, as with political economy. The 
model of the population, in fact, allowed the assumption of an essential 
continuity between the welfare of the ruler and that of the state as a 
whole to rely on a more solid model than that of the family.
Second, the growth of bio-power was hindered by the theory of 
sovereignty. The latter, Foucault (2001a: 80) argues, was based upon 
premises which renders it incompatible with the exercise of bio-power:
If it is true that the juridical discourse [of sovereignty] has been 
able to serve and represents a type of power, although, probably 
not in an exhaustive way, based upon extraction and death, it is 
absolutely heterogeneous to the new procedures of power which 
are based on technique and not right, on normalisation and not 
law, on control and not punishment and which are exercised at 
levels and forms which go beyond the State and its apparatus
And it is to tensions between bio-power and the theory of sovereignty 
that Foucault (1991a) traces delays in the deployment of bio-power and 
cahnes in the theory of sovereignty accompanying the development of 
bio-power. Hobbes’ social contract and Rousseau’s transformation 
upon it, for Foucault, represent two instances of the latter process.
However, as it is made apparent in his 1976 course, Foucault does not 
see Rousseau’s social contract as the end point of the process. Foucault 
(1998: 181) emphasises how Roussevian thought lacked an essential 
element of nineteenth-century conceptions of sovereignty, in that it was
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fundamentally a-historical. In France, the idea that subjective rights are 
grounded in the particular history of ‘a nation’, Foucault (1998: 147- 
85) claims, was initiated at the beginning of the eighteenth century by 
aristocratic historians like Boulainvilliers, as a weapon against the 
centralising efforts of the monarchy and in opposition, not as a product, 
of the social contract. In particular, Foucault focuses on two sources of 
differentiation with the latter. First, the founding subject instead of the 
savage is the barbarian. The barbarian, differently from the savage, lies 
at the edge, as opposed to outside, civilisation. In addition, whereas the 
savage is chiefly concerned with dynamics of exchange, the barbarian 
exercises domination. Second, related to the latter point, to the idea that 
the political order was based upon a contract, Boulainviellers opposed a 
conception of political right defined by the outcome of real wars
90between collective subjects cross-cutting the social body (nations) . 
According to Foucault, the French bourgeoisie continued to be framed 
into the idea that political legitimacy was grounded in the social 
contract and remained, on the whole, a-historical until the end of the 
eighteenth century. It is only with the revolution that the idea that the 
legitimacy of the political order was grounded upon the history of 
nations and their wars became adopted by the bourgeoisie. This 
movement, Foucault (1998: 186-205) adds, coincided with the birth of 
dialectical history.
Foucault reflections bear upon both the question of what factors led to 
the growth of state schooling and that of why this movement coincided 
with the rise of nationalism. With respect to the former, Foucault 
complements Green’s (1992, 1997: ch. 2) idea that state systems of 
education are part of wider processes of state formation, by providing a 
more satisfactory explanation of its rhythm of growth. Foucault’s idea 
that the emergence of conception of population precipitated processes 
of state formation has substantial parallels with De Swaan’s (1988) 
argument that the rise of the welfare state resulted from the 
intensification of networks of dependency amongst social groups and
Boli and Ramirez’s (1987a) conception of statism. However, 
Foucault’s account has the advantage of moving beyond the broadly 
functionalist approach employed by these works in explaining the 
movement, as well as providing a fuller characterisation of the 
dynamics underlying the process. The argument that the transition from 
mercantilism to political economy associated to the emergence of ideas 
of population was an important factor behind the growth of bio-power 
shall be used in chapter five in order to account for the sudden growth 
of state schooling experienced by the Italian states from the later 
eighteenth century. Furthermore, the idea that the progress of bio­
power was hindered by traditional conceptions of sovereignty allows us 
to explain why growth of state schooling was eased by the transition 
from absolutism to nation-state, moving beyond the limitations of 
teleological arguments such as Boli and Ramirez’s (1987b) and of 
those which explain the correlation in terms of the manufactured nature 
of nations.
Foucault’s discussion of the relationship between development of bio­
power, the social contract and organic ways of imagining the state has 
substantial parallels with Breuilly’s (1995) and Calhoun’s (1997: 69- 
79) argument that the rise of nationalism was related to problems of 
political legitimacy brought about by the growth of the modem state. 
On the other hand, rather more satisfactorily than them, Foucault 
highlights how it was not merely the growth of the state, but the 
assertion of a particular technique of state formation, bio-power, which 
was conducive to the social contract and nationalism. In doing so, 
Foucault can account for why nationalist forms of democratic mle 
differed from traditional models, such as republicanism, in a way that 
Calhoun and Breuilly cannot (as well as other accounts linking 
nationalism to egalitarianism). Particularly useful in this respect is 
Foucault’s emphasis on population in defining the conditions of 
exercise of bio-power. The perspective of population allows to move 
beyond the limitations of Calhoun’s and Breuilly’s reliance on modem
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conceptions of civil society in explaining nationalism, in that it 
captures with greater accuracy the movement whereby ‘the people’ 
becomes conceived as possessing a particular organic identity, and does 
not rest on the dubious claim that civil society was responsible for 
introducing the idea that society acts as a guardian against abuses on 
the part of political power. The latter idea, for instance, as we shall see 
in chapter six, was already embedded in traditional conceptions of 
‘patria’. Furthermore, Foucault’s account exhibits greater accuracy than 
Calhoun and Breuilly, by spelling in greater details what factors 
governed the transition from social contract to nationalism. Chapter six 
shows that nationalism was conceived of as an alternative to the social 
contract, hinting at inadequacies in Calhoun’s argument that 
nationalism was a direct consequence of the application of the social 
contract (Breuilly concedes that historicism constituted a departure 
from the state/society framework, but falls short of accounting for why 
the transition took place). The perspective of bio-power helps 
explaining the movement leading to the eventual rise of dominance of 
the idea that subjective rights are grounded on national history, as 
opposed to the social contract, by stressing the conceptual problematic 
brought by a ‘biological’ subject of right. The idea that a type of power 
exercised as an instance of biological production of the body and the 
population was conducive to a vision of political right grounded in the 
history of the population is persuasive. This passage allowed 
conceiving of a subject of right, a citizen, which identity changes in 
accordance with the type of conditioning to which he/she is subjected 
to, as well as a type of power which optimal deployment is grounded 
upon the particular historical conditions of the population. In addition, 
this type of argument does not lack the support of more mainstream 
literature. There are, for instance, clear parallels with Smith’s (1991: 
96-7) claim that the rise of nationalism and historicism are associated 
to the ethical dilemmas introduced by the spread of science (albeit 
Smith emphasises tensions with religious, rather than within secular, 
thought). The importance of political economy in precipitating
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nationalist conceptions of society is stressed also by Breuilly (1995) 
and Calhoun (1997). Finally, an association between processes of 
normalisation of the biological functioning of the body, anxiety about 
change and nationalism is emphasised by Mosse (1985).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented how the nature of the relationship 
between nationalism and state systems of education has been addressed 
by sociological literature, with reference to eight theorists in particular: 
Balibar, Boli and Ramirez, Green, Archer and Vaughan, Gellner, 
Breuilly, Calhoun and Foucault. The discussion has revolved around 
two basic questions: (a) what factors were responsible for the growth of 
state systems of education; (b) why the growth of state systems of 
education was conducive to nationalism. With respect to the first 
question, scholars focus on one or more of the following factors: the 
rise of the bourgeoisie, nationalism, industrialisation, and state 
formation. In the course of the presentation I have commented on 
merits and limitations of these explanations. Chapter five provides a 
more detailed discussion of the role of industrialisation, the bourgeoisie 
and state formation in explaining the origin of state systems of 
education in relation to Piedmontese and Italian evidence. The impact 
of nationalism is addressed in chapter six. As for the impact of state 
schooling on nationalism, the literature provides us with two main 
types of explanation. First, nationalism and state systems of education 
both obey to the logic of the egalitarian state, whereby the promotion of 
categorical identities around the state is perceived of paramount 
importance for its overall welfare. According to this perspective, 
nationalism is chiefly defined by the fact that it postulates cultural 
homogeneity within the boundaries of the state as being at once a pre­
condition for state legitimacy and an end of the state. These principles 
were instrumental to the legitimisation of state systems of education 
aimed at breaking down sources of particularism within state
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boundaries. Second, the growth of the state provided the context for the 
emergence of modem doctrines of popular sovereignty. In turn, 
nationalism corresponded to the translation of democracy in practice. In 
concluding the final section, I have argued that this perspective neglects 
important discontinuities between contractualist thought, upon which 
democratic doctrines were grounded, and nationalism, particularly with 
reference to the relationship between history and citizenship. This issue 
will be developed in chapter six.
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4. Research method
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to expound and justify the choice of method. 
The presentation is organised around four topics. After introducing the 
reader to historical sociology in the next section, the third section 
discusses why social structures of past societies are of concern for 
sociologists. The fourth section focuses on the relationship between 
structure and ideology. I shall than proceed to address issues of 
reliability in historical sociology and outline the data-gathering 
strategy. The conclusion summarises the main points made.
Historical sociology
Historical sociology, its proponents maintain, accounts for the set of 
relationships making possible the emergence of distinctive patterns of 
action in any given social context. In other words, historical sociology 
attends to the ways in which social change is structured (Burke, 1980: 
13; Elias, 1983: ch. 1; Bendix, 1984: 6; Skocpol, 1984: 1-2). As it is 
often the case with definitions, such statements raise more questions 
than they answer. In particular, this section discusses to what extent the 
analysis of historical structures is peculiar to historical sociology.
The identity of historical sociology has been at the centre of much 
debate. The dominant position predicts that history and sociology are 
distinguished by different objectives and a different method, 
particularly in relation to what counts as valid evidence (e.g. see Smith, 
1991; Goldthorpe, 1994; Mouzelis, 1994). According to this view, 
history is primarily concerned with the particular, whereas sociology 
strives for generalisation (nomothetic/ideographic distinction). 
Sociologists, this perspective maintains, treat each case as
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representative of wider social trends. By contrast, historians seek to 
understand the particular case. In addition, historical sociologists tend 
to rely on secondary sources to a greater extent than historians. Within 
sociology, historical sociology claims a particular status for it relies on 
historical material in constructing theoretical arguments. This attribute 
differentiates historical sociology from the main body of the discipline, 
where survey data, field-work and documentary analysis of 
contemporary societies constitute the main sources of evidence.
Both historians and sociologists have questioned the validity of the 
distinction between history and sociology. Mann (1994) views 
sociology as defining a scientific approach to society. History may or 
may not be guided by such principles. Hence, history and sociology 
overlap, rather than defining separate forms of enquiry. Similarly, 
Skocpol (1984) qualifies as historical sociology also works interested 
in particular outcomes, as well others where a more explicit attempt to 
construct general arguments is made, provided they do it in a 
systematic way. From the other side of the disciplinary boundary, Carr 
(1990) rejects the whole idea that history is not concerned with the 
general. ‘The historian’, Carr (1990: 63-6) writes, ‘is not really 
interested in the unique but in what it is general in the unique ... It is 
nonsense to say that generalisation is foreign to history; history thrives 
on generalisation’. In addition, Carr argues, sociology, if it wants to 
avoid the danger of being an unconscious apologist of a static society, 
‘must become dynamic - a study not of society at rest (for no such 
society exists), but of social change and development’. Hence, ‘the 
more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology 
becomes, the better for both’. Abrams (1983) invites to an even more 
radical redrawing of the disciplinary boundaries. According to Abrams 
(1983: x; emphasis in original):
In my understanding of history and sociology there can be no
relationship between them because, in terms of their fundamental
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preoccupations, history and sociology are and always have been 
the same thing. Both seek to understand the puzzle of human 
agency and both seek to do so in terms of the process of social 
structuring.
Unravelling the interplay between structure, what actors have to do, 
and agency, what actors choose to do, Abrams maintains, defines both 
the objectives of history and sociology, properly conceived. Moreover, 
Abrams (1983: 3) adds, sociology is compelled to be historical in scope 
by the fact that social structures are not ‘things’, but they change over 
time. Within this context, time is that which allows to distinguish 
between the contingent and the necessary, ‘the social world is 
essentially historical. Process is the link between action and structure’.
Abrams (1983) and Carr (1990) are correct in stressing that history is 
not mere accumulation of knowledge about particular events of the 
past. As argued at length by Carr (1990), the past is composed by a 
potentially infinite number of facts, and yet only a few of them 
constitute historical facts. Historical facts are distinctive in that they are 
deemed by the historian to cast light on the nature of historical 
processes. In turn, what historical processes are considered to be of 
interest and the ways historians approach them are intrinsically linked 
to the particular preoccupations of the day. The historian, in selecting 
the type of questions and the material to tackle them, is guided by 
motives which go beyond understanding the particular case. By 
directing his/her gaze towards the past, the historian seeks to illuminate 
aspects of the present, not simply enlarge our stock of knowledge of the 
past. If, starting from the nineteenth century, the historical development 
of societies has been at the centre of unprecedented attention, it is 
because, in the wake of the development of human sciences, historical 
knowledge came to be perceived as central to understanding the 
possibilities for political intervention upon societies, not simply out of 
a sudden curiosity for the past. ‘History’, Hegel (reproduced in Aiken,
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1956: 89) wrote, ‘is the exhibition of the Spirit in the process of 
working out the knowledge of that which is potentially’. If Hegelian 
notions of ‘Spirit’ now appear overlaid with problems of teleology and 
historical determinism, the aspect of studying the past in order to act 
consciously upon the present continues to characterise present-day 
historical enquiry. So, for instance, it is in the wake of the resurgence 
of ethnic conflicts and nationalist movements that historians have in 
recent years addressed the rise of nationalism in past societies, not 
merely thanks to the brilliance of scholars of nationalism or out of a 
fascination with the bizarreness of nationalist thought. There is no 
difference here between history and historical sociology, in either 
method or objectives.
Furthermore, few historians, I suspect, would subscribe to the idea that 
there work does not rest on a systematic approach, and Skocpol’s 
(1984) and Mann’s (1994) argument that history is less systematic than 
sociology is somewhat misleading. And yet, I believe there is 
something to be gained from granting historical sociology a separate 
status from history. It is difficult to deny that historical sociology 
exhibits a greater emphasis on the comparative value of each given 
historical case, as opposed to the presentation of original evidence. The 
work of historians on primary sources constitutes an essential tool for 
the historical sociologist, as well as other historians, and I see no good 
reason why the situation ought to be changed. Having said this, I feel 
sympathetic to the idea that historians and sociologists are compelled to 
exchange methods and interpretations by the fact that their aims and 
methodological orientations overlap to a significant degree.
History and social change
This section discusses in what ways social change renders an historical 
perspective useful and enriching. In particular, I single out four factors 
why the study of the past is of concern for sociologists: (a) social
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patterns are sufficiently stable to allow meaningful comparisons with 
the past; (b) social change maybe so slow to need an historical 
perspective to be detected; (c) social structures are processes with a 
long memory; (d) the order of change is key to understanding the 
relationship between social processes and structures. In concluding the 
section, I touch upon the role of origins in sociological explanation.
Abrams’ (1983) and Carr’s (1990) argument that sociology needs to be 
historical in scope to do justice to the dynamic nature of society and 
social structures need some qualifications. To begin with, the fact that 
societies are dynamic does not necessarily imply that they cannot be 
meaningfully analysed as if they were static, and it is hard to share 
Abrams’ imperialism. This point is made apparent if we compare 
sociology with geography, the study of territory. At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Croce (reproduced in White, 1955: 48-9), the 
Italian philosopher, wrote:
Whatever that is being judged, is always an historical fact, a 
becoming, a process under way, for there are no immobile facts 
nor can such things be envisaged in the world of reality ... for 
example ... The stone is really a process under way, struggling 
against the forces of disintegration and yielding only bit by b i t ... 
historical judgement is not a variety of knowledge, but it is 
knowledge itself; it is the form which completely fills and 
exhausts the field of knowing, leaving no room for anything else
There is no denying that even an object as static as a stone possesses 
dynamic properties. Few, on the other hand, would subscribe to 
Croce’s uncompromising historicism and argue that geographers ought 
to abandon the study of contemporary territory because of this reason. 
The nature of stones is sufficiently stable to allow us to assume that it 
is as if they were ‘immobile facts’, for the purposes of gaining insights 
into their nature. Similarly, stating that the dynamic nature of societies
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disqualifies synchronic analysis from being meaningful is falling back 
on the positivist utopia of reproducing society as it is. Even if there is 
no such thing as a ‘society at rest’, this factor by itself does not imply 
that some types of question cannot be addressed in terms of present 
developments. The historical and present oriented approaches are better 
viewed as complementing each other, rather than posing an alternative.
With respect to the question of why the historical perspective is useful, 
the assumption that societies change is a pre-condition for historical 
sociology to be meaningful. If societies were static objects, there would 
be no good reason to adventure into the uncertainties of the past. As 
stressed by Goldthorpe (1994), historical evidence is more costly to 
gather than data from contemporary society, and if we are to endorse an 
historical approach we need to have a good reason to do so. One such 
reason is that societies change, and hence certain aspects of them can 
be identified only by attending at their development over time. Were it 
not the case that societies change, the study of the past would not 
introduce any substantial advantage with respect to the analysis of 
present societies, and reliance on historical material would represent an 
unnecessary complication. The dynamic nature of society, on the other 
hand, does not automatically render historical sociology necessary. If 
societies were ‘white noise’, exhibiting no relationship to their past 
development, the study of the past would be of little help to the 
understanding of the present. A bit like trainspotting, studying the past 
would be a well worth activity for its entertainment value, but of little 
interest to the social scientist concerned with illuminating the nature of 
the societies we are living in. Historical sociology grounds its 
legitimacy on the assumption that past and present societies differ and 
yet they are related. It is the way that societies change, rather than 
merely that they change, that renders an historical perspective 
enriching. In particular, one can identify at least four such features.
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First, social change is patterned, and patterns of change are sufficiently 
stable to provide meaningful analogies in the past. The study of social 
phenomena benefits from knowledge of the past because there is an 
essential similarity between past and present manifestations of a given 
phenomenon. When we study how a social phenomenon developed in 
the past, we assume that the past and present manifestations of the 
phenomenon are comparable, and thus its past unfolding constitutes a 
good predictor of its present nature and likely development. For 
instance, nineteenth-century nationalism is relevant to understanding 
contemporary nationalism because we assume that the two phenomena 
are, at least to some extent, analogous. In this respect, it is the relative 
stability of social structures, rather their continuously changing nature 
that renders history of interest to the sociologist. It is the fact that 
nationalism remained, on the whole, significantly similar to its prior 
self, not that it developed in another entity, that makes nineteenth- 
century nationalism a worthwhile field of enquiry for sociologists. In 
addition, the study of the past manifestations of the phenomenon 
exhibits substantial advantages over that of the present because the 
historian, unlike the observer of present societies, is a in a position to 
know how things turned out to be. This should not be taken as meaning 
that history will necessarily repeat itself or that the observed 
development of a given phenomenon was unavoidable. Italian 
nationalism eventually turned into fascism. This does not mean that 
nationalists inevitably become fascist. Nevertheless, the past 
experience is useful in gaining insights into the possibilities of change 
and, in this case, dangers associated with any given social process.
Second, sometimes (but by no means not always) the cycle of change is 
of the order of centuries, rather than decades, and thus its nature is 
revealed only by attending its development over the long period (on 
these issues see also Braudel, 1980). To use again the similitude with 
geography, the shape of continents is a case in point. The rhythm of 
change is so slow that to be detected, and therefore acquire meaning,
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necessitates an historical (in this case pre-historical, even) perspective. 
The need to question the past arises out of the fact that change is very 
slow, not the dynamic nature of the elements of which the continent is 
composed. By analogy, social structures, while never completely stable, 
are nevertheless subject to enduring regularities. And it is the latter 
aspect, not the former that compels sociologists to widen the scope of 
their horizon to the centuries before us. For example, the institutional 
structure of schooling is subject to almost daily variations, through 
decrees, issuing of governmental instruction and other types of 
intervention. Nevertheless, in other respects, the institutional structure 
of contemporary schooling is remarkably similar to that of its 
nineteenth century-counterpart. In Piedmont, ever since 1848, 
schooling has been organised into elementary, secondary and further 
education, and all the children have been expected to be enrolled for a 
number of years. These aspects differentiate sharply modem and 
contemporary structures of schooling provision from those of the past, 
and it is customary to say that the nineteenth century brought about an 
‘educational revolution’. In order to appreciate the extent to which such 
an assessment is accurate it is necessary to study the development of 
institutionalised education over the long period. Revolution conveys 
the idea of a sudden and radical change. Not unless one widens the 
angle beyond the nineteenth century does the extent to which the 
change brought about by nineteenth-century schooling promoters was 
sudden, as opposed to gradual, and radical, rather than conservative, 
becomes apparent. And this is because of the slowness of change, not 
the historically contingent nature of stmctures of schooling provision. It 
is because the organisation of schooling exhibits a significant degree of 
stability over time that an historical perspective adds to its 
understanding, not simply the dynamic nature of stmctures of schooling 
provision. Similar remarks can be made the study of nationalism. 
Perhaps the most debated issue in nationalist studies has concerned the 
question of when was the nation. One of the reason why this question 
has attracted so much attention is that the shape of ideologies and
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associated forms of collective identification change slowly and subtly 
(another is sociologists’ obsession with origins, which shall be 
discussed later). The methodological implication being that it is only 
through a patient work of reconstruction of their development over the 
long period that the ways in which they are particular emerge.
Third, social structures are processes with a very long memory. The 
past lives in the present a subterrean existence, which can be rendered 
explicit only by looking at the ways current formation came into being 
(Archer, 1979: 11-20; Smith, 1991; Bryant, 1994). So, for instance, as 
stressed by Abrams (1983: 1-2) himself, contemporary Italy’s political 
instability is not merely the result of the incompetence of the Italian 
political class, but is directly related to a history of political divisions. 
Knowledge of events occurring hundreds of years ago thus becomes an 
essential element towards the understanding of contemporary Italy. 
Similarly, to take an example from this research, the development of 
schooling in modem Piedmont was fundamentally shaped by the fact 
that it played a peripheral role in the Renaissance. The latter factor 
meant that absolutism developed earlier than elsewhere in the 
peninsula. In turn, early transition to absolutism had an impact on 
eighteenth-century developments, since the Savoyard State reformed 
the schooling system earlier than the other regional states and failed to 
pursue a policy of schooling growth. If at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century Piedmont’s schooling provision was amongst the 
lowest in Italy, it is not simply because its nineteenth-century political 
elite was more reactionary than elsewhere in the peninsula, but because 
of the way the Savoyard State developed over the whole of the early 
modem period. Not unless one expands the scope of analysis to cover 
the centuries preceding 1800 do these factors become apparent. That is 
not simply because societies change. On the contrary, knowledge of 
Renaissance Italy helps understanding contemporary Italy or 
nineteenth-century Piedmont because they share fundamental features.
81
It is the resilience of the past, not merely the dynamic nature of 
societies which renders the historical perspective useful and enriching.
Fourth, the temporal sequence of events is key to understanding the 
relationship between processes and structures (Skocpol, 1984). 
Mapping the historical development of social phenomena helps 
understanding what factors are more important in explaining their 
emergence. For example, if we are to assess the impact of ethnic 
heterogeneity on the development of a nationalist pedagogy, we might 
compare the type of pedagogy in place in Piedmontese school before 
and after the unification. If schooling became aimed at constructing a 
nation only after the unification, we can conclude that the ethnic 
heterogeneity brought about by the unification was an important factor 
in turning schools into a site of nationalist propaganda. As it turns out 
that was not the case, and hence we argue that ethnic heterogeneity is 
less important than some scholars would have us to believe in 
precipitating processes of nation-building. In a similar way, if we want 
to understand whether changes in techniques of state formation 
between the first half and the second half of the eighteenth century 
were important in precipitating growth schooling, we may compare 
educational reforms carried out in these two periods. A marked change 
in orientation with respect to diffusion of schooling supports the 
argument that something important happened between the first half and 
the second half of the eighteenth century.
In the paragraph above, I have been qualifying the idea that sociology 
needs to take an historical approach in order to do justice to the 
dynamic nature of social structures. My argument has been that the 
need for historical sociology arises out of the fact that the way societies 
change renders the past key to understanding contemporary social 
structures. Yet, more often than not, works in historical sociology only 
touch upon present societies. There are, of course, notable exceptions. 
For instance, Brubaker (1992) maps the development of citizenship
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policies in France and Germany from the eighteenth century up to the 
present day. Similarly, Archer (1979) looks at how the structure of state 
systems of education in four different countries changed between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, that is hardly the norm. 
The historical sociology of schooling, for instance, almost always stops 
the analysis sometime between the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries. Archer and Vaughan (1971) focus on the early phases of 
educational expansion, between the French revolution and 1848. Green 
(1992) begins the analysis in the sixteenth century to stop at around 
1870, when Foster’s Education Act put the bases for an integrated 
system of education in England. A similar periodisation is adopted by 
Boli and Ramirez (1987b). De Swaan (1988) and Smelser (1991) cover 
the nineteenth century. Meyer et al. (1979) study developments of 
schooling occurring between 1870 and 1930.
The fact that historical sociologists of schooling focus on nineteenth- 
century developments, instead of carrying out the analysis up to the 
present day, is not simply the result of a division of labour, whereby 
historical sociologists study the past in order to prepare the ground for a 
more historically conscious analysis of the present. It is the 
consequence of the fact that the period between the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries is when state systems of education similar to 
contemporary ones came into being, and that the intellectual trajectory 
of historical sociology (similarly to nationalism) is intrinsically linked 
to the quest for origins. Why are origins so important? Mann (1994: 39; 
emphasis in original) writes: ‘An historical causal analysis of origins 
considers the conditions which gave rise to modem institutions relevant 
to understanding their present nature and likely persistence’.
There are at least two problems associated with this approach. First, to 
a great extent, social phenomena acquire an identity, and therefore an 
origin, in relation to conventional parameters set by the researcher, and 
it is important not to confuse ideal types with reality. For instance,
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Archer (1979) is able to date state systems of education with a yearly 
precision by defining state systems of education in relation to de jure 
governmental leadership, nation-wide diffusion and integration of the 
component parts. However, none of these attributes came out of the 
blue. The elements listed by Archer did not happen all at the same time 
giving rise to a coherent whole. They were the result of long, over­
lapping and uneven processes, manifesting themselves neither in 
complete isolation nor in a necessary relation to each other. If one were 
to slightly change the emphasis of Archer’s definition (e.g. change de 
jure to de facto) one could come up with a very different dating than 
hers. As an illustration of this argument, take the Piedmontese case. In 
Piedmont, an integrated state educational system has been in place 
since 1729. However, processes of centralisation were under way at 
least since the counterreformation, in the sixteenth century. In addition, 
popular schooling started growing only form the later eighteenth 
century, when the Piedmont was invaded by the French army, and not 
until the second half of the nineteenth century was the great majority of 
the children in schooling age enrolled. We have here four possible 
dates for the origin of state systems of education in Piedmont, spread 
over a period spanning four centuries. Establishing when a 
phenomenon begins involves a good deal of arbitrariness, and social 
phenomena ought to be approached with due sensitivity to the ways in 
which they are dispersed through time. Origins are a working tool, not 
an historical datum. This point is worth stressing because, as proved 
also by the amount of controversy that has surrounded the question of 
‘when was the nation’ within nationalist studies, scholars often tend to 
forget this fact.
Second, there is no good reason to believe that the origins of a 
phenomenon are of particular importance in defining its historical 
function. On this, Foucault (1991c: 79), citing Nietzsche, says: ‘The 
lofty origin is no more than “a metaphysical extension which arises 
from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the
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moment of birth’” . Foucault touches here an important point. Mann’s 
(1994) argument implicitly assumes is that by attending at the ways a 
phenomenon came into being we can access to what historical 
conditions are responsible for its deployment and therefore the 
phenomenon’s present nature. This approach is grounded on the 
teleological assumption that the development of an institution 
corresponds to the coming to maturity of a process. As argued by 
Nietzsche (1991: 60; emphasis in original), the idea that the end of an 
institution, an idea or a thing is defined by the reason why it came into 
being is profoundly misleading:
the genetic cause of a thing and its final utility, as well as its 
effective usage and insertion within a system of ends, are facts 
toto coelo differentiated one from the other; something existing, 
which in some way came into being, is always interpreted in a 
novel way ... with new ends, taken away, manipulated and 
adapted to new objectives ... If one understands the utility of a 
physiological organ (or even a juridical institution, a social 
custom, a political habit, a given form in the arts or in the 
religious cult), this should not be taken as meaning that 
something has been understood about its origin ... ‘Evolution’ of 
a ‘thing’, of a custom, of an organ, hence, is an altogether 
different thing than its progressus towards a destination
Institutions, ideas and things can be employed to different ends 
depending on the will which governs it. Explaining the origin and the 
present function of institutions such as the nation-state or state systems 
of education poses different problems. While explaining their present 
nature and past developments are undoubtedly related tasks (for the 
reasons expounded above), they ought to be treated as different 
questions (it is less than clear that Foucault’s own historical works do 
not fall prey to this type of problem, which partly explains why he was 
particularly concerned with the question of the relationship between
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origin and knowledge). For instance, in this research, I argue that the 
rise of nationalist ideology to dominance in nineteenth-century 
Piedmont was associated to the problem of legitimising the state’s 
leadership in schooling. However, it would be absurd to claim that 
contemporary manifestations of nationalism, such as the Northern 
League, are explained in terms of the attempt to further processes of 
centralisation of the schooling apparatus. On the contrary, to remain 
with the example of the Northern League, the opposite holds, and the 
promotion of a schooling curriculum tailored to the local conditions is 
a central aspect of the policy pursued by the party. Similarly, schooling 
emerged in medieval Europe as an institution to train the clergy. 
However, that gradually ceased to be either the primary or sole 
objective of the institution, and its conditions of emergence are a very 
poor predictor of its future developments. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the origins of schooling are intimately linked to the expansion of the 
Church, processes of secularisation coincided with a marked increase, 
not decrease, of its importance. Origins and subsequent developments 
correspond to different processes, and the historical conditions 
responsible for the initial deployment of a social phenomenon ought 
not to be seen as necessarily representative of its present functions.
On the other hand, the analysis of origins is methodologically justified 
(and, indeed, the present study relies heavily on this type of approach) 
by the fact that it allows to draw sharp contrasts. So, for instance, the 
ways in which nationalist ideology is particular are more easily 
identified by comparing nineteenth-century nation-states with absolutist 
states, rather than twentieth-century states, with which they exhibit 
greater ideological continuity. The possibility to draw sharp contrasts 
renders the study of the emergence of social phenomena particularly apt 
to identify the ways in which social phenomena are particular and, by 
implication, carry out causal analysis on what factors were responsible 
for their deployment. In short, I am not opposed to the study of origins. 
However, I am wary of charging it with metaphysical attributes.
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Structure and ideology
Gone are the days when structure was seen as a unifying principle 
explaining in a relationship of subordination every aspect of social life, 
being this the class struggle, as in the Marxist tradition, or the 
functioning of complex societies, like in Durkheim and Parson. Two 
recurrent strategies in recent works in historical sociology are to either 
abandon the concept of structure altogether, as with post-modernism 
and anti-foundational thought, or, following Weber, to view structure 
in multiple terms.
With respect to the former strategy, I agree with Smaje’s (2000: 33, 75) 
argument that the critique of a singular historical determination should 
not lead us to assume no historical determination at all. The theoretical 
advantage of embracing ambivalence in place of structure is dubious. 
At least since Weber, sociologists know that the claim to a transcendent 
epistemological status on the part of scientific enquiry can never be 
fully sustained. And yet this fact, by itself, does not prevent us to 
systematically attend to the ways in which the social world is patterned, 
and, in doing so, to gain insights into its functioning. Even if it is not 
possible to provide a complete account of the details and accidents 
giving shape to social life, it is nevertheless within the reach of the 
researcher to model enduring and recurrent manifestations of it.
Archer (1979) and Mann (1986; 1996) are examples of the latter 
approach. In opposition to the idea that the Marxist idea of labour as 
the single determinant of social life, they propose a multiple model of 
social structure, whereby other sources of power, such as ideological 
and political structures play an equally important role. In particular, 
here we shall concentrate on their discussion of ideology.
87
Archer (1979; see also Archer and Vaughan, 1971) assumes that there 
is a rough congruence between interests and values, and there are two 
basic reasons why that is the case. The first has to do with the nature of 
social structures, whereby structural conditioning implies that unless 
actors shape their values in accordance with their interests they incur 
punishment, to the result that, in the long-run, actors end up endorsing 
values corresponding to their interests. The second derives from the 
purposes of ideology. For Archer, the purposes of ideology are to 
justify dynamics of dominance or assertion on the part of a social group 
by making appear the desired outcome as universally progressive and 
providing a blueprint to direct action. In addition, Archer argues, the 
elaboration of an ideology is a pre-condition for assertive action to take 
place, as well as for dominion to be maintained. Nationalism in 
nineteenth-century France, for instance, is viewed by Archer as a 
middle-class ideology, instrumental to its challenge to the traditional 
dominion of the clergy over schooling. As she (1979: 115) puts it:
the bourgeois assertive group appealed to French Enlightenment 
thought and especially Diderot. His stress on utilitarianism, 
nationalism, and meritocracy captured their aims perfectly, 
specified precisely the type of education desired and negated the 
Catholic definition of instruction so successfully that even the 
Monarchy supported the expulsion of the Jesuit order
Archer admits two exceptions to the rule that actors’ values can be 
derived by their interests. Cross-cutting ties deriving from other 
struggles might imply that actors endorse belief contrary to their 
interests and more than one ideology can serve the same interests.
A similar conception of ideology is adopted by Mann (1986; 1996). 
Mann (1996: 227) writes:
To struggle successfully as a class or nation requires a meaning 
system embodying ultimate values, norms, and ritual and 
aesthetic practices. It requires ideology in the dual sense of 
immanent collective morale and a transcendent message to confer 
morality on one’s own collective identity, to deny it to the 
opponent, to totalize the struggle, and to conceive of an 
alternative society worth the struggle.
As with Archer, for Mann ideology is a pre-condition for mobilising 
actors towards a given end. In addition, Mann shares with Archer the 
assumption that ideology is inherently universalistic in aspiration and 
particularistic in practice. However, Mann, more explicitly than Archer, 
rejects interest-driven theories of society on the grounds that in the 
name of ideology actors act against their stated interests. Hence, 
according to Mann, networks of emotional attachments, irreducible to 
the actors’ interests, must be incorporated into an explanatory model. It 
is in this spirit that Mann argues that a pre-condition for nationalism to 
develop was the rise of institutional networks of literacy under the 
aegis of state builders and capitalist entrepreneurs.
Mann, more satisfactorily than Archer, allows understanding the 
mobilising force of nationalist ideology. Some of the acts committed in 
the name of the nation can be accounted for by Archer’s scheme only 
as a momentary lapse of reason, and it is our duty towards 
nationalism’s victims, as well as the perpetrators, to do better than that. 
However, Mann’s approach evinces ultimately unsatisfactory 
materialist groundings, in that the emergence of a particular ideological 
pattern is explained solely in relation to the interests it represents and 
the institutional basis upon which the ideology rests. There are at least 
three problems associated with Mann’s method.
First, it neglects the extent to which interests and group affiliations are 
defined by ideology. As argued by Foucault (1991a) discourse does not
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masks the true identity of the subject, but produces it. Ideologues are at 
once expressions and producers of power relations. Take, for instance, 
nationalism. The idea that a nation constitutes an interest group is 
intrinsically linked to the rise of nationalist ideology. As stressed by 
Gellner (1983), to a large extent, it was nationalist ideologues that gave 
shape and content to the nation, rather than the other way round (see 
also Breuilly, 1995; Brubaker, 1997). Failing to recognise this fact 
corresponds to assuming that nations possess an interest and an identity 
independently of whether its members are aware of it. In other words, it 
entails assuming that the nation exists beyond itself, to the effect that 
the explanation of the ideology becomes coterminous with it. 
Furthermore, the type of the interests guiding the action of nations is 
fundamentally shaped by nationalism. As we mentioned earlier, Mann 
finds it difficult to accommodate actions such as rape, martyrdom and 
genocide within an instrumentalist framework of analysis. Mann’s 
suggestion of including institutional variables into the explanatory 
scheme goes some way in accounting for the emotional force of 
nationalism. It falls short, on the other hand, of explaining why 
determinate set of actions become identified as being in the nation’s 
interest in the first place. There is therefore a case for approaching 
ideology with greater sensitivity to the ways in which dynamics of 
group formation and interest definition are shaped by ideology, rather 
than providing the a priori ground for its development.
Second, not only, as conceded by Archer different ideologies can serve 
the same interests, but the same ideology can serve different, even 
opposite interests. As various scholars have pointed out (e.g. Smith, 
1991; Breuilly, 1995), nationalism was used as a vehicle to further the 
interests of diverse groups, and it makes little sense to view nationalism 
as the ideology of any one class, being that the bourgeoisie or others. In 
Archer’s own earlier work (Archer and Vaughan, 1972), she herself 
associates nationalism to secular projects in France and to religious 
dominion in England. This should not be taken as implying that, as De
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Swaan argues (1988: 8), since ideas lend themselves to contradictory 
policies and action, the analysis of ideology is of little explanatory help. 
Ideologies lend themselves to legitimise contradicting actions. 
Nevertheless, ideologies are not equally compatible with an infinite 
pattern of actions. Ideology has a constraining, albeit not deterministic, 
role in guiding action. Equally, the above argument does not imply that 
interests are irrelevant to account for the emergence of particular 
ideological crystallisations. Dynamics of interest have an impact upon 
what aspects a particular ideology become more prominent at any given 
time. So, for instance, the rise of Italian nationalism, I argue, is linked 
to the attempt to legitimise state schooling, and some of its features, 
such as an emphasis on the constructed nature of the citizen and the 
transformative power of the nation-state, can be directly related to this 
end. And yet by themselves, explaining ideology solely in terms of the 
interests it serves fails to capture how ideology can be bent towards 
manifold directions. Ideologies are better viewed as defining arenas of 
struggle between competing elite, providing a set of symbolic resources 
which can be mobilised towards different ends.
Third, the development of ideological configurations finds its ground 
upon pre-existing ideological traditions, rather than simply reflecting 
the creativity of the actors and their interests. To use Zimmer’s (2003: 
174) words, ‘While ideological innovation is by no means impossible, 
such innovation tends to take the form of novel combinations rather 
than pure invention’ (see also Wagner, 1986; Smaje, 2000). Again I 
take as an example nationalism. Nationalist ideologues introduced 
substantial innovations with respect to traditional doctrines of political 
legitimacy. Nevertheless they drew upon a pre-existing symbolic 
repertoire, and it is hard to explain nationalism outside the biblical 
tradition of the ‘chosen people’, medieval patriotism and the social 
contract. Therefore, when accounting for the emergence of a particular 
ideology it is necessary to attend at the ideological context within 
which agents operate. In addition, logical tensions embedded within a
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particular ideological structure are important in accounting for its 
developments, in that logical contradictions lend themselves to be 
challenged by asserting and descending groups looking for arguments 
to challenge the grounds of dominance and assertion. For instance, as 
we are going to see in the empirical chapters, tensions between the 
logic of development of the post-mercantilist state and the social 
contract opened the way for the Catholic Church’s strategy of defence 
of its prerogatives in education as well as the nationalist’s challenge to 
them.
Historical sociology and evidence
History has always being rewritten ... Each period takes it over 
and stamps it with its dominant slant of thought. Praise and 
blame are apportioned accordingly. All this drags on until the 
matter itself becomes unrecognisable. Then nothing can help 
except a return to the original evidence. But would we study it at 
all without the impulse of the present? ... Is a completely true 
history possible? (Ranke, cited in Elias, 1983: 4)
With these words, the nineteenth-century German historian Ranke 
summarises with admirable economy some of the most serious 
problems one faces when addressing historical material. The position 
of the historian as a member of society, as well as the position society 
accords to history, prevents one from making any ultimate claim to 
objectivity. The answer to Ranke’s question is, without doubts, no, 
‘completely true history’ is not possible. What we look for in history is 
bound to shape what we see, and history, almost inevitably, will be 
bent towards one’s own objective. If we identify patterns and these 
conform to an overall logic development, this is not simply because we 
observe the manifestation of underlying social forces, but because, as 
researchers, that is what we look for in the data. What type of patterns 
emerge is intrinsically linked to what variables we focus upon. Our
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particular social identity is of fundamental importance in determining 
what types of explanation we feel more sympathetic to and, by 
implication, which ones appear to be more persuasive.
These problems are particularly serious in historical sociology, where 
the fact that the scope of the enquiry tends to cover a number of 
societies over long periods of time forces the researcher to greater 
reliance on secondary sources, with the result that the danger of 
selecting material solely on the bases of the logic of the argument 
becomes particularly severe. Even if the position of the researcher 
cannot be completely transcended, there are nevertheless ways of 
minimising the dangers of employing evidence in a purely instrumental 
way. These issues have recently been at the centre of a symposium on 
the British Journal o f Sociology. In what follows, I summarise the main 
lines of the debate. I then proceed to outline the data-gathering strategy 
I employ in the empirical chapters.
For Goldthorpe (1994: 64-7), the use of secondary sources is 
problematic because ‘historical facts may be understood as simply 
‘inferences from relics’, which are made with very varying degrees of 
security and which, moreover, typically represent highly interdependent 
elements within complex, and inevitably contestable, interpretative 
schemes’. Thus, the tendency among historical sociologists of treating 
secondary sources ‘as if they were an assemblage of relatively discrete 
and stable identities’ is wanting. The results of this lack of self- 
reflexivity, Goldthorpe continues, are ‘serious weaknesses in their work 
in the linkage between evidence and argument: this was often tenuous 
and arbitrary to quite unacceptable degree’.
To this charge, historical sociologists reply with three types of 
argument. First, the charges Goldthorpe advances against the evidence 
used by historical sociologists can be applied also to fieldwork and 
survey data. For instance, Bryant (1994: 5) argues: ‘finitude and
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incompleteness, after all, seem to be characteristic of most forms of 
scientific enquiry’. On the contrary, the fact that historians often have a 
more limited degree. of control over the sample than sociologists do 
results in less biased accounts. Second, historical sociologists are not 
passive receivers. This is valid both for the academic community as 
whole, where scrutinising the accuracy of the evidence constitutes one 
of the favourite pastime, and the single researcher. As stressed by Hart 
(1994: 28) and Mann (1994: 40-1), historical sociologists have the 
ability to critically engage with their sources. By attending at the way 
arguments are constructed and comparing various accounts, historical 
sociologists are able to analyse data from fresh angles without 
necessarily falling pray to the tricks of the historian. Third, Bryant 
(1994: 13-4) notices how Goldthorpe overlooks how historians are 
concerned with reportage as well as interpretation, where reportage 
means information regarding basic questions such as who, where, 
when, how many etc. Whereas they tend to be interwoven, he argues, it 
is possible for the attentive reader to distinguish between the two and 
treat basic information as safe.
I agree that Goldthorpe (1994) overstates the peculiarity of historical 
knowledge. Being contested is a feature of scientific knowledge in 
general, rather than being specific to history. Confrontation between 
different positions and questioning received truths are essential 
elements of any type of scientific enquiry. This factor does not prevent 
scientists to treat findings of others as if they were facts, for else any 
type of scientific knowledge would be impossible. The contested nature 
of evidence does not by itself renders science meaningless. If the 
failures of science makes us aware of the dangers associated to the 
scientific method, its successes renders the opportunities exhibited by it 
undeniable.
Bryant (1994) neglects the extent to which establishing simple 
historical facts, such as the author of a treatise or the number of schools
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in a given historical context, can give rise to conflicting interpretations. 
On the other hand, he strikes a good point by emphasising how history 
is characterised by areas of agreement as well as dispute. No historian 
in his right state of mind would hope to base his work entirely on 
primary sources, and feels confident to do so because many aspects of 
our histories have been covered very well indeed. Neglecting these 
information would be arrogant. There is no a priori reason to believe 
that the research on primary sources on the part of sociologists would 
deliver more accurate accounts. On the contrary, the fact that historians 
are more accustomed to dealing with primary sources means that the 
opposite holds.
On the other hand, we can agree with Goldthorpe that historical 
material should be approached with special care. Mann (1994) and Hart 
(1994) are correct in stressing that sociologists can critically engage 
with the sources. However, they overstate the extent to which 
sociological training, by itself, enables to evaluate historical evidence. 
Comparing sources and assessing the quality of historical 
interpretations demands familiarity with the type of evidence employed 
by historians as well as the historical context. This fact has two main 
consequences. First, relying exclusively on secondary sources as 
advocated, for instance, by De Swaan (1988), is less safe than he 
claims. Second, historical sociologists ought to concentrate less on ‘big 
structures, large processes, huge comparisons’, to use Tilly’s (1984) 
expression, and spend more time becoming familiar with the particular 
case(s).
To enter into the specifics of this research, the evidence is based on 
both primary and secondary literature. The empirical analysis is based 
upon the development of state schooling, on the one hand, and the 
institutionalisation of a nationalist (i.e. aimed at constructing a nation) 
pedagogy, on the other. In particular, to map these processes I rely on 
three types of evidence: quantitative data on schooling diffusion,
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institutional history of schooling and writings of intellectuals on state 
and schooling.
The relative abundance of published quantitative data on schooling 
diffusion in modem Italy has meant that it has been possible to base the 
quantitative analysis almost exclusively on published sources. The 
presentation of quantitative data cover the period between the thirteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The periodisation reflects two basic concerns. 
First, to evaluate the scale of the change occurring between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it is necessary to compare it with 
the size of the provision in place in the previous centuries. Second, the 
Renaissance was an important period in terms of state and schooling 
developments in Italy. Therefore, some knowledge of the Renaissance 
is needed to interpret later developments. Data from areas other than 
Piedmont, particularly other Italian regions, have been presented in 
order to characterise the particular development of schooling in 
Piedmont. In addition, I present published data on schooling diffusion 
across and within regions and industrialisation rates in post-unification 
Italy in order assess the impact of industrialisation and other factors on 
schooling diffusion. Merits and problems associated with the 
measuring techniques employed by quantitative historians of schooling 
are discussed in chapter five. Here, I shall limit myself to comment that 
while quantitative analysis provides a useful complement to 
institutional analysis while mapping state schooling, since it renders 
explicit divergences between patterns of intervention and patterns of 
growth and renders clear the scale of the change occurring between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it cannot serve as a substitute for 
it. The means of intervention are as important as the results in order to 
interpret schooling developments.
By institutional developments, I mean history of changes in the 
organisational structure of the schooling provision, curriculum and 
pedagogy. Following the approach indicated by ‘new sociology of
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education’ (e.g. Young, 1971), curriculum and pedagogy have a central 
part in the analysis, particularly in relation to characterising the 
intentions of schooling promoters. The evidence is drawn from 
secondary sources, published and unpublished legislative and 
administrative interventions, and theoretical writings on state 
schooling. In Italy, secondary literature on the institutional history of 
schooling concentrates on juridical and administrative developments at 
the elite level, to the result that little is known of the extent to which 
instruction were followed and shaped by the action of intermediate 
agents, such as families, teachers, inspectors and councils, as well as 
the recipients of schooling, the children. In selecting the evidence, I 
followed the same strategy. Not because I think that the behaviour of 
intermediate agents and children are unimportant, but because elite data 
are rich enough to provide enough material for a meaningful analysis to 
be carried out, and, since the actions of those in authority is better 
documented, in the economy of the work it has been preferred to 
concentrate on this type of evidence.
Finally, in keeping with the type of approach outlined in the previous 
section, I take ideology seriously. In other words, I pay attention to the 
overall logic of dominant structures of thought to explain any given 
outcome. Following a similar approach to Archer and Vaughan (1972) 
and Green (1992), educational ideologies are studied through writings 
of key intellectual figures and senior officials setting the agenda of 
educational policies. These include writings of Muratori, Leprotti, 
Genovesi, Carli, Gorani, Filangieri and Casati. Even if some of these 
authors came from context other than Piedmont, the fact that their 
writings were read across Italy renders their thought relevant to 
interpret Piedmontese developments. In addition the study of ideology 
is aimed at characterising nationalist conceptions of citizenship and 
attend at the intellectual context that led to their development. In line 
with the approach taken by sociological works on nationalism, such as 
Chatterjee (1993: ch. 11), Breuilly (1995: ch. 2), Llobera (1996: ch. 7)
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and Calhoun (1997: ch. 5), nationalist conceptions of citizenship are 
analysed through writings of major Italian political thinkers, 
particularly Doria, Muratori, Amidei, Mazzini and B. Spaventa.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have been discussing what a sociological approach to 
the study of history promises to yield and outlined the approach I intend 
to pursue. To summarise the main points, firstly, even if history and 
historical sociology do not differ a great deal in terms of objective and 
overall methodological orientation, I have been arguing in favour of a 
particular status for historical sociology, grounded in a greater 
emphasis on the comparative value of each given case, as opposed to 
the presentation of original evidence. Secondly, I have qualified the 
assertion that historical sociology grounds its legitimacy in the dynamic 
nature of social structures, by arguing that it is the way they change that 
it renders an historical approach enriching, singling out four such 
features: (a) social pattern are sufficiently stable to allow meaningful 
comparisons with the past; (b) social change maybe so slow to need an 
historical perspective to be detected; (c) social structures are processes 
with a long memory; (d) the order of change is key to understanding the 
relationship between social processes and structures. In addition, I 
touched upon the role of origins in sociological explanation, stressing 
that while the analysis of origins is methodologically justified, since it 
allows to draw sharp contrasts, it is important not to charge origins 
with metaphysical attributes. Thirdly, I have been advocating an 
explanatory role for ideological structures autonomously of structures 
of interests on the grounds that to a large extent interests and group 
affiliations are defined by ideology, the same ideology can serve 
different interests, and ideological developments find their ground upon 
pre-existing traditions. Finally, we have been discussing problems of 
reliability in works of historical sociology, emphasising how evaluating 
historical evidence demands some familiarity with the historical
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context and the historiographical evidence, and presented the data- 
gathering strategy adopted in the present research. The next two 
chapters illustrate an empirical application of the type of historical 
sociology advocated in the discussion, starting with an analysis of the 
growth of state schooling in Piedmont between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.
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5. Universal schooling in Piedmont
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to account for the origin of universal 
schooling in Piedmont. By origin of universal schooling, I mean the 
transition from a situation where a minority of the children attend 
schools to one where almost all of them do it for a number of years. 
The discussion draws mainly from the historical sociology of schooling 
(Archer and Vaughan, 1972; Archer, 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; 
De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Smelser, 1991; Green, 1992). Differently from 
the approach taken by these works, however, the focus of the analysis 
is on quantitative growth. In shifting the focus from state systems of 
education to universal schooling, I seek to give greater relevance to the 
facts that institutional developments, while related to processes of 
growth, do not mirror them in a transparent or univocal way.
The discussion focuses on the impact of industrialisation, rise of the 
bourgeoisie and state formation on the development of universal 
schooling in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
To anticipate the main conclusions, whereas both industrialisation and 
the rise of the bourgeoisie had a positive effect on growth of schooling, 
the origin of universal schooling cannot be explained solely in relation 
to these processes. Following the approach of Green (1992) (see also 
Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; De Swaan, 1988), I argue that that the 
growth of state schooling was part of wider processes of state 
formation, and the particular trajectory of state formation of Piedmont 
was decisive in shaping patterns of growth across the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. However, I operate two basic transformations 
upon Green’s explanatory framework. First, I emphasise discontinuities 
with respect to popular schooling in early modem and modem 
techniques of state formation. In particular, I show that in Italy state
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formation became strongly associated with schooling expansion only 
starting from the second half of the eighteenth century. To explain the 
transition, I draw from Foucault’s (1991b; 2001a) writings on bio­
power and stress the importance of changes in dominant perspectives in 
economic thought, away from mercantilism. Second, I explore the 
different effect of liberalism on the development of the state schooling 
system across England and Piedmont. In doing so, I distinguish 
between liberal critiques to state-led schooling systems on grounds of 
efficiency and those grounded in right, and argue that the framework of 
legitimacy associated to classical liberal philosophy, more 
unambiguously than laissez faire liberalism, acted as an obstacle 
towards the development of state-led schooling systems.
The chapter is organised as follows. After expounding the method of 
measurement, I map the rhythm of growth of schooling in modem 
Piedmont. The following three sections discuss the impact of 
industrialisation, rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation on patterns 
of growth of schooling in Piedmont between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In conclusion, I summarise the main results of the 
enquiry.
Measuring schooling
Since the 1970s, the growth of schooling in Italy has been at the centre 
of growing attention on the part of social historians, and even if we are 
still far from having a complete picture at our disposal, long-term 
trends have been studied in enough details to allow meaningful 
comparisons to be drawn relying on published sources alone. On the 
other hand, the limitations of indicators of growth of schooling must be 
kept in mind before they can be put into use. The objective of this 
section is to discuss strengths and weaknesses of the various indicators 
I employ to measure growth of schooling.
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Growth of schooling manifests itself in two ways. Either a growing 
share of the population attends schools, or children stay in schools for 
longer. The focus of this analysis is on the former. To measure it, I 
employ the following indicators.
In Piedmont, the state started to gather statistics on the provision of 
elementary education in the nineteenth century. Hence, for the early 
modem period I have been forced to rely heavily on the estimates of 
historians. Estimates are based on incomplete information and involve 
a good deal of guess-work, reflecting more or less justified 
expectations on the part of the historian on variables such as 
demographic trends, distribution of schooling across areas, number of 
unofficial schools, and quality of the data reproduced in the documents. 
Whenever I encountered conflicting accounts, I regarded the 
assessment supported by better data as more reliable.
Estimates of growth of schooling take three basic forms: number of 
schools, enrolment and literacy rates. Traditionally, the latter 
constitutes the main tool employed to measure overall levels of 
instmction in pre-industrial societies, the main reason being that they 
are relatively easy to gather through documents, particularly marriage 
registries, were the signature is required. Typically, the only attempt to 
measure long-term trends in schooling provision in Piedmont, Cipolla 
(1969), is based almost exclusively on literacy rates. However, as a 
measure of schooling diffusion literacy rates exhibit serious limitations 
(and, as we shall see, Cipolla’s account is, in fact, flawed). Melton 
(1988: 8-9) and Brizzi (cited in Toscani, 1993: 182-3) argue that, in the 
early modem period, not all types of school put equal emphasis on 
literacy, and thus low literacy levels can be found in connection with 
high schooling diffusion. I consider the opposite kind of relationship 
more likely. Whereas, certainly from the second half of the eighteenth 
century, one can expect all those who have been in school to be able to 
sign their name, schooling is by no means the only site where literacy,
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and basic literacy in particular, is acquired. In addition, distribution of 
literacy are affected by growth of schooling only with a certain time- 
lag. Thus, firstly, literacy rates tend to be greater than schooling 
attendance. Secondly, the distribution of literacy does not necessarily 
mirror that of schooling at any given moment. Thirdly, while schooling 
expansion leads to greater literacy, rising literacy does not necessarily 
imply a greater schooling provision. For these reasons, I have been 
using literacy rates as a proxy of schooling availability only in the 
absence of better measurements, complementing them with qualitative 
evidence, or to confirm the accuracy of other indicators.
Numbers of schools and enrolment rates are related to diffusion of 
schooling in a more direct way than literacy rates, and whenever 
conflicting results appear, I consider them more reliable. On the other 
hand, they are not without their problems. Estimates of number of 
schools and enrolment rates are mostly based on data reproduced on 
administrative documents of the local secular and religious authorities. 
These are bound to be incomplete, in that the intensity of control upon 
diffusion of schooling, particularly before the eighteenth century, was 
weak. In addition, numbers of schools identifies with a certain 
precision the trend, but can be misleading unless the information 
include their size and do not tell much about overall levels of diffusion. 
In these respect enrolment rates offer a more complete picture, and they 
will be our main indicator. However, enrolment rates measure changes 
in the length of schooling attendance as well as growth in the number 
of students, and do not give accurate information on how regular the 
attendance is. In addition, typically these data are costly to acquire, for 
the lack of regular statistics implies that the relevant information tends 
to be scattered across a variety of documents. The result being that we 
have at our disposal only a few snapshots, often limited to a certain 
area. If the coverage is detailed enough starting from the eighteenth 
century, this is not the case for the preceding period (in any case this 
problem is not too serious, as the analysis concentrates upon the
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and data from the centuries before 
are presented chiefly to set the context and provide a contrast).
With the nineteenth century the data becomes significantly better. First, 
the presence of government statistics implies that less guess-work is 
involved and measurements are more frequent. Second, the fact that 
schooling becomes more standardised implies that it is safer to assume 
a typical path of attendance, with the result that enrolment rates become 
more representative of overall levels of diffusion. Third, increasing 
attention on the part of the authorities on popular education implies that 
statistics become more accurate as the century progresses (even though 
this factor might have also an opposite effect. For instance, the growth 
of schooling in Piedmont in the period leading to the unification is 
almost too fast to be believed, and it may well be that the statistics had 
been swelled in order to support the Piedmontese bid for leadership in 
post-unification Italy). Fourth, after the unification statistics become 
gathered according to a uniform method, and the results can be 
compared across regions more directly (Vigo, 1971: 132-4).
Yet government statistics leave some periods uncovered and are bound 
to contain serious errors. Both because of technical reasons and the 
type of incentives faced by the agencies (families, pupils, teachers, 
inspectors, councils, state) involved in the data collection, which, in the 
Italian case, by and large, remain to be ascertained. To minimise the 
possibility of making wrong assessments and fill the gaps, whenever 
available, I checked the accuracy of the results emerging from 
enrolment rates against other indicators. These include literacy rates, 
number of teachers, and boroughs and towns with at least one 
elementary school.
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Quantitative growth, 1200-1900
In what follows, I measure the rhythm of growth of schooling between 
the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries in Piedmont and post-unification 
Italy. The aim of the operation is twofold. First, introduce the reader to 
the origin of universal schooling in Italy and the comparative position 
of Piedmont in the process. Second, provide an empirical base for the 
theoretical discussion. The presentation is chronological. After quickly 
looking at the Renaissance school, I cover developments between the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The final part is dedicated to the 
nineteenth century.
In Italy, the period between the thirteenth and the first half of the 
sixteenth centuries witnessed a marked increase of the provision of 
schooling on the part of the local authorities for the urban elite, 
merchants and their employees, and to a lesser extent, the populace. 
Similarly to contemporary schooling, the curriculum of the Renaissance 
school was centred around literacy and numeracy. Administrative 
documents testify that by the later thirteenth century in the Italian city- 
states schooling had reached a respectable diffusion. In 1288, Milan 
employed about 70 teachers of grammar for pre-university education, 
and there is evidence that similar movements were occurring in other 
cities, such as Genoa, Verona, Bassano, San Gimignano and Bologna. 
Piedmont, while arguably not at the centre of this movement, was not 
untouched, and municipalities were providing free education for the 
poor in Turin, Ivrea and Pinerolo from the fifteenth century. By the 
closure of the sixteenth century, schooling was attended by a sizeable 
portion of the male, and to a lesser extent female, urban population of 
the Renaissance core. In Florence in 1480 about 28 percent of the boys 
aged between 11 and 13 were attending regular schools. Given the high 
standing of Florence at the time, the figure is likely to be exceptionally 
high, and about one century later, in 1587, boys’ attendance to regular
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schools in Venice was at 26 percent (against about 11 percent of 
females in convents and popular schools). In Venice, schools for the 
poor, both males and females, were much less diffused, but their 
impact was not negligible, about 6.5 percent of the children (Grendler, 
1991:7-8, 53, 87,116,118).
According to Cipolla (1969: 53, 63), the progress of elementary 
education in early modem Piedmont did not follow a linear pattern. In 
the seventeenth century, in Italy the growth of popular educations was 
hindered by economic crises and the decline of cities, with the church 
concentrating on the education of the children of the elite. By contrast, 
in eighteenth-century Piedmont, in the wake of a social, economic and 
artistic revival, basic literacy advanced rapidly.
Cipolla (1969: 53) does not produce any data for the seventeenth 
century, and his assessment on the poor state of elementary education 
in seventeenth-century Italy is suspiciously in line with Cipolla’s 
general argument that economic development is the main factor behind 
schooling expansion. There is little controversy about the fact that the 
seventeenth century was not a felicitous period for the university of 
Turin (Balani and Roggero, 1976: 55; Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977: 
225-6). However, the university is not the school, and historians of 
early modem schooling in Italy are less prone than Cipolla to dismiss 
the effort of the church towards popular education (see Balani and 
Roggero, 1976: 16-7; Brizzi, 1982: 906; Grendler, 1991: 360).
The availability of quantitative data for the seventeenth century is too 
limited to settle the question. Estimates of literacy rates show that by 
the beginning of the eighteenth century the diffusion of literacy in 
Turin was not comparable to that of the best endowed European areas 
(Stone, 1966; Duglio, 1971). The idea that the seventeenth century was 
a period of slow development for schooling is supported also by data 
on the foundation of popular schools in Piedmont. According to
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Berardi’s (1982: 36) account, Duboin (1818-69), in his collection of 
official interventions (laws, edicts, patents and posters) of the Savoyard 
Kingdom registers only two foundations in the seventeenth century 
(1610 and 1699), and none in the central part of the century. This figure 
compares with five registered foundations in the course of the 
eighteenth century (1717, 1719, 1743, 1769, 1772 and 1789). However, 
the difference between the two figures is small, and it might simply due 
to greater availability of data, or signal an intensification of control 
upon diffusion of popular schools.
A similar estimate for Lombardy, based on primary sources, while 
confirming a slowing down of the pace of growth of schooling in the 
central part of the seventeenth century, invites to a reassessment of the 
actual impact of the decline:
Table 5.1
Registered foundations of popular schools in Lombardy, 1570-1760
Years Foundations
1570-1630 24
1631-1680 15
1681-1735 22
1736-1760 12
Source: Toscani (1993: 112, 115-6, 119).
In addition, in sharp contrast to Cipolla’s (1969: 53, 63) prediction on 
educational trends in early modem Piedmont, the secondary sector 
expanded in the course of the seventeenth century, but not in the 
eighteenth. In the Savoy dominions, between 1561 and 1679 the Jesuits 
established schools in nine cities (Roggero, 1981: 17). By 1729 there 
were 45 secondary schools managed by the Jesuits and other religious 
orders spread homogeneously around the territories of Piedmont and 
Savoy. Although we do not know much about the state of the provision 
before, the Jesuit intervention is normally accounted for by historians 
in terms of foundation, rather than replacement, and the fact that the 
size of the system did not increase in the course of the eighteenth
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century testifies that the secondary sector had reached a respectable 
magnitude. The eighteenth century did not witness a significant growth 
of either size or number of secondary schools. In the aftermath of 1729 
reforms, the number of colleges in Piedmont and Savoy decreased from 
45 to 31, to rise to 41 by 1772 (Roggero, 1981: Appendix). The size of 
schools remained stable in the course of the century with the number of 
the registered employees rising from 313 in 1739-40 to 405 in 1771-221 
(hence, about 10 employees for each school).
In short, even if the data broadly confirms Cipolla’s assessment on the 
poor state of elementary education in seventeenth century Piedmont, 
there are reasons to believe that the seventeenth-century crises was less 
marked than Cipolla maintains. What is more clear is that, as we are 
now going to see, Piedmont failed to experience a boom in the 
eighteenth century.
Cipolla (1969: 63) supports his claim on the rapid growth of 
elementary education in eighteenth-century Piedmont by saying that in 
1740 about 76 percent of the bakers working in Turin could sign their 
name, for the figure to rise to 96 percent by 1796, and his assessment 
on rapidly rising literacy levels in eighteenth-century Piedmont is 
confirmed by other sources. According to Duglio’s (1971: 495-7) 
estimates, literacy rates rose steadily between 1710 and 1790 in Turin 
and the province. Particularly in the latter, Duglio registers a marked 
increase, from 21 percent to 65 percent for the males and from 6 
percent to 30 percent for the females. By the closure of the century, in 
an isolated village of the country-side, Candiolo, half the men could 
sign their name in a petition (similar estimates in France in the same 
period rates rural male literacy at between 20 percent and 60 percent 
depending on the area) (Roggero, 1992: 140). On the other hand, rising 
literacy levels do not necessarily imply that the schooling provision 
was growing at similar rates. As it turns out, that was not the case.
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According to Ricuperati (1982: 996), Lombardy and Piedmont 
constructed a state system of education more systematically than 
anywhere else in Italy, with the result that by the end of the eighteenth 
century basic education was quite diffuse. However, Ricuperati does 
not support this claim with any data, and while there is evidence that by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century schooling had reached mass 
proportions in Lombardy (see table 5.2), in Piedmont the effect of the 
educational reforms was ambivalent at best, if not outright 
conservative.
As we have seen earlier, the eighteenth century did not witness an 
increase in the size of the secondary sector, upon which the attention of 
the monarchy concentrated. The only data available on diffusion of 
primary and elementary schools in the eighteenth century is for the 
capital, where the supply did not progress in any significant way, either 
as a result or after the educational reforms. In Turin, in 1738 the king 
opened six primary classes (i.e. aimed at preparing for the secondary 
school), which occasionally were admitting poor children free of 
charge. However, other data shows that expansion of popular access to 
schooling is not what the absolutist state was after. First, in connection 
with the operation all the schools for the poor (four at the beginning of 
the century) were closed down, to be opened again, two, towards the 
end of the eighteenth century by a religious order (Berardi, 1982: 36; 
Roggero, 1992: 145). Second, in contrast to the religious system (which 
was free), substantial fees were introduced to register in the primary 
class. Third, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the number of 
official primary schools had not increased, and in 1807 there were still 
only six state elementary schools (Roggero, 1992: 177). Even if 
educational institutions had been closed down in the wake of the 
political and financial crises of the later eighteenth century, this should 
be more than offset by the French and Austrian administrations, which 
in the intervening period both sought to implement compulsory 
education (1799 and 1812 respectively), and a greater diffusion in the
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course of the eighteenth century is unlikely. Fifth, the overall level of 
attendance remained limited. According to Roggero’s (1992: 178) 
estimate, in 1807 about one fourth of the boys aged between seven and 
fourteen were attending some school for a period of time. This figure is 
about the same, if a little smaller, as enrolment rates in Florence more 
than four centuries before (Grendler, 1991: 53).
Turin is not the whole of Piedmont, and it may well be that schooling 
expanded more quickly elsewhere, in the wake of processes of 
integration between centre and periphery. As we have mentioned 
earlier, literacy rates rose in the province more rapidly than in the 
capital. In the territories of neighbouring areas, Lombardy and the 
Republic of Venice, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
schooling was considerably spread also in territories distant from the 
capital (Vigo, 1971: 89). Similarly, the first data at our disposal for 
Piedmont (1850) shows that Turin lagged behind the province of Ivrea 
and the provision in the capital was only marginally greater than in 
Vercelli (Vigo, 1971: 100-1, 119). On the other hand, the rest of the 
region was significantly worse endowed. In addition, firstly, in contrast 
to Lombardy and the Republic of Venice, the Savoyard monarchy 
started pursuing a policy of educational expansion only in the 
nineteenth century (Genovesi, 1999; Roggero, 2002). Secondly, the 
data on Turin indicate that in the eighteenth century the development of 
primary education closely followed that of the secondary sector, which, 
as we mentioned earlier, did not expand in the course of the eighteenth 
century. Thirdly, the number of registered foundations of popular 
schools in the course of the eighteenth century in the Kingdom’s 
mainland was low (five) (Berardi, 1982: 36). Fourthly, nineteenth- 
century data show that at the beginning of the 1840s elementary 
schools were still absent from the great part of the Kingdom’s mainland 
(see table 5.5). Hence, too different a scenario is unlikely.
What is more, by the beginning of the nineteenth century schooling in
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Turin was significantly less diffuse than in other Italian regions:
Table 5.2
Ratio of schoolboys over male population aged 6-12 in Italy at the beginning of
the nineteenth century (1810 ca) by region (percentage)
Turin1 Lombard
departments
Venetian
departments
Emilian
departments
Marchigian
departments
Kingdom of 
Naples2
25 62 41 15 16 32
‘The figure for Turin refers to 1807 and the age range is 7-14. 
2The figure for the Kingdom o f  Naples refers to 1814. 
Sources: Vigo (1971: 89); Roggero (1992: 178).
These data are based upon statistics gathered by the French 
administration. Conceivably, fourteen years of discontinuous and 
uncertain rule were too short a time for the French to significantly alter 
the distribution of schooling across regions, and these figures can be 
regarded as representative of the legacy of the ancien regime (with the 
possible exception of the data on Naples, since the period between 
1809 and 1814 witnessed a marked acceleration in the pace of 
expansion; Brambilla, 1972: 522). Due to the different age range these 
figures exaggerate the poorness of the provision in Turin. Nevertheless, 
according to Roggero (1992: 177), the capital was considerably better 
endowed than the rest of Piedmont and the statistics of Turin, 
differently from the others, include non-official schools (which 
accounted for almost half of the total estimated attendance). Hence, the 
indication that schooling diffusion at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century in Piedmont was significantly lower than in Lombardy, Venice 
and the Kingdom of Naples.
Brambilla (1972: 522) warns us that statistics from the French period 
contain serious errors, and there is a risk of getting the wrong message, 
even at a broad level of comparison. Yet, other sources confirm the
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scenario emerging from table 5.2. Comparatively high diffusion in 
Venice and, to a lesser extent, in Naples is supported by data on 
number of schools. By 1792 there were forty primary schools in Naples 
(Sani, cited in Genovesi, 1999: 25). Venice in 1786 counted nineteen 
public schools and about three-hundred private teachers (Scarabello, 
1992: 638-9). These data, I remind you, compare with six elementary 
schools in Turin in 1807, where the population was about one fourth of 
Naples and two-thirds of Venice (Woolf, 1979: 283-4; Roggero, 1992: 
177). The Lombard’s leadership is confirmed by nineteenth-century 
data (see table 5.4), as well as the high rate of growth registered by 
Toscani (1993: 174) in the later part of the eighteenth century.
The comparatively weak position of Turin can be traced to a lack of 
expansion in the later part of the eighteenth century, more directly than 
to the legacy of the Renaissance. In 1770, Venice counted as many state 
primary schools as Turin. Even if a thriving private sector meant that 
the provision of schooling in Venice was probably higher than in Turin 
(in 1786 the size of the private sector, in terms of number of school­
children, was more than three times greater than the public sector), it is 
only in the intervening period that marked difference started emerging. 
Between 1770 and 1786, in fact, while schooling was stagnating in 
Turin, the number of public schools more than tripled in Venice (from 
6 to 19) (Scarabello, 1992: 638-9). In Lombardy, while up to the 1760s 
the trend of expansion did not depart from that of the two previous 
centuries (see table 5.1), from the 1770s schooling started growing at a 
pace which would have been unconceivable in the preceding centuries. 
Between 1775 and 1796 there were founded 206 schools. This figure 
compares with 34 registered foundations between 1750 and 1775, and 
72 between 1570 and 1750 (Toscani, 1993: 112, 115-6, 119, 174).
The table and chart in the two following pages show trends in 
schooling diffusion in the nineteenth century in seven Italian regions, 
two from the north-west, Piedmont and Lombardy, one from the north-
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east, Veneto, two from central Italy, Tuscany and Lazio, and two from 
the south, Campania and Sardinia (Sardinia and Lazio have not been 
included in the graph due to too limited availability of data).
The data is mostly based upon government statistics gathered by Vigo 
(1971). The chart has been drawn assuming that enrolment rates are 
correct, and is based on informed guesses for the period not covered by 
the statistics.
The first thing one notices by looking at the graph 5.1 and table 5.3 is 
that Piedmont and Lombardy the size of the provision reached quasi- 
universal proportions considerably earlier than any other region. This is 
due neither to the sample nor to the measurement. Data from the 1861 
census on number of boroughs with at least one school , and literacy 
rates provide the same indication (Vigo, 1993: 50; De Fort, 1996: 79).
Enrolment rates show that, in contrast to the previous century, by the 
mid-nineteenth century Piedmont was second only to Lombardy, thus 
indicating a comparatively high growth in the course of the first half of 
the century. They do not tell us, on the other hand, when Piedmont 
made the ‘jump’. Other sources can help us filling the gap.
Enrolment rates declined between 1814 and 1818 in Campania and 
increased only by a relatively small amount between 1810 and 1830 in 
Lombardy, suggesting that, in general, the period immediately after the 
restoration was not one of expansion. This interpretation is supported 
by the fact that at the same time schools were viewed with suspicion by 
the Piedmontese authorities, who feared them to be a site of 
revolutionary propaganda following the French rule (Roggero, 1992: 
156-7).
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Table 5.3
Ratio of school-children over population aged 6-12 in nineteenth-century Italy by
region (in percentage).
Region/Yea
r
1814 1818 1830 1835 1841 1845 1848 1850 1851
C
O
IX
)
C
O 18561 1857 1858 1864 1882 1902
Piedmont
M 69 101 96 99
F 24 85 91 95
Total 46 46 57 93 93 97
Lombardy
M 72 70 83 85 87 88
F 33 53 72 81 82 85
Total 53 61 771 83 85 86
Veneto
M 67 82 83
F 12 68 73
Total 40 75 78
Tuscany
M 23 16 36 50 61
F 17 11 27 42 58
Total 203 14 32 46 59
Lazio
M 37 55 70
F 56 57 70
Total 464 56 70
Campania
M 32 16 30 49 52
F 9 8 25 42 44
Total 20b 12 7 28 45 48
Sardinia
M 17 24 30 31 50 50
F 0 8 25 42 47
Total 9 13 19 28 46 48
'These figures refer to the average number o f  school-children and have been computed with reference 
to the rate Piedmont/Kingdom and number o f  children o f  1850.
2These figures refer to success o f  compulsion.
3These figures include children attending schools for children aged 3 to 6.
4These figures refer to the province o f Rome.
5These figures refer to the kingdom o f  Naples (mainland).
Sources: Mittermaier (1845: 194), Vigo (1971: 69, 100-1, 104-7, 110-3, 116, 119-21, 154-9, 178-83), 
Lanza (1857, reproduced in Berardi, 1982: 194-5).
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Graph 5.1
Enrollment rates in nineteenth-century elementary 
schools in Italy
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From 1822 it became compulsory for councils to open free elementary 
schools, and this factor, no doubt, had an impact on dynamics of 
growth. Quite substantial, in the account of Serristori ([1833: 61-2] 
reproduced in Bearardi, 1982: 182-3), who wrote in the Statistical 
essay o f  Italy that by the beginning of the 1830s male (but not female) 
elementary schools were present in virtually all towns of the kingdom’s 
mainland. On the other hand, other sources indicate that Serristori’s 
estimate overstates the case.
Mittermaier (1845: 201-2) argues that the 1822 regulation were largely 
ineffectual, and Mittermaier and Rodolico (1936: 397) write that the 
provision started expanding at some pace only from the 1840s. Their 
assessments needs to be scrutinised, since Mittermaier is advocating an
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intensification of governmental intervention in education and Rodolico 
is celebrating the reign of Carlo Alberto, ruler of Sardinia from 1831. 
Hence, both of them have an incentive to exaggerate the achievements 
of the 1840s interventions. Yet a glance at the quantitative data 
gathered by Griseri (1973: 22, 38, 73, 74) broadly confirms the 
accuracy of their assessment. Statistics of the deputy intendant of 
Salluzzo show in the period between 1825 and 1832, in the province 
the schooling population registered a very limited growth, from 3118 to 
3336. In 1839 the magistrato della riforma, the officer responsible for 
directing the schooling apparatus, ordered a general inspection of all 
colleges and schools. The results showed that by 1842 elementary 
schools were still absent from the great part of the Piedmontese 
mainland. The 1853 statistics depict a very different scenario. In the 
whole of kingdom (including Sardinia, where the provision of 
schooling was amongst the lowest in Italy), only a minority of the 
towns were still without any male elementary school (see table 5.4). If 
these figures confirm both the limited impact of the 1822 regulation, 
and an acceleration from the 1840s, the 1842 statistics also showed that 
only about 19 percent (328) of the towns had no school at all, 
indicating that in the course of the 1840s some of these schools 
probably changed status, and the real pattern of growth was somewhat 
more gradual than Mittermaier and Rodolico claim.
In any case, in Piedmont, and not anywhere else to a comparable 
extent, schooling grew at great pace between 1853 and 1864. The 
difference between the figures (from 46 percent to 93 percent) cannot 
be explained by the fact that the liberal regime allowed private schools 
to ‘come out’, since both in 1850 and 1864 the private sector accounted 
only for a minority of the enrolments, and the share decreased from 10 
percent to 4 percent in the course of the same years (Vigo, 1971: 100-1; 
132-3). The fact that from the 1840s the path of attendance to 
elementary schools became increasingly regulated and prolonged (from 
‘two or more years’ to four years; Berardi, 1982: ch. 2), implies that
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some of the difference is due to a longer stay. In addition, much of the 
difference is accounted for by the fact that girls started going to school 
in great numbers. However, this was the case also in other regions (see 
table 5.3), and the rate of growth remains too great to be believed. If 
enrolment rates are correct, Piedmont managed to achieve in just over a 
decade what Lombardy did not manage in a century of compulsory 
education. And all this without schooling being compulsory (it became 
so only from 1859, only for two years, and without specifying any 
sanction). It may well be that the 1863 statistics had been swelled in 
order to support the (successful) Piedmontese bid for leadership in
education in post-unification Italy. Some inconsistencies in the data
00would suggest that to be the case . On the other hand, there is a limit 
to the possibilities of manipulation, and, even if the change was 
probably more gradual than the figures suggest, other sources confirm 
that during the 1850s in Piedmont schooling grew at a particularly high 
pace, for the girls in particular. The following table is based upon 
statistics of the magistrato della riforma and the ministry of public 
instruction:
Table 5.4
Towns with at least one elementary school in the Kingdom of 
Sardinia, 1840-1860 ca. (percentage).
Year M F
1842 10*
1853 76 25
1856 95 63
*This figure refer to the provinces o f  Turin, Cuneo, Nice, Alessandria, Novara and 
Aosta only.
Source: Griseri (1973: 38, 73-4).
These data cast some light on how Piedmont managed to become the 
best endowed region by the time of the unification starting from a 
subaltern position at the beginning of the century. Between the 1840s
117
and the 1850s, at the same time as the Kingdom of Sardinia was 
becoming a constitutional monarchy, schooling grew at a greater pace 
than anywhere else.
By contrast, in central and southern Italy schooling growth was on the 
whole slow up to the unification, for an acceleration to ensue in its 
aftermath. This is as valid for the above sample as for the peninsula as 
a whole:
Table 5.5
Ratio of school-children over population aged 6-12 in Italy by area after the
unification (in percentage)
Year/Region North-West North-East Centre South Isles
1863-4 83 37* 29 24 17
1881-2 88 68 46 39 32
1901-2 90 76 60 43 45
*This figure is for Emilia only.
North-West: Lombardy, Liguria and Lombardy.
North-East: Veneto and Emilia.
Centre: Tuscany, Marches, Umbria, Lazio and Abruzzi.
South: Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria.
Isles: Sicily and Sardinia.
Source: Vigo (1971: 138-9, 160-1,184-5).
In addition, these data show that while in the immediate aftermath of 
the unification, beside the north-west, where the margin for 
improvement was small, schooling grew at sustained pace everywhere 
(albeit not to the same extent as in post-1848 Piedmont), the latter part 
of the century witnessed a marked slowing down in the south and the 
isles.
In this section I have measured the rhythm of growth of schooling in 
Piedmont and post-unification Italy between the thirteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. To summarise the main lines of development,
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between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries schooling 
experienced a first phase of expansion centred in the cities of the 
Renaissance core. Throughout Italy, up until the second half of the 
eighteenth century, schooling remained the domain of a minority. Over 
the long period, the emergence of universal schooling was sudden, 
rather than gradual. From the 1770s the schooling provision, 
particularly for the boys, began growing with at unprecedented pace in 
some areas, notably Austrian Lombardy and the Republic of Venice, 
but not in Piedmont. At the beginning of nineteenth century, the 
schooling provision in Piedmont was amongst the lowest in Italy. 
Starting from the 1840s, in Piedmont schooling grew faster than 
anywhere else in Italy. By the time of the unification, statistics show 
that Piedmont was the first Italian region for schooling diffusion and 
almost all the children in schooling age were enrolled. In central and 
southern Italy, and, to a lesser extent, in the north-east, the provision 
remained limited until the unification. The immediate aftermath of the 
unification saw an acceleration everywhere, albeit not of the same 
proportion experienced by Piedmont in the central part of the 
nineteenth century. In the last twenty years of the century, schooling 
continued to grow at a good pace in central and north-eastern Italy, but 
significantly less so in the south and the isles. By the turn of the century 
the majority of Italian children in schooling age was enrolled. We shall 
now proceed to discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.
Schooling and industrialisation
The major debate emerging from the historical sociology of schooling 
has been the extent to which the state systems of education are 
explained by the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. 
The argument that mass education emerged to train the work-force to 
the technical requirements of industrial production nowadays 
commands much less influence than it used to be the case, and Gellner 
(1983: ch. 3) is possibly the sole historical sociologist arguing for the
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unmediated primacy of industrialisation in explaining the rise of 
universal schooling in recent times. The industrialisation hypothesis 
has been challenged on three grounds. Firstly, systematic interventions 
aimed at promoting schooling expansion often predated the industrial 
revolution, and patterns of growth, across and within nation-states were 
only weakly correlated to industrialisation. Hence, factors other than 
industrialisation, such as philanthropy, state formation and nation- 
building were decisive in explaining dynamics of growth (Laquer, 
1.969; Meyer et al., 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; De Swaan, 1988: 
ch. 3; Green, 1992). Secondly, the functional link between education 
and industrial production, particularly in the early phase of 
industrialisation (1780-1870), is much weaker than it is usually 
assumed. The first factories, the argument goes, did not demand 
particularly complex tasks from the workers, and literacy was not a pre­
requisite to enter into the labour market. On the contrary, the first 
industrialists relied with unprecedented intensity on child labour, to the 
effect that, on the whole, the first phase of industrialisation had a 
negative effect on schooling diffusion (Cipolla, 1969: 68; Smelser, 
1991: 356; Green, 1992). Thirdly, the effects of industrialisation upon 
growth of schooling were mediated through conflicts between 
interested groups, such as classes, churches, and local and central elite, 
and patterns of growth were significantly affected by the distribution of 
economic, ideological and political power across nation-states (Archer 
and Vaughan, 1972; Archer, 1979; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Barbagli, 
1976; Smelser, 1991; Green, 1992).
On the other hand, the industrial revolution continues to recover central 
importance in most accounts of educational expansion. In particular, 
one can identify four types recurrent arguments. First, in the second 
half of the nineteenth century industrial technology became 
increasingly complex, and industrialisation became important in 
accounting for growth of schooling from around 1870 (Cipolla, 1969: 
68-71; Green, 1992). Second, in contrast to agrarian production, the
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factory demanded a disciplined (punctual, cleaned, healthy, orderly) 
work-force (Thompson, 1967; see also Bowles and Gintis, 1976; De 
Swaan, 1988). Third, schooling expansion followed the attempt to 
manage the social tensions brought about by the development of an 
industrial urban economy (Wardle, 1970: 22-6; Laquer, 1976; De 
Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Smelser, 1991: 357). Fourth, industrialisation 
upset the traditional structure of power relations and identity, by 
endowing the middle-class with unprecedented access to wealth, and 
political and ideological influence. In turn, the rise of the bourgeoisie 
translated in an increasing emphasis on qualification in defining the 
social hierarchy and schooling diffusion to train the work-force (Archer 
and Vaughan, 1972; Archer, 1979; Berardi, 1982; Green, 1992).
What follows discusses the above arguments in relation to the 
particular development of schooling in Piedmont within Italy and 
patterns of growth of schooling within and across regions in post­
unification Italy. In particular, the section focuses on the impact of 
industrialisation. The rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation are 
addressed in the two next sections.
The Italian evidence confirms Cipolla’s (1969: 68) argument that the 
association between industrialisation and growth of schooling became 
stronger in the later part of the nineteenth century. First, the city started 
being dominant in terms of diffusion of schooling only towards the 
later nineteenth century. At the time of unification enrolment rates were 
not significantly greater in the urban centres. And particularly so in a 
relatively industrialised region like Piedmont, where, on the contrary, 
the diffusion of elementary schools was higher in the countryside (even 
if attendance in the country-side was more intermittent (Vigo, 1971; 
Berardi, 1982), with the implication that the actual levels of attendance 
remained higher in the cities, this factor does not challenge the result in 
its essentials). It is only in the intervening period, and particularly in
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the last twenty years of the century, that a marked difference of 
schooling diffusion across urban and rural areas started emerging:
Table 5.6
Ratio of school-children over population aged 6-12 in urban and rural areas in
Piedmont and Italy after the unification (in percentage)
Piedmont Italy
Year Cities Rest Difference Cities Rest Difference
1863-4 79 94 -15 44 43 1
1881-2 93 93 0 62 57 5
1901-2 94 98 -4 80 61 19
Source: Vigo (1971: 132-3, 136-7, 154-5, 158-9, 182-3, 178-9).
Second, a strengthening of the association between schooling diffusion 
and industrial development in the later nineteenth century is confirmed 
if we look at correlation rates between regional distribution of 
schooling and industrialisation. Regional industrialisation is measured 
as the percentage of industrial added value over percentage of male 
population aged fifteen or more. The following table shows correlation 
rates between regional schooling diffusion and industrialisation:
Table 5.7
Correlation between regional industrialisation and diffusion of schooling 
in post-unification Italy (in percentage).
Years* (sample size) Corr (schooling, 
industrialisation)
1864/1871 (n=14) 70
1882/1881 (n=16) 65
1902/1902 (n=l6) 78
*the first year refers to the enrolment rates statistics and the second to industrialisation rate 
statistics.
Sources: V igo (1971: 132-79); Fenoaltea (1999: 169).
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The last figure is significantly higher than the other two, thus 
confirming a strengthening of the association between industrialisation 
and schooling diffusion in the later part of the nineteenth century (the 
fact that the second figure is lower than the first one is due an increase 
in the size of the sample and ought not be given much importance). To 
control for the effect of wealth, I have compared correlation rates 
between enrolment rates and GDP per capita and enrolment rates and 
industrialisation by area (north-west, centre and north-east (not 
included in the first row), and south):
Table 5.8
Correlation between enrolment rates and industrialisation and enrolment rates 
and wealth by area (in percentage).
Years*(sample size) Corr (schooling, 
industrialisation)
Corr (schooling, GDP per 
capita)
1863/1871 (n=2) 99 52
1882/1891 (n=3) 88 50
1902/191 l(n=3) 89 58
*the first year refers to the enrolment rates statistics and the second to industrialisation rate and GDP 
per capita statistics.
Sources: Vigo (1971: 132-79); Fenoaltea (1999: 167-169), Cohen and Federico (2001: 15).
The correlation between schooling diffusion and industrialisation is 
consistently and significantly higher than that between schooling 
diffusion and GDP per capita (again, an increase in the correlation rates 
with respect to the previous table is due to a smaller sample size). 
Hence, we may conclude that industrialisation had a positive effect on 
schooling diffusion independently of its correlation with wealth, 
particularly in the later nineteenth century.
On the other hand, Italian schooling developments cast doubts on the 
argument that that early phases of industrialisation hindered the growth 
of schooling. The actual impact of child labour in the early phases of
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industrialisation on dynamics of growth of schooling should not be 
overstated. In Italy, industrialisation had a positive effect on schooling 
diffusion also in the first half of the nineteenth century. The correlation 
rate between regional industrialisation and schooling diffusion was 
high already at the time of the unification (see table 5.7). Within 
nineteenth-century Italy, the two regional leaders in terms schooling 
development, Piedmont and Lombardy, were also early industrialisers, 
not in spite, but partly because of that. As noticed by Berardi (1982), 
educational growth in Piedmont followed the industrial take off of the 
1830s. A marked leadership in the early phases of industrialisation did 
not affect negatively the trend of growth in Lombardy (see table 5.3 and 
graph 5.1).
Moreover, in the first half of the nineteenth century, industrialisation 
was not centred in the urban areas. The greatest share of industrial 
workers were employed in the textile sector, which was not 
concentrated in the cities. For instance, in 1819 Portula, a village in the 
province of Biella, counted almost twice as many looms as Turin 
(Bulferetti and Luraghi, 1966: 101, 117). Hence, the lack of correlation 
between industrialisation and urbanisation in the first half of the 
nineteenth century (see table 5.6) does not necessarily disqualify 
industrialisation from being an important factor also in the early phases 
of schooling expansion.
It does, on the other hand, indicate that, in Italy, the emergence of 
universal schooling cannot be explained in terms of the attempt to 
manage social tensions brought about by processes of urbanisation 
unleashed by the industrial revolution. In this respect, the Piedmontese 
data are particularly significant. Since the councils were responsible for 
financing and running elementary schools, we would expect the 
geographical distribution of schooling to be particularly sensitive to the 
local conditions.
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Furthermore, these data should not seen as meaning that the later 
nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the objectives of popular 
schooling from state formation to economic development. The two 
objectives, both in the early and in the later part of the nineteenth 
century were combined. If in Italy the early stages of expansion (1770- 
1860), popular schooling spread more or less homogeneously across 
rural and urban areas, this is not because schooling promoters were not 
concerned with economic progress, as some commentators have argued 
in relation to other contexts (Laquer, 1976; Meyer et al., 1979). Quite 
independently of whether the production process demanded particularly 
refined skills from the workers, enhancing the productive capacities of 
the population was a central preoccupation of schooling promoters in 
the second half of the eighteenth century. As the Milanese economist 
Gorani ([1773] 1975: 156) wrote in Essay on public education:
When a sovereign plans to perfect the arts, the trades, the 
manufacture, he needs necessarily to spread more lights amongst 
those who cultivate them. Ignorance produces superstition ... 
superstition expands its evil empire ... over the mechanical arts, 
trades and agriculture ... Hence, politicians, stop talking about 
the ways to perfect the mechanical arts, the trades, the 
manufacture. There is only one way ... Dissolve the dark 
ignorance; direct the children of the artisans to able teachers ... 
Never again will the artisans be useless machines unable to 
reflect, but men who can reason with solid foundations on the 
principles of their occupation.
Rather, as in the physiocratic and cameralist traditions, early schooling 
promoters viewed agricultural productivity to be crucial for economic 
development. Rural economy (‘introduction to the probity and 
economy suitable for the country people’) was taught as a subject of the 
curriculum of the first Lombard’s state elementary schools (Ichino 
Rossi, 1977: 159). Maria Theresa (cited in Ichino Rossi, 1977: 144-5),
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empress of Austria, clearly inspired by the economists, in the 1774 
regulation, instructed the Lombard’s elementary teachers thus: ‘The 
infamous class of the people has been for the greatest part of the past 
forsaken in the native ignorance, without training and culture. Hence 
the prejudices, and the mistakes, which spurred by ignorance, have 
been maintained to these days; hence, in many places the slow progress 
of agriculture’.
If starting from the later nineteenth century, schooling started being 
more diffuse in urban and industrial areas, this occurred as part of 
general redressing of economic policy, rather than as a result of the fact 
that technological progress led to the emergence of an association 
between schooling and economic development, as Cipolla (1969) 
would have it. The relevant association was between industrialisation 
and economic development, not between schooling and economic 
development. Favouring industrial development over agriculture was a 
dominant trait of economic policy in general in the same period. In 
Gramsci’s (1997: 154) words: ‘Crispi [’s] ... general policy tends to 
strengthen industrialism in the north ... he does not hesitate to throw the 
Mezzogiomo and the isles in a terrible commercial crises, in order to 
strengthen industry ... it is the policy of producing the producer’. At the 
same time the problem of constructing the citizen was becoming, if 
something, more, not less central, in shaping schooling policies, in the 
wake of the intensification of policies of nation-building that followed 
the unification of Italy.
By contrast, the fact that industrialisation had a positive effect on 
schooling diffusion throughout the nineteenth century should not be 
taken as meaning that schooling expansion was either primarily or 
solely driven by industrialisation. The aims of educational expansion, 
both before and after 1870, went beyond training the work-force to the 
technical requirements of industrial production. The industrial 
revolution was not a pre-condition to experience mass schooling. In
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Tuscany, Lombardy, Parma, Modena and Naples the process of 
expansion of popular education started gathering momentum from the 
1770s (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati and 
Roggero, 1977; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 2). There is evidence that by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, before the industrial revolution 
invested the Italian peninsula, the diffusion of schooling reached mass 
proportions in Lombardy and Veneto (see table 5.2). In some areas, 
universal schooling predated the technological innovations of the later 
nineteenth century and its emergence cannot be reduced to them. As 
shown by table 5.5, in the north-west, by 1863, almost all the children 
in schooling age were enrolled. Even after 1870, the provision of 
schooling was greatly in excess of the demand for industrial workers. 
Whereas by the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of the 
Italian children in schooling age was enrolled (64 percent, Vigo, 1971: 
183), Italy was still a predominantly agrarian society. As late as 1921, 
the national census classified three fifths of the active population as 
agricultural workers.
Viewing schooling expansion as a creation of the industrial bourgeoisie 
to accustom the work-force to the disciplinary demands of the factory is 
reductive. Firstly, a similar pedagogical model was meant to be applied 
also upon rural workers and citizens, (here I limit myself to mention 
these two categories, but the list could be easily expanded). The 
association between schooling and production of disciplined rural 
workers is well represented by Pagnini’s (1775, reproduced in Balani 
and Roggero, 1976: 131-4) Project o f some school o f agriculture and 
coherently a system o f education for the country hoys, winner of a prize 
at the Accademia dei Georgofili in Florence, from which the following 
extract is taken:
they [the rural workers] must learn ... those rules and maxims, 
physical as well as moral, ... which must produce in the farmers a 
robustness and bodily health such as to become fully active, and
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accustomed to fatigue, which is indispensable to their art... 
secondly, cancel their ... prejudices, to render them shrewd and 
considerate, and able to change their coarseness and pride into 
docility, through which they become bent and apt to listen to the 
reasons and truths, which they will hear from their masters, 
supervisors and leaders
The idea that schooling was instrumental to the production of 
disciplined citizens23 is well conveyed by Carli ([1787] 1975: 161), 
functionary of the Austrian government in Lombardy, for whom the 
end of public education was the creation of:
the necessary uniformity of maxims and feelings; without which 
it is broken that chain of opinion and custom, which, 
supplementing force and fear, ... induces men spontaneously and 
gently towards discipline, and accustoms them to uniform their 
ideas, and direct them towards the legitimate point of union, that 
is society, and the sovereign.
Secondly, the association between schooling and production of 
disciplined bodies long predated the nineteenth century and the 
industrial revolution. Schools were used as a means to discipline 
children of elite and poor at least since the sixteenth century (Balani 
and Roggero, 1976: 16-7; Grendler, 1991: 365; Brizzi, 1982: 906-7). 
An emphasis on continuous surveillance and minute regulation on the 
usage of time, imagination and body are to be found already in 
Renaissance pedagogical thought, and were characterising the 
functioning of Italian schools at least since the heyday of the counter­
reformation (Anselmi, 1981; Scaglione, 1986: 94-5; Chatellier, 1988: 
44-54). For instance, these ideals found a particularly extreme 
manifestation in the system of the internato, theorised by Renaissance 
pedagogues and realised by the Jesuits for the children of the 
aristocracy. The system is described by Balani and Roggero (1976: 51)
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with the following words: ‘the aims of the internato ... was to separate 
the child from the outside world ... isolating him within a closed space 
to shape him through an uninterrupted surveillance ... [and] minute 
rules [which] were guiding in every instant the life of the pupils’. And 
Roggero (1981: 81), with reference to the noble’s college of Turin: 
‘The superiors were taking the most diligent care that the boarders were 
never left to themselves and were led at each instant of their laborious 
day ... Also the division of the spaces within the college ... was 
articulated in such a way as to favour the surveillance of the pupils’.
Thirdly, related to the last point, disciplinary techniques were by no 
means limited to the education of the subaltern classes. On the 
contrary, traditionally, discipline was applied with greater intensity 
upon the children of the elite, in a monotonic fashion (for the 
aristocracy more than the rest). As an example of these dynamics24, 
consider the following extract from a request for funding addressed to 
the king of Sardinia, dated fourteenth of June 177625. The abbot in 
charge of the Turin’s boarding school had been forced to take on a new 
employee, after the suppression of the fellowship of Jesus had left him 
with a personnel shortage. These were the tasks:
Close and universal vigilance on the conduct of both the noble 
boarders, as regards piety, customs, studying, civility, cleanness, 
health, and observance of each rule, down to the tiniest, and on 
that of tutors, teachers, assistants, waiters, and other personnel 
employed by the college to keep everyone to their duty; and 
obviate to any relaxing of the discipline.
The industrial bourgeoisie was not responsible for turning schooling 
into a disciplinary institution, discipline was not peculiar to factory 
work, and factory workers were not the sole object of disciplinary 
intervention. While, arguably, the industrial revolution did contribute to 
precipitate the spread of disciplinary techniques and associated
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institutions, the argument that popular schooling emerged in order to 
train the work-force to the discipline of the factory is reductive. 
Starting from the nineteenth century, the aims of state schooling 
included, but by no means were limited to, training a modem industrial 
work-force.
Schooling and the middle-class
As stressed by Archer (1979), the positive effect of industrialisation on 
schooling diffusion is better seen as mediated by the agency of the 
middle-class. Early industrialisation falls short of explaining 
Piedmont’s exceptional growth of schooling in the central part of the 
nineteenth century, and there is a strong case for granting the early 
enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie an independent role in the process. 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, in Piedmont, the 
rate of industrialisation was only marginally superior to the national 
average (0.07 points against a range of 0.75 in 1871, and 0.18 against a 
range of 1.03 in 1901), and remained well below that of Lombardy. 
Notably, Piedmont’s relative industrialisation in 1871 was lower than 
in Sicily, where landed interests traditionally were strong and 
enrolment rates were amongst the lowest of the peninsula (14 percent 
in 1863, 29 percent in 1882, 44 percent compared to a national average 
of 43 percent, 57 percent and 64 percent respectively) (Vigo, 1971: 
137, 159, 183; Fenoaltea, 1999: 16).
A marked intensification of processes of secularisation of state 
schooling is a definitive trait of post-1848 educational policies (Bertoni 
Jovine, 1954; Berardi, 1982; Genovesi, 1999). The dominant position 
in the Subalpin parliament was one of educational expansion (De Fort, 
1996). As the president of the chamber Bixio26 put it in 1848 in the 
address to the crown:
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The government takes the vote for the universal re-organisation 
of public education which must inform the growing generation of 
both sexes to virtue, charity of the patria, and liberty; the 
Chamber trusts that free instruction extended to every type of 
studying will prepare the citizens to the noble office of holding 
and illustrate the State. The deputies will not neglect any 
proposition directed to the highest end, to the development of the 
material and moral interests of society, and for the benefit of the 
less wealthy and more numerous classes
The enfranchisement of the middle-class proved to be positive factors 
on schooling expansion also in the other Italian regions, where, as we 
saw earlier in the chapter, in the aftermath of the unification the rate of 
growth accelerated significantly. The correlation rate between regional 
distribution of enrolment rates and industrialisation falls significantly if 
we neglect the effect of industrialisation upon distribution of wealth. In 
1902 the correlation rate between regional enrolment rates and number 
of industrial workers every one thousand inhabitants was 5.9 percent 
(Vigo, 1971: 107). This figure compares with 7.7 percent, when we 
take into account industrial wealth when measuring regional 
industrialisation (see table 5.7). Albeit isolated, the result is significant 
since at the time, according to Cipolla (1969: 69-72), there was close 
link between literacy and industrial production, and thus we expect a 
close correlation between schooling diffusion and demand for 
industrial manpower.
On the other hand, the emergence of universal schooling cannot be 
reduced to the transition from a society of orders, where the educational 
system is dominated by the clergy to the benefit of the aristocracy, to a 
society of classes, where schooling is dominated by the bourgeoisie. 
Archer (1979) argues that in France, England, Denmark and Russia, 
before the establishment of state systems of education, schooling was 
dominated by the clergy in an absolutist fashion. The religious system
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of education obstructed the bourgeoisie because it granted insufficient 
attention to financial disciplines, legitimised a rigidly stratified social 
order and prevented the middle-class to access positions commensurate 
to their qualifications. The legitimation of a conservative social 
structure rendered the religious system beneficial to the aristocracy. 
Similarly, Brizzi (1976) claims that, in early modem Italy, the Jesuit 
system acted as a means to reinforce the aristocratic hold on political 
power against the challenge of the third estate through the college of 
the aristocracy. Brizzi supports this claim by showing that the public of 
the college of the aristocracy was drawn disproportionally from the 
aristocracy of blood.
The Piedmontese case shows that this perspective tells only a part of 
the story. On the whole, particularism was eroded, not re-enforced by 
the religious system. The type of dominion legitimised by the religious 
system was lateral, rather than particularistic, and formally grounded on 
merit, as opposed to blood. The Jesuits intensified processes of 
individualisation to previously unseen extents through the continuous 
and meticulous recording of details about each student’s ‘virtues and 
vices’, an unprecedented reliance on examination, and, crucially, the 
employment of comparable evaluation standards across aristocracy, 
clergy and third estate (Brizzi, 1981; Anselmi, 1981; Scaglione, 1986). 
Free and officially open to everyone willing and capable, but in practice 
serving a selected public, the Jesuit system contributed to the 
crystallisation of lateral identities across clerical elite, aristocracy and 
liberal professions, not least through the usage of Latin as the exclusive 
medium of teaching and a uniform pedagogy across the system. Like 
state schooling in the class society (see Young, 1971; Bourdieu, 1972; 
Bernstein, 1997), by and large, the religious system of education, 
assisted processes of reproduction of the social stmcture through 
hidden, as opposed to overt, means, such as a status oriented pedagogy, 
curriculum and evaluation (Anselmi, 1981: 39-40; Brizzi, 1976: 235- 
56; Roggero, 1981: 84-90; Scaglione, 1986: 91-2).
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The Jesuit system granted the aristocracy a separate educational space, 
through the college of the aristocracy. However, a distinct educational 
space for the aristocracy hardly constituted a novelty, and the relative 
weight of the college of the aristocracy within the religious system 
should not be overstated. In Piedmont and Savoy, there was only one 
college for the aristocracy, and its establishment (1679) post-dated the 
spread of religious colleges for third estate and clergy, forty-four by 
1729. The argument that the religious system was instrumental to 
aristocratic dominion neglects that schooling served also as a means to 
legitimise the liberal professions’ dominion over the populace. The 
assumption that education in the old order was absolutely dominated by 
the Church is ill-suited to describe early modem Piedmont, where 
religious schools were predominantly financed by municipalities 
(Balani and Roggero, 1976; Roggero, 1981).
The beginning of state’s leadership in education, carried out between 
the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth 
centuries, and fiercely opposed by the Catholic Church, led to a 
strengthening of the association between the schooling system and 
production of an educated elite, overlapping, but by no means 
coterminous, with the aristocracy (Roggero, 1981; 2002). By the later 
seventeenth century, the spread of mercantilism meant that the 
regulation of dynamics of access to the liberal professions was the 
objective of deliberate educational policies on the part of the state. As 
the intendant of Savigliano (cited in Roggero, 1981: 24) put it in 1699, 
in a letter to Her Majesty: ‘Reflect her Your Eminent Signoria ... on the 
political usefulness of [a Jesuit school] since we find ourselves without 
lawyers, doctors, solicitors and scientists ... the only means to make up 
for such a shortage, will be the opening of schools of the above 
mentioned Fathers’. At the same time Jesuit schools were departing 
from the religious and humanities centred curriculum prescribed by the 
Ratio studiorium in favour of more scientific and mundane oriented
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01subjects . In the noble’s college of Turin, for instance, the curriculum 
included: ‘geometry, geography, cosmography, fortification,
chronology, history, ... coat of arms, ... civil and canonic law, foreign 
languages, French and others’ (cited in Roggero, 1981: 83). The link 
between educational reforms and promotion of scientific knowledge is 
stressed in the Royal Constitutions for the University of Turin (1729), 
which motivate the re-organisation of the university thus: ‘so that the 
Youth cultivated in the sciences and the good arts can ... usefully serve 
the Prince and the Patria, and benefit itself and the others through the 
usage of the knowledge acquired’ (reproduced in Duboin, 1818-1869: 
249). The curriculum of the university included experimental physics, 
mathematics and geometry in the faculty of arts (reproduced in Balani 
and Roggero, 1976: 94).
State intervention in schooling coincided with a process of closure of 
popular access to schooling, and it would not be incorrect to associate 
the 1729 educational reforms to the attempt to clamp down on what 
was seen as an excessive demand on schooling on the part of the third 
estate. However, the means of intervention, the introduction of fees to 
access to the primary classes together with greater integration between 
primary and secondary sectors, corresponded to a class, not aristocratic, 
type of closure. An emphasis on meritocratic, as opposed to 
aristocratic, closure emerge from the fact that the absolutist educational 
system fostered intergenerational Social mobility through the 
introduction of a system of bursaries, the Collegio delle province, being 
the most famous manifestation.
The growth of popular schooling cannot be explained solely with 
refemce to the fact that in the nineteenth century the bourgeoise took 
control of the schooling system. Both because the assumption that 
schooling under the old order was unambiguously obstructive of the 
‘bourgeoisie’ is inaccurate, and because the fact that the schooling 
system was serving the interests of the middle-class was not a sufficient
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condition to experience sustained schooling expansion. Sectors of the 
‘bourgeoisie’, liberal professions, state functionaries, local elite, thrived 
on the religious and absolutist schooling systems. The absolutist state, 
if somewhat more bulkily, exhibited a propensity to erode areas of 
clerical and aristocratic autonomy through schooling in the same way 
as the nineteenth-century bourgeois state did. And yet, as we have seen 
in the previous section, between the sixteenth and the second half of 
the eighteenth centuries growth of popular schooling was very slow 
indeed. By and large, as far as schooling was used as a means of social 
reproduction, the mechanism relied on dynamics of limitation, not 
expansion, of the access of the populace to schooling.
Neither the industrial revolution nor the enfranchisement of the 
bourgeoisie were responsible for changing the attitude of state builders 
towards popular education. In Piedmont educational expansion did 
follow the industrial take off and benefited from the enfranchisement of 
the bourgeoisie. However, this is due to the particular trajectory of state 
formation of Piedmont. A strong intellectual movement demanding 
state-led schooling expansion started developing earlier, from the 
1760s (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976: 112-42). From the 
1770s Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Naples and, especially, Lombardy, put 
in place measures aimed at expanding the provision of popular 
education (Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977; 
Genovesi, 1999: ch. 2).
As argued by Green (1992), particular trajectories of state formation 
were decisive in shaping the process of growth of state schooling, in a 
way that can only partly be accounted for by class relationships. It was 
neither a weak tradition of capitalism nor a weak ‘bourgeoisie’ that 
prevented eighteenth-century Piedmont, unlike Lombardy, Tuscany, 
Modena, Parma, Venice and Naples, to pursue a policy of expansion of 
popular schooling. According to Malanima’s (1999: 203-4) account, 
Piedmont was hit with less intensity than the rest of the peninsula by
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the eighteenth-century economic crises, with the result that 
Piedmontese industry and commerce were in a comparatively good 
state. As shown by Stumpo (1979, 1984), between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, in Piedmont the state started organising itself 
along capitalist lines earlier than the other Italian states. Even if the 
peripheral role played by Piedmont during the Renaissance hindered 
the rise of an urban patriciate to the result that aristocratic traditions 
were stronger than in the Italian core, early state formation meant that, 
in institutional terms, the Piedmontese ‘bourgeoisie’ was in a 
comparatively good position to bring about change. It was Piedmont’s 
particular trajectory of state formation, not its class structure, that 
explains the lack of popular schooling expansion in eighteenth-century 
Piedmont.
Finally, the fact that the rise of the bourgeoisie to hegemony led to the 
development of state schooling systems ought not to be seen as the 
result of the fact that the bourgeoisie acquired the means to enforce its 
desires, as implied by Archer’s (1979) explanatory model. Processes of 
centralisation and intensification of governmental control upon popular 
education underpinning nineteenth-century Piedmont’s exceptional 
schooling development only partly reflected the will of the bourgeoisie. 
The educational reforms leading to Piedmonts’ exceptional growth of 
schooling in the aftermath of 1848 were top-down measure, passed in 
authoritarian fashion. The two major educational reforms of those 
years, Boncompagni Law (1848) and Casati Law (1859) were passed 
by decree, and attempts of changing the legislation through parliament 
collapsed, or were severely delayed as in the case of the Lanza Law 
(1857), around the issue of the ‘liberty of teaching’ (Gentile, 1920; 
Talamanca, 1977; De Fort, 1996: 37-75). The Piedmontese 
bourgeoisie, similarly to its English and French counterparts, was 
deeply divided by the issue of whether it was legitimate for a liberal 
state to retain a role of leadership in education. Hence, either one takes 
a structuralist perspective and sees the development of state schooling
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systems as a crystallisation of the increased strength of the bourgeoise 
within Piedmontese society, as opposed to a manifestation of its will, 
or accords the political elite an independent role of agency in the 
process. Either way, we are compelled to look at the role of the state in 
the development of the Piedmontese state schooling system in greater 
details. To this task we now turn.
Schooling and state formation
The development of the state schooling system in Piedmont suits 
Green’s (1992; see also Boli and Ramirez, 1987a; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 
3) argument that the growth of state schooling systems was part of 
wider processes of state formation very well. Between the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, all the major educational reforms were carried 
out in connection with wider processes of reform of the administrative 
structure of the state. Complementarily, failure to reform the state 
coincided with failure to reform the schooling apparatus.
The development of the state schooling system started between the end 
of the seventeenth century, marked by the establishment of the college 
of the aristocracy in Turin (1688), entirely funded with royal finances, 
and at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the 1729 
educational reforms asserted the monarch’s leadership over secondary 
schools, first case in Italy. At the same time the Amedean reforms were 
altering radically the institutional outlook of the Savoyard State, 
anticipating other absolutist states in Italy by about half a century 
(Quazza, 1954; Symcox, 1983; Ricuperati, 1994). In the second half of 
the eighteenth century, Piedmont, differently from Tuscany, Lombardy, 
Parma, Naples and Modena, failed to embark on major reformist 
activities (Woolf, 1977: ch. 5). Whereas Tuscany, Lombardy, Parma, 
Naples and Modena started pursuing policies of expansion of popular 
education between the 1760s and 1770s, in Piedmont the 1772 
educational regulation did not introduce substantial innovations with
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respect to 1729 (Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati and Roggero, 
1977; Roggero, 1981; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 2). The basis of universal 
schooling in Piedmont were put by the Jacobins and Napoleon 
(Roggero, 1992; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 3). Its development fell upon the 
restoration regime, starting with the 1822 regulation, which rendered 
compulsory for councils to establish free elementary schools (Griseri, 
1973; Berardi, 1982; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 4). Educational interventions 
in the restoration period were part of a wider movement of 
development of the administrative capacity of the state, after the 
Napoleonic model of ‘administrative monarchy’ (Raponi, 1981; Nada 
and Notario, 1993; Riall, 1994). However, at this stage, schooling 
developments remained framed within the educational structure 
inherited from the eighteenth century. Between 1848 and 1859, the 
system radically departed from the absolutist model, to become similar 
to the one of post-revolutionary France, with a common, compulsory 
elementary course for all (Bertoni Jovine, 1954; Berardi, 1982; 
Genovesi, 1999; Morandini, 2003). At the same time Piedmont, earlier 
than the rest of Italy, was departing from the absolutist model of state 
development to become a nation-state (Caracciolo; 1960; Riall, 1994).
On the other hand, the Italian evidence challenges two arguments 
produced by the literature on education and state formation. First, the 
importance of militarism in precipitating popular schooling ought not 
to be overstated. An influential strand of literature (e.g. Mann, 1993; on 
Britain see Colley, 1992) sees the development of the administrative 
capacity of the state, and schooling in particular (e.g. Boli and Ramirez, 
1987b), as a sort of ‘homeostatic’ reaction to militarism, and the 
pressure of modem warfare on the financial and political resources of 
the modem state. As we observed in chapter two, eighteenth-century 
Piedmont witnessed militarism comparable to that of Prussia and more 
marked than elsewhere in Italy. And this factor was reflected by the fact 
that in Piedmont a state schooling system was introduced earlier than 
anywhere else in Italy and more systematically than in most places. On
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the other hand, militarism failed to deliver growth of schooling. On the 
contrary, eighteenth-century Piedmont was particular within Italy by 
failing to pursue a policy of expansion of popular schooling between 
the 1770s and the 1780s.
Second, accelerated state formation was not a sufficient condition to 
experience growth of the schooling provision (see Boli and Ramirez, 
1987b; Green, 1992). In Piedmont, accelerated state formation in the 
first half of the eighteenth century failed to deliver schooling 
expansion. Across Italy, accelerated state formation became 
unambiguously associated to schooling expansion only starting from 
the second half of the eighteenth century. Even if early modem 
educational developments anticipated those of the nineteenth century 
there are important differences, and the two phenomena must be 
distinguished. Arguments associating the growth of state schooling 
systems to the growth of the modem state fall prey to similar problems 
to those relying on the rise of the bourgeoisie, since, while both the 
making of the bourgeoisie and that of the modem state developed over 
the long period, that was not the case with popular schooling, which 
development was sudden.
There is therefore the need to specify why state builders in eighteenth- 
century Piedmont, unlike Lombardy, the Republic of Venice, Tuscany, 
Modena, Parma, and Naples in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, failed to pursue a policy of schooling expansion. This question 
can be answered by following Foucault (1991b; 2001a), and view 
schooling expansion as a manifestation of bio-power.
According to Foucault, in the course of the eighteenth century the 
development of bio-power saw a marked acceleration in the wake of 
the emergence of post-mercantilist techniques of state formation and 
associated notions of population. In particular, mercantilism, Foucault 
argues, acted as an obstacle towards the development of bio-power
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because it remained framed within a top-down vision of power, rather 
than diffuse one, and the idea that aggregate dynamics of population 
behaviour, such as rates of death and reproduction and economic 
cycles, exhibit regularities amenable to systemic controls was key in 
precipitating the transition. In addition, for Foucault, the progress of 
bio-power was hindered by the rigidity of the theory of sovereignty.
Foucault’s emphasis on the departure from mercantilism in 
precipitating bio-power is consistent with the uneven development of 
schooling systems across eighteenth-century Italy. In particular, this 
perspective accounts for why Piedmont, which reformed in the early 
part of the eighteenth century following a mercantilist logic (Ricuperati 
and Roggero, 1977; Roggero, 1992), failed to pursue schooling 
expansion. And why Lombardy, the Republic of Venice, Tuscany, 
Naples, Modena and Parma, which reformed the educational system in 
the second half of the eighteenth century, at the same time as 
mercantilism was giving way to political economy and physiocratic 
thought as dominant perspectives in economic thought (Woolf, 1979), 
pursued a policy of schooling expansion. In addition, Foucault’s 
perspective accounts for why in Austrian Lombardy, where the 
movement away from mercantilism was anticipated by cameralism, 
experienced educational reforms with the greatest levels of intensity.
Compulsory schooling was introduced in Lombardy as early as 1786, 
only case in eighteenth-century Italy. In Lombardy, the educational 
reforms of the 1770s and 1780s led to the construction of the most 
integrated schooling system in Italy, together with the Piedmontese one 
(Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati, 1982; Genovesi, 
1999). Systematic intervention in popular schooling delivered rapid 
expansion, and, as we have seen in the section on quantitative growth, 
by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Lombardy exhibited a 
marked leadership with respect to schooling diffusion within Italy.
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On the fact that physiocratic thought and political economy represented 
a departure from mercantilism, and from a top-down to a diffuse vision 
of political power in particular, there is little controversy (Haney, 1949; 
Bell, 1953; Roll, 1953). In addition, economists, such as Carli, 
Beccaria and Genovesi were pivotal figures in precipitating the 
expansion of popular schooling in second half of the eighteenth century 
in Italy (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976), and, as predicted by 
Foucault (1991b; 2001a), associated popular schooling to the 
construction of disciplined bodies and populations. In the words of the 
abbot Genovesi ([1768] 1824: 83-7):
The State is a great family. From this it follows that like in the well 
governed family we do not think only about having numerous 
children but also about educating it ... Before anything else we 
must take care of both the domestic and civil education, through 
which we become to trained and regulated in what we think and 
intend to do ... A good education is that which makes good heads 
and strong bodies ... In a plan of wise education we would like I 
The Laws of puberty not in line with the natural body should be 
corrected. Puberty in the women must not be before 17, and those 
of the males not before 20 ... II Re- establish feasts and gymn
The relationship between cameralism and mercantilism is more 
complicated, since cameralist thought is sometimes viewed as a form of 
mercantilism (e.g. Haney, 1949: ch. 8; Bell, 1953: ch. 7). However, 
there are important differences between these two bodies of thought. In 
particular, here we shall focus on their different attitude towards the 
question of population. According to Bell (1953: 120), both 
mercantilists and cameralists praised dense populations, and viewed a 
productive population as an important agent in wealth getting. Rima 
(1967: 26-7) also claims that mercantilists emphasised the importance 
of fighting idleness in the population, citing as an example William 
Petty.
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On the other hand, other sources depict a different picture. If there is 
wide agreement that both mercantilists and cameralists emphasised the 
desirability of a numerous population, other scholars are less prone 
than Bell and Rima to associate mercantilism with an emphasis on the 
productivity of the population. Roll (1953: 104), for instance, argues 
that the thought of Petty represented a departure from mercantilism 
exactly because Petty emphasised the importance of labour as a source 
of wealth, whereas mercantilists were chiefly concerned with dynamics 
of exchange. More generally, Roll views a shift from a focus on trade 
to one on production as one of defining features of post-mercantilist 
economic thought.
As we mentioned earlier, Haney (1949: ch. 8) sees cameralism as a 
form of mercantilism. However, he stresses that cameralist thinkers 
were less concerned than mercantilists with foreign relations, 
commerce and the balance of trade, and concentrated more on 
production. In particular, the stimulation of industry was addressed by 
cameralists under the heading of ‘police’, which objective was that of 
dealing with conduct and sustenance of the population. Raeff (1975: 
1224) also argues that cameralism differed from mercantilism because 
whereas mercantilist thought was chiefly concerned with the regulation 
of tariffs, taxation and trade, cameralism entailed the construction of a 
comprehensive system of national economy, the ‘police’. The latter was 
aimed at promoting and protecting the productive potentials of the 
population. A similar perspective emerges from Pribram’s (1983) 
history of economic thought. Pribram (1983: 91-6) stresses how 
cameralists thought that one of the main tasks of public administration 
was the maintenance of a numerous and well-employed population, and 
that it entailed a shift from trade to industry as the main means of 
economic progress (Pribram emphasises the latter aspect in the thought 
of Sonnenfels in particular). Hence, the indication is that cameralism 
did lead to an increased emphasis on stimulating the productivity of the
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population, as opposed to merely increasing its size, than it was the 
case with mercantilism.
The emphasis found in cameralist thought on the contribution of a 
well-behaved and industrious population towards the good 
administration of the state had direct consequences on their attitude 
towards popular schooling. For cameralist thinkers education was part 
of the ‘police’, and the construction of a disciplined work-force was the 
main objective of popular schooling (Haney, 1949: 157; Melton, 1988). 
And, as shown by Raeff (1975) and Melton (1988), cameralist thought 
was central in shaping the educational policies of eighteenth-century 
Austria and Prussia.
The fact that cameralism and notions of population associated to it 
were important in precipitating popular schooling in the course of the 
eighteenth century is further supported by the fact that there is evidence 
that at the same time cameralist thought started influencing the 
Piedmontese administration, its attitude towards popular schooling 
started changing. In an influential monograph on the state in 
eighteenth-century Piedmont published recently, Ricuperati (1994) 
argues that the Piedmontese reforms were informed by Muratori’s 
(1749) model of ‘public happiness’. Muratori, librarian and abbot in 
Modena, was one of the major Italian intellectual figure of the early 
part of the eighteenth century.
Muratori’s thought on schooling reflects closely the Piedmontese 
educational reforms. Muratori (1749: 77-8) advocates the establishment 
of state schooling systems similar to the Piedmontese one:
it is of the greatest importance for each country to found and 
maintain public schools. And it must be called privileged that city 
where with the name of university are taught by professors paid 
by the prince, or the public all the sciences ... [Hence] In our
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days singular glory has been acquired by Luigi XIV the great 
King of France, and Peter the Great Emperor of Russia, and we 
need to add Vittorio Amedeo King of Sardinia, whose sublime 
mind and beautiful genius, knowing all that can influence the 
Good and Glory of a country, promoted amply the Study of 
Letters, the Cultivation of Arts and Commerce, and the exercise 
of the Militia in his Piedmont. In addition to the university, which 
he founded in Turin, he built a college of Theology, Law, 
Medicine and Surgery.
However, Muratori does not advocate popular schooling. Although 
Muratori (1749: 77) believes that it is ‘of the greatest importance ... the 
goodness and wise regulation of a people’s custom’, he chiefly 
associates the good administration of the state to a virtuous and able 
ruling class, and grants the problem of how to regulate the conduct of 
the populace only cursory attention in his treatise. Accordingly, for 
Muratori, the main objective of schooling is to train the ruling class. As 
he (1749: 74) puts it: ‘The study of letters can serve to form excellent 
captains, and the kings, to succeed in the civil and military government 
... have to learn that which is needed to keep a king prudent on the 
throne and courageous in war’. For Muratori (1749: 76) a more 
‘ignorant people’ is more obedient, and only a few, liberal professions, 
clergy and elite, need to be educated in schools. ‘Law and medicine’, 
Muratori writes, ‘are not needed by he who is not arguing and is 
healthy’. And the best means to educate the populace is through mass: 
‘the ministries of the sacred religion of Christ ... to whose preaching 
are invited all the people ... are the most comfortable and quick means 
to educate the populace and teach it the goodness and righteousness of 
customs’.
We now turn the attention to another text, written just over ten years 
later than Muratori’s treatise under the influence of cameralism. For 
Carlo Felice Leprotti (1966), Piedmontese Secretary of State and War
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in Sardinia, the objectives of popular schooling and its relationship to 
social order are diametrically opposed from Muratori. In what follows, 
I present a detailed summary of the last section of the report, where 
Leprotti addresses the issue of education. Beside the fact that Leprotti, 
differently from Muratori, views the state educational system as a 
means to educate the population, which behaviour Leprotti considers of 
paramount importance, this section is of particular interest to us 
because of two reasons. First, Leprotti’s plan of intervention 
corresponds closely to the logic of bio-power, as described in chapter 
three. As we are now going to see Leprotti, similarly to the cameralist 
thinker von Justi (see Foucault, 2001b: 142), grounds policy-making 
upon the nature of the Sardinian population, conceived of as an organic 
substance amenable to gradual empowerment through a set of detailed 
regulation and incentives tailored to it. Second, Leprotti’s project of 
‘cleansing Sardinia’ closely resembles policies of nation-building that 
developed in nineteenth-century Piedmont. Analogies between the two 
processes include the institutional means, schooling, theatre, and public 
celebrations, the objectives, the emancipation from barbarism and the 
construction of an integrated society, and the logic of intervention, 
which for Leprotti is grounded upon the particularistic nature of the 
Sardinian population.
The title of the report is First book on the reasons behind the 
population implosion in Sardinia. The stated aim of the report is to 
discuss how to transform Sardinia from an ‘accessory’ to a ‘real’ 
power, exploiting its underused natural resources. The final section, On 
the remedies to moral evils, starts by addressing how to reform the 
customs of Sardinians, ‘cleansing the Nation’ as Leprotti calls the 
operation. ‘[TJhere are still in Sardinia some traces, or relics of that 
coarseness, and ancient barbarism, perennial source of one-thousand 
disorders’, Leprotti comments (1966: 107-12). ‘[HJence we start with 
this objective, with the intent of cleansing, as much as it is possible, 
that Nation, and refine it so that it will catch up with the most civilised
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of Europe’. Leprotti rejects Aristotle’s argument that ‘some kind of 
men’ do not need to be trained for they are bom slaves, on the grounds 
that: ‘it is much easier to lead enlightened people, whom by reason, 
willingly, and precisely obey ... than coarse and wild people, who 
unavoidably execute appallingly that which poorly comprehended’. For 
this reason, the establishment of a university in Sardinia’s capital city, 
Cagliari, would be of great advantage, ‘especially as regards the 
reformation of customs’. To support the argument Leprotti cites the 
beneficial effects of the educational reforms in Piedmont, where the 
university led to ‘the increase of commerce ... , the cleansing of 
customs, the advancement of mechanics, the dissolution of the first 
darkness, and the ancient ignorance, and the good taste in each thing’. 
However, according to Leprotti, it would be unwise to apply directly 
the Piedmontese system in Sardinia. For instance, ‘being Sardinians by 
nature ready, and ferocious ... it is apt to forbid to each student to carry 
swords, imitating the custom introduced in all the Pmssian 
universities’.
Leprotti then goes on to suggest other measures to ‘cleanse Sardinia’. 
‘Having started the work, and prepared the spirits through sciences and 
arts’, Leprotti (1966: 112-7) , writes, ‘it would be convenient to study 
how to instil in the souls a certain sweetness, or docility, which partly 
tempers, and corrects that innate ferocity. This idea must not be 
communicated through violence and Laws, but through very sweet 
means, which operating slowly conduct the Peoples to the given end, 
without them realising if . Such measures include the establishment of 
theatres, which like ‘a sleeping drug’ calms the ‘animal spirit of the 
sick’, the implementation of restrictive laws on the supply of alcohol 
(very important for Leprotti given that the hot climate of Sardinia, and 
the effects of wine and liqueur on the blood motion), and the institution 
of public celebrations. On the latter, Leprotti says, ‘These are directed 
towards tightening the knots of society amongst natives, and give 
motion, as it were, ... to the totality of its inhabitants, which contribute
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... to undress them, without them realising it, of the wild genius 
leading them to solitude and violent life’.
‘Having cleansed the Nation’, Leprotti continues, ‘it seems to me that 
there is nothing left but to take out those barriers in between marriages, 
unique means to repair humankind’. As with education, Leprotti 
advises his king against applying in Sardinia the same type of 
intervention as in Piedmont, without taking into account the particular 
body of the local population. ‘Beware of the climate, and of the 
fecundity of the women to that corresponding’, Leprotti warns his ruler, 
‘It would be in vain to apply the incentives only for those women with 
more than twelve children. Such a law is beneficial in the more 
temperate climates, and where the population is more advanced, like in 
Piedmont, but in Sardinia it seems to me, that the number of six, or at 
most eight should be enough, to enjoy these privileges’.
The fact that in the second half of the eighteenth century the 
Piedmontese elite started changing attitude towards popular schooling 
raises the question of why Piedmont failed to follow Lombardy, the 
Republic of Venice, Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Naples in their 
effort towards schooling expansion. A full treatment of this 
problematic would demand a more detailed analysis of the differences 
between eighteenth-century Piedmont and the other Italian regional 
states than we are able to offer here. On the other hand, Foucault’s 
(1991b) perspective of bio-power can help us in two respects. First, the 
early transition to absolutism meant that a particularly strong form of 
authoritarianism developed in Piedmont, thereby hindering the 
assertion of models of state formation grounded on the assumption that 
power is diffuse, as opposed to being concentrated in the elite. Second, 
the rigidity of the scheme of sovereignty meant that state formation 
under absolutism occurred in a discrete, rather than continuous fashion. 
Piedmont experienced difficulties while furthering processes of state 
formation remaining within absolutist frameworks of political
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legitimacy in the first half of the eighteenth century, when the 
institutional reforms, and the educational reforms in particular, led to 
prolonged litigations with the Church (Quazza, 1954). Absolutist states 
reforming the schooling system in the second half of the eighteenth 
century faced similar difficulties (Venturi, 1976). In Piedmont, the 
educational arrangement reached with the Church predicted that the 
Church retained the jurisdiction on popular schooling, and the 
reluctance of facing the consequences of redrawing jurisdictional 
boundaries goes some way in accounting for the failure to reform 
popular education.
The argument that the origin of universal schooling is associated to the 
emergence of diffuse conceptions of power in economic thought 
apparently conflicts with Green’s (1992) claim that laissez faire 
liberalism hindered the development of the state schooling system in 
the first half of the nineteenth century in England (see also Cipolla, 
1969; Wardle, 1970), since, notoriously, laissez faire liberalism 
celebrated the importance of the resistance in devising effective policy 
making to an unprecedented extent. The remain of this section 
addresses the relationship between liberalism and state schooling 
systems.
A full discussion of whether the growth of schooling in the first half of 
the nineteenth century in England was comparatively slow is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion. Here we shall limit ourselves to 
stress two things. First, as emphasised by Green (1992: 248-54) 
himself, laissez faire liberals were enthusiast supporters of schooling 
expansion, and they saw popular schooling as a means to construct an 
orderly and quiescent population (see also West, 1965: ch. 8). Hence, 
notwithstanding the apparent contradiction, in this respect, the English 
evidence does support the claim that schooling expansion was a 
manifestation of bio-power, and that the emergence of diffuse 
conceptions of power was an important factor in changing the
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dominant attitude towards popular schooling.
Second, the evidence on the state of schooling in the first half of the 
nineteenth century in England is mixed. Green (1992) and, especially, 
Cipolla (1969) claim that England was characterised by comparatively 
low rates of growth of schooling in this period. On the other hand, 
Laquer (1976) sees the early part of the nineteenth century as a period 
of intense development of popular schooling, emphasising the role of 
agency of the working class in furthering processes. West (1965: chs. 
9-10) argues that enrolment rates started rising rapidly well before the 
1870 Education Act, which effect on growth of schooling was 
ambivalent. Italian statistics rate England as better endowed than 
France and inferior only to Prussia with respect to schooling diffusion 
by the mid-nineteenth century (De Fort, 1996: 78).
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the evidence does suggest that 
England failed to play the unambiguously dominant role with respect to 
schooling expansion we would expect from the what at the time was 
the unchallenged leader of industrial capitalism. And there is case for 
subscribing to Green’s (1992) view, and grant England’s particular 
trajectory of state formation an important role in explaining this fact. 
On the other hand, we can accept Green’s argument that laissez faire 
liberalism was responsible for retarding the construction of an 
integrated schooling system in the first half of the nineteenth century in 
England only with two qualifications.
First, there is little doubt that in nineteenth-century England the 
schooling system was considerably less integrated than in continental 
Europe, and the influence of society-led models of schooling 
development advocated by laissez faire liberals goes some way in 
accounting for this fact. On the other hand, a similar movement 
developed also in Piedmont. If in Piedmont state builders relied much 
less on the private sector than they did in England is not primarily
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because laissez faire liberalism was not as strong as it was in England. 
It is because Piedmontese state builders thought that the particular 
resistance exhibited by Piedmont was less suitable to a society-led 
model of development than in England, where the population was more 
used to liberty. As Gabriele Casati (1859, reproduced in Talamo, 1960: 
73), Piedmontese ministry of public instruction, wrote in the report to 
the king where he expounds the principles informing the Casati Law: 
‘An unlimited liberty ... is convenient and apt in England, where the 
private citizens have been for a long time accustomed to do that which 
elsewhere is left to the government, could not be experimented without 
dangers here’. Hence, we must stress that the logic of laissez faire 
liberalism, when applied to political practice (if not necessarily in 
theory), was not against the development of a state-led schooling 
system as such, but entailed that the degree- of political intervention 
ought to be limited by the particular type of resistance exhibited by 
each given society.
Second, it is important to distinguish between the ‘limited state’ 
advocated by laissez faire liberals and the ‘nightwatchman state’ 
entailed by classical liberal philosophy. Green (1992) is somewhat 
imprecise on this issue. In particular, Green fails to distinguish laissez 
faire critiques to state schooling system on grounds of efficiency, with 
those invoking the illegitimacy of the operation on the grounds that by 
claiming control of schooling the state would infringe subjective rights, 
and he is too quick in associating the dominance of laissez faire 
liberalism in early nineteenth-century England to the legacy of the 
eighteenth-century liberal state and its emphasis on individual freedom. 
The opposition to state-led schooling systems informed by classical 
liberal philosophy and that associated to laissez faire liberalism must 
be distinguished. Not only for the sake of precision, but also because 
they had different effects on the development of state schooling 
systems. For the reason expounded above, the effects of laissez faire 
liberalism on the development of a state-led schooling system was only
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weakly negative. As we are now going to see, a stronger opposition 
was informed by the second type of critique.
Italian schooling developments confirm that eighteenth-century 
England was particular in lacking a state-led schooling system, and that 
this fact can be explained in terms of its particular constitutional 
structure. In eighteenth-century Italy, similarly to England, the presence 
of constitutional systems of government was a hindering factor towards 
the assertion of the state’s leadership in education. The state intervened 
first in Piedmont, where absolutism developed earlier and republican 
traditions were weaker. By contrast, the intensity of political 
intervention remained comparatively weak in the Republic of Venice, 
where, similarly to England and differently from Lombardy, Tuscany, 
Parma, Modena and Naples, the private sector, as opposed to the state, 
was leading the process of growth of schooling (Ricuperati and 
Roggero, 1977; Scarabello, 1992).
Within classical republicanism, a critique to the legitimacy of state 
schooling systems similar to the one later elaborated by English liberal 
thinkers such as J. S. Mill (see Green, 1992: 254) is to be found in the 
thought of the later Doria ([1741] 1978: 928):
the peoples are like the princes want them. It is for every-one to 
see that the peoples become like brute animals when they are left 
without a true education and discipline, and even more they 
become like brute animals when tyrants expressly educate them 
with a vicious and false discipline
By explaining the growth of state schooling systems in terms of the rise 
of individualist ideology, Boli and Ramirez (1987b) neglect important 
tensions between the language of individualism and the logic informing 
the construction of nineteenth-century schooling systems. State 
schooling systems were not only aimed at empowering the individual,
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but also at unwittingly bend the body towards social ends. As we 
observed earlier, the technique of implementation of state schooling 
system did not reflect universalistic conceptions of human nature, but 
the particularistic nature of populations which were gradually 
transformed by them.
This logic of development was difficult to accommodate within 
classical liberal conceptions of subjective rights. If at the beginning of 
the 1830s, the Lombard jurist Romagnosi (1833: 232) was writing:
Public instruction is necessary for the conservation and progress 
of the single associates. Hence, since it a necessary natural right 
of every-one towards the community; in the same way it is 
a necessary natural duty of the community towards every-one.
It is not to demand his state to honour its commitment to individualist 
values by intervening systematically in the education of the individual. 
But because the principle of individual sovereignty was perceived as 
being in tension with compulsory schooling by French liberals. ‘The 
Chamber of the Deputies’ Romagnosi (1833: 239) writes ‘was 
convinced that the introduction of this principle [compulsory 
schooling] in the law was above the power of the legislator’. And the 
controversy was gradually expanding across liberal circles in Italy.
At the beginning of the 1840s, Mazzini ([1842] 1972: 104-5) informs 
us, the idea that subjective rights are grounded in the individual was 
employed to question the legitimacy of state-led schooling systems. 
The issue of the ‘liberty of teaching’, what was the right of the liberal 
state to educate the individual, invested the Piedmontese public sphere 
in the course of the 1840s, marked by Lambruschini’s (1841) article 
Instruction: On the liberty o f teaching, and, after 1848, the Subalpin 
parliament. The controversy acquired a particularly high degree of 
intensity the 1850s, when the inability to find a solution to the
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problematic led to the resignations of the ministry of public instruction, 
Gioia (Gentile, 1920; Talamanca, 1975; Berardi, 1982).
Key in precipitating the controversy was the agency of the Catholic 
Church The Catholic Church exploited tensions between classical 
liberalism and state schooling systems to defend its prerogatives in the 
field to some effect. As the Catholic philologist, Amedeo Peyron 
(1851: 118), wrote in the aftermath of the 1848 educational reforms in 
On secondary education in Piedmont, ‘what party is left [to the 
Church]? Pronounce liberty of teaching’. And in 1870, the Catholic 
Member of Parliament, D’ Ondes Reggio , in a speech defending a 
proposal of legislative reform aimed at relieving the government of its 
responsibilities in schooling:
Human society ... is composed of various families living together 
... men in human societies have to practice their duties and rights, 
develop their capacities, pursue the good; and all this without this 
society being a State, i.e. a Government... From this follows that 
teaching, like family, patriarchal authority, property, arts and 
trades, religion with its priests, charitable associations, does not 
belong to the state, it precedes it. ... States ... are borne for 
internal security and defense from external enemies ... 
Governments do not have rights, but only functions; even less can 
they concede rights or impose duties, for men receive rights and 
duties from nature.
Hence, in both discursive and institutional terms the Italian evidence 
shows that classical liberal philosophy and cognate doctrines, like 
traditional republicanism acted as an obstacle towards the assertion of a 
state leadership in schooling. This fact raises questions about why in 
nineteenth-century Piedmont, differently from eighteenth and 
nineteenth-centuries England, liberalism eased the progress of the state 
schooling system. In this respect, we must stress that Italian liberalism,
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more unambiguously than English liberalism, was of a nationalist type. 
Nationalism was key in overcoming the difficulties of legitimising state 
schooling with the language of liberalism. As exemplified by the 
following extract from senator Linati’s (reproduced in Talamo, 1960: 
91-2) speech in parliament in 1859:
A government ... must not only govern but found the nation: to 
make it in such a way that each member feels the association ... 
Those that advocate the liberty of teaching think of the individual 
not the nation ... Does it not compete to [society] the right, better 
still the duty to provide and demand a bodily spirit from the 
nation? That which is necessary everywhere is indispensable in 
Italy, because Italy is not a made nation, like France, Spain and 
England, but a nation to be made, and it is apt to make it 
immediately.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have been discussing the origin of universal schooling 
in relation to patterns of schooling expansion in Piedmont between the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In particular, we considered the 
impact of industrialisation, rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation. 
To summarise the main conclusions, both industrialisation and the rise 
of the bourgeoisie had a positive effect upon growth of schooling. Early 
industrialisation and enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie were found in 
connection with an exceptional rate of schooling development in the 
central part of the nineteenth century in Piedmont. Across post­
unification Italy, regional industrialisation was strongly correlated with 
schooling diffusion, particularly in the later part of the nineteenth 
century.
However, the emergence of universal schooling cannot be explained 
solely in relation to these processes. Patterns of schooling expansion in
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Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries obeyed only 
imperfectly to the logics of bourgeois hegemony and industrialization, 
and they were significantly affected by dynamics of state formation. 
This not because the modem state has an inherent tendency to gradually 
expand its scope of intervention. Universal schooling corresponded to 
the assertion of particular technique of state formation, not simply the 
development of a process under way. In particular, I stressed the 
importance of the movement away from mercantilism as the dominant 
perspective in economic thought in precipitating the process.
Finally, I addressed the relationship between liberalism and state 
schooling systems, emphasising how the definition of subjective rights 
entailed by classical liberal philosophy, more unambiguously than 
laissez faire liberalism, acted as an obstacle towards the assertion of a 
state leadership in schooling. The ways in which tensions between the 
logic of development of state schooling systems and the definition of 
subjective rights associated to classic liberal philosophy provided a 
context for the emergence of the nationalist solution to state/society 
relations, thereby precipitating the development of the state schooling 
system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont, will be addressed in the next 
chapter.
155
6. The nationalist school in Piedmont
Introduction
This chapter discusses the process by which the Piedmontese schooling 
system became aimed at constructing a nation. The objective of the 
operation is twofold. First, to show that the schooling system in 
Risorgimento’s Piedmont was aimed at constructing a nation, thereby 
supporting the claim that nationalism was an important factor in 
explaining Piedmont’s exceptional schooling development in the 
central part of the nineteenth century. Second, to show that nationalism 
was instrumental to overcome difficulties associated with legitimising 
the development of the state schooling system with the language of the 
social contract, and discuss the implication of these findings with 
respect to on-going debates on the relationship between nationalism 
and state formation.
The chapter is organised as follows. The next section maps the 
institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy in the Piedmontese 
schooling system, by attending to the development of national language 
as a medium of teaching and national history as schooling subject 
between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In doing so, I 
challenge the positions that Italian nation-building was precipitated by 
the unification of Italy and the enfranchisement of the working-class, 
and that the enfranchisement of the working-class was responsible for 
precipitating political nationalism. Risorgimento’s nationalism 
exhibited typical features of political nationalism both with respect to 
the attitude of state builders towards the nationalist objectives of 
popular education, and with respect to the grounds of national identity, 
which included descent.
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The chapter then moves on to address the relationship between political 
nationalism and the state schooling system. Through a comparison 
between absolutist and nationalist conceptions of citizenship, I show 
that while nationalist ideology was anticipated by the social contract, it 
entailed a different conception of subjective rights, and was developed 
in opposition to the social contract as a doctrine of political legitimacy. 
In particular, I show that the movement away from the social contract 
towards nationalist ideology was instrumental to overcome difficulties 
experienced by liberal thinkers with legitimising the maintenance and 
development of a centralised schooling system with the language of the 
social contract. In turn, I argue that these difficulties are to be traced to 
tensions between post-mercantilist techniques of state formation and 
the definition of subjective rights associated to the tradition of the 
social contract. The conclusion summarises the main argument and 
findings.
Language, history and nation-building
This section maps the institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy in 
the Piedmontese schooling system between the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, by attending to the development of national 
language as a medium of teaching and national history as a schooling 
subject. The first part is dedicated to language. The second part focuses 
on history. In concluding the section, I discuss the implications of the 
findings.
Language
Ever since the nineteenth century, language as a basis for collective 
identification and objective of the political struggle has been playing a 
prominent part in most, if not all, nationalist movements. This is 
particularly so in the Italian case, where the basis for nationhood, 
Hobsbawm (1994: 37) writes, was the presence of an elite sharing a
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national literary and administrative language, Italian. The promotion of 
Italian language was also one of the basic means through which nation- 
builder in Risorgimento’s Piedmont and post-unification Italy sought to 
foster a categorical identification with the nation-state amongst society, 
with schooling playing a central part in the process (Marazzini, 1984: 
ch. 5; Catarsi, 1990; Soldani and Turi, 1993; Morandini, 2003).
Things had not always been so. Across the Italian peninsula, Italian was 
a literary and administrative language at least since the fourteenth 
century, when Renaissance humanism celebrated the virtues of 
vernacular, taught, written, read and spoken, with unprecedented 
intensity. However, in Piedmont even more than in other regional 
states, before the nineteenth century, the importance of Italian was 
incredibly limited, when compared to contemporary standards. At the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, Piedmont presented a diversified 
patchwork of linguistic communities. Italian was the official language 
of government since the sixteenth century. But it was not the only one. 
Laws were written in both French and Italian. Across the Kingdom of 
Sardinia, linguistic diversity between the different administrative units 
was the norm. French in Savoy, Val d’Aosta and parts of Piedmont, 
Nissard in Nice, and Italian in the Piedmontese mainland (Symcox, 
1983: 16). Italian was not the only language read or spoken by the elite. 
The Piedmontese ruling class preferred French in their social 
relationships and private milieus, limiting themselves to use Italian as a 
lingua franca in the offices of government. It is only in the course of the 
eighteenth century, particularly from the 1730s, under the reign of 
Carlo Emanuele III, that marked dominance of Italian over French as 
the language of ruling class and institutions of the state started to 
emerge (Ricuperati, 1989a). The Piedmontese publishing industry 
produced periodicals in both French and Italian. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, both French and Italian were unintelligible to the 
greatest part of the populace. The latter communicated through local 
dialects and lacked even basic literacy skills (albeit literacy rates
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increased significantly in the course of the eighteenth century) (Duglio, 
1971; Roggero, 1992).
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Italian was neither a 
schooling subject nor a teaching language. Following the Jesuit 
tradition, with the exception of ‘French and other foreign languages’, 
Latin was the only language in use in the religious schools. Italian 
penetrated schools and university starting from the 1730s, after the 
monarchy had gained control of the educational apparatus. On the other 
hand, in eighteenth-century Piedmont, the importance of Italian within 
the educational system remained very limited. As late as 1772 ‘Italian 
eloquence’ and surgery were the only academic subjects taught in 
Italian. Starting from the 1730s, Italian was taught in secondary 
schools, but only on Saturdays in the last three years of the course. 
Italian grammar became a full subject of the royal schools only towards 
the later part of the eighteenth century, in connection with the issuing 
of the 1772 regulations. Until 1780, when textbooks in Italian were 
imported from the Lombard elementary schools, students were learning 
even the first notions of literacy in Latin. Until well into the nineteenth 
century, Latin remained the principal medium of teaching in 
Piedmontese schools (Migliorini and Griffith, 1966; Roggero, 1981; 
Ricuperati, 1989a; Marazzini, 1984; Roggero, 2002).
The lack of diffusion of Italian amongst the populace was source of 
neither concern nor surprise to eighteenth-century Piedmontese state 
builders. As reflected by the limited diffusion of popular schooling, 
what little effort was made by the monarchy to spread Italian through 
schooling was confined to the elite. The question of teaching 
vernacular to the masses started attracting the attention of Piedmontese 
intellectuals and literary societies, such as the Sampaolina and the 
Filopatria, in the later eighteenth century (Marazzini, 1984: 117; 
Ricuperati, 1989a: 167-9; Roggero, 2002: 243, 245). Similarly to 
nineteenth-century nation-building, the project of diffusion of Italian
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was associated to that of fostering a particularistic and categorical 
identity with the patria/nation. In the words of the conservative 
Piedmontese aristocrat, Galeani Napione (1791; cited in De Mauro, 
1970: 5), author of the influential On the usage and advantages o f 
Italian language:
Language is one of the strongest links to the patria ... To have 
one’s own language, to cultivate it, love it, appreciate it, to use it 
both in official and domestic situations ... is not the last reason 
which unite men and attach them to the province where they live; 
which helps instil in their heart an original character, particular to 
the nation
Processes of normalisation of linguistic practices amongst the populace 
were began by the Jacobins, after Piedmont was invaded in 1796. As 
stressed by Hobsbawm (1996: 21), the Jacobins considered mastery of 
the state language as a pre-condition to qualify for full citizenship and 
associated language to political loyalty. These same ideals were 
reflected in the educational reforms of the Jacobin and Napoleonic 
years (1796-1799, 1799-1815), when the pre-eminence of vernacular 
over Latin as a teaching and taught language was strongly asserted. The 
1801 elementary curriculum included reading and writing in Italian. 
The teaching of Latin was advised from the second year. In 1802, in 
connection with the annexation of Piedmont to France, French became 
the dominant teaching language. Albeit limited in the actual results, the 
Jacobin and Napoleonic administrations gave also the first major spur 
towards the development of popular schooling, culminating with the 
introduction of compulsory elementary schools in 1812 (Brambilla, 
1979; Roggero, 1992; Genovesi, 1999: 37-9).
After an initial retreat, the lead of the French of employing schooling to 
further processes of linguistic standardisation was gradually endorsed 
by the absolutist state in the restoration period (1815-1848). The choice
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of language fell on Italian. This was due to three main factors: the trend 
set in the previous century, as a way of establishing distance with 
revolutionary France, and as a consequence of the fact that an anti- 
French, pro-Italian movement crystallised amongst the Piedmontese 
intelligentsia in the wake of policies of linguistic standardisation 
carried out by Napoleon. In 1822, Carlo Felice issued schooling 
regulations making compulsory for councils to establish free 
elementary schools teaching reading and writing in Italian. Albeit 
officially prohibited, Latin continued to be used to teach literacy in 
schools, and in 1827 the official position of the authority was one of 
tolerance for the practice. Not so in 1840, when the teaching of Latin in 
elementary schools was strictly prohibited by Troya’s regulations for 
elementary teachers. Ever since, Latin has never made his way back 
into elementary schools.
Beside Italian, another language spread amongst the populace through 
schooling in the restoration years was Piedmontese. By norm dialect 
was used as a teaching tool and teachers were encouraged to translate 
Italian words in dialect so as to ensure their proper comprehension on 
the part of the children. There were also issued school text-books on 
how to translate from Piedmontese dialect into Italian, such as Ponza’s 
(1843) Piedmontese anthology to exercise in translation from  
Piedmontese to Italian, as well as a number of Piedmontese/Italian 
dictionaries (Marazzini, 1984: ch. 5).
Between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries, dialect was attacked by enlightenment thinkers as an obstacle 
to progress. The period between the 1830s and the 1840s witnessed a 
widening of the public appeal of the anti-dialect movement, marked by 
publications such as Dal Pozzo’s (1835) Plan o f an association for all 
Italy having as an objective the diffusion o f the pure Italian language 
and the suppression o f the various dialects spoken in the peninsula. At 
the same time the spreading of Italian language was seen as a means to
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prepare the political unification of Italy (Marazzini, 1984: ch. 5; 
Barberis, 1988: ch. 4). For Dal Pozzo linguistic unification was a 
substitute for political unification, which he considered an unrealisable 
dream. As if inverting Dal Pozzo’s judgement, the American novelist J. 
F. Cooper (1838: 317-8) observed in his travelling diaries, published 
three years later: ‘Sooner or later, Italy will inevitably become a single 
State: this is a result that I hold to be inevitable, though the means by 
which it is to be effected are still hidden ... In the absence of great 
political events, to weaken the authority of the present governments, 
education is the surest process, though a slow one’. In the late 1840s, 
the struggle against dialect was consciously associated to processes of 
de-Piedmontisation meant to pave the way for the unification of Italy 
by pedagogical writers like Pansoja in Short account on the 
suppression o f dialects (1848), Gissey in On the study o f language as a 
means o f national education (1848) and Cargnino, author of On the 
usage o f national language in Piedmont (1848). The latter (cited in 
Morandini, 2003: 183-4), for instance, in an article published on the 
Istitutore, a Piedmontese pedagogical journal specialised in popular 
education, remarked:
It is in vain to hope that the feeling of Italian Nationality spread 
and become rooted amongst administrators, military, traders, and 
all the classes, it is in vain to hope that our men considered 
themselves other than Piedmontese, Ligurian, Lombard until will 
prevail the spoken municipal dialects. Language is the most 
evident and eloquent sign of nationality, actually it constitutes its 
central element, ... because a common language implies exactly a 
commonality of manners of conceiving and act which joins the 
souls of a society distinct from the others
We ought not to overstate the force of anti-dialect practices in the 
Risorgimento’s schools. In 1849, in contrast to the post-unification 
period (Catarsi, 1990: 20), the government’s instructions for
162
elementary teachers were still encouraging the usage of dialect as a 
device to teach Italian: ‘In the teaching of reading and writing ... the 
teachers must ensure that [the pupils] understand the content of what 
they write and read, by making them express in dialect the words most 
different from it. In this way they will obtain a double training at once’ 
(reproduced in Marchi, 1985: 132). As late as 1863 Manzoni in Report 
on the unity o f the language, written by the nationalist novelist for the 
ministry of public instruction, defended the spreading of Piedmontese- 
Italian dictionaries as a way of favouring the linguistic unification of 
the newly bom Italian state (Marazzini, 1984: 208).
In any case, from around 1848 the idea that the process of linguistic 
standardisation of society was associated with the construction of Italy 
was institutionalised in the Piedmontese schooling system. In 1849, the 
year after the ‘first war of independence’, the governmental instructions 
for ‘teachers and other officers involved in public education’ stated that 
public education was the foundation of the feelings of ‘national 
independence [and] freedom ... which constitute the citizen worthy of 
living in a free country’ (reproduced in Berardi, 1982: 153). The 
spreading of Italian language was one of the basic means through 
which the schooling system was meant to constmct national feelings in 
the children according to Risorgimento’s statemen and schooling 
promoters. Already in 1847, Vincenzo Troya (cited by Morandini, 
2003: 165), author of the 1840 governmental instmctions for 
elementary teachers and an anthology of Italian fiction and poetry in 
use in the Piedmontese schools in the Risorgimento’s years, wrote an 
article on the Piedmontese pedagogical journal The Educator, 
‘Advantages of making speak the Italian language at an early stage’. 
The following is an extract from the article:
We must align the love of the newly bom to the laws of the 
patria, the customs of the patria, the walls of the patria, and such 
a love is associated with that of the language which makes us
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brothers ... He who complains of the ignorance of the people, ... 
of the weak feeling of Italian nationality and does not do anything 
about the spreading of Italian language ... is either a liar or a 
madman
Two years later, Antonino Parato ([1849] 1885: 461-7), author of the 
text-book of Italian grammar in use in the Sardinian states’ elementary 
schools in the Risorgimento’s years, in a speech given for the opening 
of the national college of Mortara was saying:
The destinies of Italy are associated with the destinies of 
instruction and education ... If we want to fulfil the national 
destinies, we must radically and absolutely modify our education 
... the Italian language, by being a particular offspring of our 
character, of our climate, of our political institutions, is the most 
powerful vehicle of national ideas, the base of Italian civility, the 
strongest link of souls and hearts ... The diffusion of Italian 
language is the means to spread the national idea ... Let us print 
in our minds that ... until the use of Italian language does not 
become more popular, the multitudes will never feel to be 
Italians, ... The unity of language is that which must prepare the 
union of the souls.
In similar spirit in 1855, the ministry of public instruction, Lanza (cited 
in De Fort, 1996: 58), in a project of educational reform presented to 
the chamber of the Subalpin Parliament:
This aspect of the question assumes in our particular conditions a 
great importance, since much more than in the schools of other 
nations, our has the task of concentrating almost exclusively on 
the question of the teaching language. The language, in the other 
nations, is learned by the people with the milk ... For our people, 
on the contrary, the language which they learn from their
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mother’s lips ... is not the light which can awaken in them the 
feeling of the nation to which they belong. Such a language can 
only be learnt in the school ... language is the only character in 
which nationalities recognise themselves, it is the deposit of 
patriotic traditions.
Similar objectives were expressed in the government instructions for 
elementary teachers Lanza issued in 1857 where, the Piedmontese 
ministry invited the teachers to ask the children to write essay’s with 
titles such as ‘facts of patriotic history’ or ‘facts honourable to the 
Italian name’ (cited in Morandini, 2003: 262).
In short, in Piedmont, the transition from absolutism to nation-state led 
to a radical change in the relationship between schooling and language, 
and more generally between language and society. Vernacular 
recovered a very limited importance within the eighteenth-century 
schooling system. Linguistic diversity, within and across classes was 
the norm in eighteenth-century Piedmont. Post-revolutionary France 
was responsible for beginning processes of linguistic standardisation of 
society around vernacular. Even if the policy was endorsed by the 
absolutist state in the restoration years, it became intense only from the 
1840s, at the same time as Italian nationalism was becoming dominant. 
The nationalist aspect of the pedagogy became more marked in the 
post-unification years, as with the implementation of restrictive anti­
dialect practices. However, the idea that the spreading of Italian 
language was instrumental to the construction of Italy was 
institutionalised in the schooling system in the aftermath of 1848, 
before the unification.
History
The construction of a shared past uniting elite and people towards a 
common destiny constitutes another essential element of nation-
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building, together with the promotion of a common language (Calhoun, 
1997: ch. 3; Hobsbawm, 2000). The change entailed by this technique 
of state formation is even more spectacular that represented by the rise 
of vernacular. In the space of a few decades, the status of history 
changed from virtual secrecy to being of universal domain.
More markedly than vernacular, the teaching of history was not 
favoured by the eighteenth-century absolutist state. Italy did not lack a 
tradition of history as a taught subject in schools. Ancient and 
contemporary history was of central importance to Renaissance 
humanists, and the study of ancient historians, Cesare, Sallustio, 
Valerio Massimo, was included in the curriculum of the Renaissance 
school, as part of the course of humanities destined to educate state and 
clerical functionaries (Grendler, 1991: 277-85). However, the 
importance of history declined in the religious schooling system, where 
history was taught only sporadically and late, lacking a specific 
disciplinary status (Scaglione, 1986: 89-90). ‘Chronology, history and 
coat of arms’ were included in the 1679 curriculum of the Nobles’ 
College of Turin (cited in Roggero, 1981: 83). A celebratory history of 
the ruling dynasty was staged in plays in the student theatre attached to 
the institution. History was not a subject in the eighteenth-century royal 
schools. History was not an academic discipline either. In 1715, the 
introduction of universal history as an academic subject was 
recommended by both Maffei and D’Aguirre, but even if D’Aguirre’s 
plan was adopted, history was left out (Balani and Roggero, 1976; 
Roggero, 1981).
The absence of history from the schooling curriculum in eighteenth- 
century Piedmont reflected the dominant view that history was better 
kept for the very few. According to Ricuperati’s (1989a; 1989b) 
account, in the first half of the eighteenth-century in Piedmont 
circulated three main types of history. Firstly, dynastic history, 
represented by Lama’s Histoire de la Maison de Savoye (1722-1729),
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centred on defending the historical role of the Savoy House and the 
thesis that the Savoy House was of Saxon origins. The latter was 
instrumental to legitimise Vittorio Amedeo II’s claim to the title of 
Vicar of the Sacred Roman Empire in Italy, which elevated the 
standing of the Savoy House above that of other Italian princes, thereby 
contributing to legitimise the monarchy’s ambitions over Lombardy. 
Secondly, there was neo-ghibellin29 history, exemplified by Muratori’s 
collection of medieval writings, the Rerum Italicarum scriptores. 
According to Muratori, the Savoy’s claim of being of Saxon origins 
had no historical grounds, and this was the main reason why he ran into 
difficulties with the monarchy while compiling his history of medieval 
Italy. The objective of Muratori was ‘to establish whether we derive 
from the ancient Italians, or from the Goths, the Lombards, the Franks, 
and the Germans’ (cited in Noether, 1951: 77). Muratori did not think 
that sharing a common origin ought to alter the political organisation of 
Italy, which he judged an equilibrated combination of monarchies and 
republics. Thirdly, Jean Baptiste De Tellier’s Recuil contenant 
dissertation historique et geographique sur la vallee et Duchee 
d ’Aoste, ‘the first civil, religious and to some extent political and social 
history of the Duchy, where he defended, against the uniformity 
imposed by Amadean policy, the historicity of the privileges and 
autonomies’ (Ricuperati, 1989a: 154). None of these works was 
published.
Piedmont started to be seen as a potential subject of ‘national’ history 
by Piedmontese intellectuals in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, where national meant economic, political, civil and literary. 
The idea was developed by the same literary societies, Filopatria, 
Sampaolina, and intellectuals, Denina, Galeani Napione, advocating the 
spread the standardisation of linguistic norms amongst the populace, 
and was associated to similar objectives. For instance, Galeani 
Napione, author of Essay on the art o f history (1773), stressed the 
importance of writing ‘a history of Piedmont that is “national” and
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“popular”, explaining what importance and usefulness had history not 
only for politicians and magistrates, but also to create a ... moral and 
political identity’ (Ricuperati, 1989a: 168). The monarchy was less 
than sympathetic to the idea of publishing a history of Piedmont, and a 
first attempt made by Denina was blocked by the censor.
In 1796, Piedmont was invaded by the French army. The attitude of the 
French administration towards the writing of a history of Piedmont and 
the diffusion of history in general contrasted sharply with that of the 
eighteenth-century absolutist state. Similarly to Renaissance thinkers, 
the Jacobins associated knowledge of history to republican virtue. 
Denina’s work was published in 1809, under the title of History o f  
Western Italy. In 1798, the Jacobin administration also tried to establish 
a state institution to supervise an official history of Piedmont, the 
Deputation of History of the Patria, but the operation did not 
materialise itself (Ricuperati, 1989b: 8). The project was explicitly 
linked to the reform of schooling. The stated aim of the institution was 
to: ‘Gather in the archives and the National libraries all the documents, 
which are believed to be more interesting for a sincere and exact 
history of Piedmont [for the] progress of public instruction, not less 
than for the honour of the Piedmontese nation’ (cited in Romagnani, 
1983: 82). During the Napoleonic period, the history of particularistic 
republics/peoples was a subject in secondary, but not elementary 
schools. The 1802 curriculum for secondary schools included ‘elements 
of geography and history, particularly of ancient and modem republics’ 
(cited in Nada and Notario, 1993: 39). The 1811 curriculum of 
secondary schools of the Kingdom of Italy included ‘general history of 
the peoples and their customs’ (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 730).
The idea of spreading history amongst a wider public, if not 
particularly the populace, became dominant in the absolutist state 
starting from the 1820s, marked by the foundation of the Egyptian 
Museum of Turin (1824). That of sponsoring the writing and diffusion
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of the history of the patria, the peoples of the Kingdom of Sardinia, was 
institutionalised between in the 1830s, when Carlo Alberto, following 
the lead of the Jacobins, founded the Deputation of History of the 
Patria, first case of an historical society in Italy. Even if, until 1848, the 
term patria officially referred to the dominions of Carlo Alberto, from 
the early stages the attention of deputation was directed to the ethnic 
identity of Italy and the ruling dynasty, and the civic identity of 
Piedmont, more than to the Sardinian States. In the restoration years, 
the historians of the deputation were concerned with three main 
histories. First, the history of the monarchy, instrumental to defend the 
monarchy’s claim that the Savoy House was of Italian origins, and pave 
the way for its leadership in the nationalist struggle. Second, the history 
of democracy in Piedmont, aimed at establishing if there were and what 
was the role of the estates system in medieval Piedmont, instrumental 
to further democratic projects and obstructed by the monarchy. Third, 
the blood of Italy: the ‘Longobard question’, initiated by Manzoni, 
taking Machiavelli as a model, concerned with establishing whether 
and to what extent Longobards and Romans were two separate peoples, 
as opposed to a fusion, and thereby define the blood of the Italian 
nation. The debate gave rise to three main thesis, Roman blood, 
Longobard and Roman blood, or a mixture between Roman and various 
barbarian peoples’ blood (Romagnani, 1983).
Mittermaier (1845: 202) writes that the 1840 regulations were granting 
more time to the teaching of geography and history in secondary 
schools. However, the institutionalisation of history in the Piedmontese 
educational system remained weak. A chair of ‘military history of Italy’ 
at the University of Turin was established as late as 1846. These 
institutions served a selected public. In restoration Piedmont, history 
still carried an elitist mark. As Balbo (1833; cited in Romagnani, 1983: 
27-8; emphasis mine) put it in the inaugural speech for the opening of 
the Deputation of History of the Patria: history is ‘the science truly 
teacher of the princes as much as the people, the doctrine necessary for
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all the governing and many of the governed’. It may be, on the other 
hand, that some education in patriotic history was given in elementary 
schools as part of religious education. That, in fact, was the case, in the 
1850s (Morandini, 2003: 259).
The restoration state in Lombardy exhibited a greater propensity than 
Piedmont towards diffusing history through schooling. As early as 
1818, ‘universal history’ was included in the programme of elementary 
technical schools and ‘history of the Austrian states of Germany and 
Italy’ in that of the liceo. However, in Lombardy, the diffusion of 
history as a taught subject remained limited and the attitude of the 
authorities towards it ambivalent. The elementary technical schools 
were never established. In 1824, universal history became optional, and 
that of the Austrian states of Germany and Italy an academic subject. In 
1850, ‘most important events of universal history and particularly 
Austrian history’ was subject of the liceo (Di Pietro, 1979: 733).
Ironically, the idea of teaching history to foster identification with Italy 
was anticipated by the Austrian administration in Lombardy, who, in 
1818, instructed secondary schools teachers of history to tell students 
about ‘the many and great men which in the sciences and the arts and in 
any kind of knowledge illustrated [Italy]’ (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 
733). In Piedmont, the idea of teaching national history to the populace 
became dominant in the aftermath of 1848, when Italy’s history and 
geography became subjects of the elementary curriculum. The 
curriculum of elementary schools in 1834 read thus ‘reading, writing,
1 A
Christian doctrine, and elements of Italian language and arithmetic’ . 
In 1848, ‘tales taken from the history of Italy’ and a description of 
‘Italy and [its] divisions’ were introduced as subjects in the primary 
schools attached to the national colleges (former Jesuit colleges) 
(Morandini, 2003: 71). In 1849, the regulation for evening and Sunday 
schools prescribed the teaching of ‘the first and easiest notions of 
national history and geography4 (reproduced in Marchi, 1985: 133), in
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the last two years of elementary schools. The 1853 regulations for 
elementary schools included the teaching of ‘tales taken from the 
history of the patria’ (reproduced in Berardi, 1982: 171) in the fourth 
year. The instruction was confirmed and extended by the Casati Law 
(1859), which prescribed curriculum included geography and 
‘exposition of the most notable facts of national history’ from the third 
year31.
It is important to stress that in the Risorgimento’s schools the terms 
patria and nation referred to Italy and not Piedmont, and that schooling 
promoters consciously associated the teaching of patriotic/national 
history to fostering a categorical identification with Italy amongst the 
children. As exemplified by the following extract from government’s 
instructions on how to teach history in special schools, dated 24 
December 1856 (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 744): ‘It is believed that more 
than from universal history ... the youth ... could benefit from that of 
our nation ... the pupils will learn how our patria is not limited by the 
borders of a State, but is truly and completely where we speak the same 
speech’.
The type of Italian identity promoted through the teaching of history in 
the Risorgimento’s schools combined ethnic elements, like a 
particularistic origin, language and territory, and civic elements, such 
as laws and interests. In 1856, the ministry Lanza, in the instruction to 
the teachers described Italy as ‘that civil society to which we are bound 
by a common language, origin, laws, interests, memories and hopes’ 
(cited in Morandini, 2003: 259). Similarly to the histories studied by 
the Deputation of History of the Patria in the Restoration years, the 
history of Italy represented in history text-books in the post-1848 
schooling system centred on the invasion of the Barbarians, the origin 
of Italy, and the communal experience, the history of democracy in 
Italy. This was the case with Scarabelli’s (1850) Summary o f the civil 
history o f the Italian people. The barbarian invasions were also the
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starting point of Ricotti’s (1851-2) Short history o f  Europe and 
particularly o f Italy from the year 476 to 1849, written by the chair of 
history at the University of Turin for the Piedmontese schools 
(Morandini, 2003: 160, 168). It is not a coincidence that history as a 
taught subject developed in tandem with geography. For nineteenth- 
century schooling promoters the identity of peoples, including the 
Italian people, was intrinsically linked to the particularistic conditions 
of the territory. For La Farina, author of a history text-book for 
elementary school published in Turin in 1853, Italy’s ‘borders are 
marked by its geographical position, the conformity of language, 
character, customs, misfortunes and hopes’ (cited in Morandini, 2003: 
163). The history taught in nineteenth-century secondary schools, 
certainly in the second half of the nineteenth century, under both 
absolutist and nation-states, told students that political boundaries are 
the outcome of the interplay between the ethnic identity of peoples, 
their homeland and particularistic features to it associated, and political 
conventions. In 1850, the Lombard teachers of the ginnasium and liceo 
were instructed to teach history thus:
take as a guidance through history some important events, 
preceded by local geography ... make well understand the 
pragmatic connection between the internal life of States and 
peoples and the development of political constitutions ... the 
objective exposition of the States, their constitution and culture.
The following extract is taken from government’s instructions on how 
to teach history in Italian technical colleges in 1871:
[the teaching of history had] to be constantly united to that of 
geography ... keeping in mind the mutations of boarders, and if 
these have reason in the conditions of the soil, that is to say 
ethnography, or simply in political conventions, clarifying ... the
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influence of climate on man, society, institutions, industries, and 
commerce of nations (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 733, 744).
Summing up, with respect to history, even more markedly than 
language, the institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy is strongly 
associated to the nation-state form, as anticipated by post-revolutionary 
France and developed by liberal Piedmont. In eighteenth-century 
Piedmont history was neither a schooling nor an academic subject. The 
French invasion at the end of the eighteenth century marked an 
inversion of tendency, albeit the diffusion of history as a schooling 
subject remained limited to the secondary sector, and was yet to acquire 
overt particularistic connotations. The diffusion of the history of the 
patria was favoured, but only timidly by the restoration state. From the 
early stages the operation was associated with the construction of Italy. 
National history became a subject of elementary schools in the 
aftermath of 1848.
Nation-building, the unification and the enfranchisement of the 
working-class
In other words, both with respect to history and language, in Piedmont, 
the assertion of the nation-state form entailed the development of 
radically new means of state formation. These data supports the 
modernist argument that nationalism is a modem phenomenon, 
strongly associated to the post-revolutionary order, rather than the 
precipitate of long term developments (see Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 
1993; Hobsbawm, 1994). On the other hand, these data also show that 
there are dangers in importing too hastily the modernist approach in 
historical analysis. In particular, the fact that most historical accounts 
of Italian nation-building followed the modernist wave of nationalist 
studies has led scholars to assume that since Italy was a late 
moderniser, nineteenth-century Italy experienced nationalism with less 
intensity than in European, and Italian nationalism is usually associated
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with the later nineteenth and, especially, the twentieth centuries. This 
reading, our analysis indicates, is inaccurate.
Hobsbawm (1994: 44-5) argues that until around 1880, it did not matter 
to Italian nationalists what was the ethnic identity of the populace. It is 
only in the wake of processes of democratisation and rise of mass 
politics that the problem of how ordinary men and women felt about 
nationality became important. On these grounds, as well as liberal and 
instrumentalist, as opposed to ethnic connotations, Hobsbawm 
differentiates the Risorgimento from the phenomenon of political 
nationalism. The ideas that in Risorgimento’s Piedmont nation- 
building was weak, and that nation-building was precipitated by the 
extension of the franchise dominate recent accounts of schooling and 
nation-building in both Italian and British historical literature (Tobia, 
1991: v; Porciani, 1993: 390; Soldani and Turi, 1993: 17; Gentile, 
1996: 11-2; Ventura, 2000: 53; Doumanis, 2001: 106; Lyttleton 2001: 
28).
Another influence on this position is that of Gramsci (1994), who 
harshly criticised the Risorgimento’s leadership for failing to pursue a 
policy of mobilisation of the masses. Bertoni Jovine (1954: 323) also 
associates the emergence of a nationalist pedagogy to the later 
nineteenth century, in her history of popular schooling in Italy.
Our analysis of the development of educational policies in 
Risorgimento’s Piedmont shows that the assessment that nation- 
building became intense only towards the later nineteenth century is 
inaccurate. In both quantitative and qualitative terms Risorgimento’s 
Piedmont experienced intense nation-building. As discussed in chapter 
five, the central part of the nineteenth century witnessed an exceptional 
development of popular schooling. The discussion above shows that, as 
stressed also by Morandini (2003), both with respect to language and to 
history, a nationalist pedagogy was institutionalised in the Piedmontese
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schooling system in the aftermath of 1848, before the later nineteenth 
century.
The other dominant perspective in historical accounts of nation- 
building in nineteenth-century Italy, alongside the extension of the 
franchise, is that the main purpose of nation-building was to construct 
Italy amid the ethnic diversity brought by the unification (Barbagli, 
1974: 86; Catarsi, 1990: 10; Soldani and Turi, 1993: 17; Vigo, 1993).
The development of a nationalist pedagogy in the Piedmontese 
schooling system shows that the nationalist aspect of it did intensify in 
the aftermath of the unification, as with the introduction of restrictive 
anti-dialect practices. Furthermore, it shows that the institutionalisation 
of a nationalist pedagogy addressed concerns about the limited 
diffusion of Italian identity within society, and nineteenth-century state 
builders saw it as a means to prepare and further the political and 
cultural unification of Italy. However, the fact that the process was 
started by Risorgimento’s Piedmont, rather than post-unification Italy, 
shows that it was not the political event and the ethnic diversity that it 
brought that were primarily responsible for precipitating Italian nation- 
building, but the process of unification and the ideology of nationalism.
Another implication of our findings on nation-building in 
Risorgimento’s Piedmont is that the enfranchisement of the working- 
class was not responsible for unleashing political nationalism. 
Hobsbawm (1994) overstates the centrality of language to 
Risorgimento’s conceptions of nationhood. Italian language was central 
to Italian identity. However, to Risorgimento’s state builders, Italian 
identity encompassed also symbols other than language. As stressed 
earlier, Italian identity, as promoted in the Risorgimento’s schools, was 
also grounded on unambiguously ethnic signifiers, such as descent. The 
question of the ‘blood of Italy’ was addressed by educational
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institutions already in the 1830s (on Risorgimento’s Italy and ethnicity 
see also Banti, 2000).
In Piedmont, political nationalism was more directly associated to 
liberalism and the bourgeois state than it was to democracy and mass 
politics. In particular, the development of political nationalism, the next 
section argues, was intimately linked to the difficulties of liberal 
thinkers with legitimising the development of the state schooling 
system with the language of the social contract.
Citizenship and nation-building
What follows compares nationalist and absolutist conceptions of 
citizenship. The analysis is based upon writings of two early 
eighteenth-century absolutist ideologues, the early Doria and Muratori, 
one late eighteenth-century absolutist ideologue, Amidei, and two 
nationalist ideologues, Mazzini and B. Spaventa. In doing so, I show 
that nationalist conceptions of citizenship were deployed against the 
definition of subjective rights associated to the tradition of the social 
contract, and that the movement was instrumental to overcoming 
difficulties associated with legitimising state schooling systems with 
the language of the social contract. The presentation is followed by a 
discussion of the implication of the finding for the relationship between 
nationalism and state formation.
On patria and nation
As we mentioned earlier, the citizen of the absolutist state owed 
allegiance to the patria. Hence, in order to define absolutist conceptions 
of citizenship we must start by looking at what absolutist thinkers 
meant by patria. Banti (2000: 3-4) distinguishes two fundamental 
meanings for patria in eighteenth-century Italian thought. A first 
meaning, cited in the Dictionary o f the academia o f the bran in both
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the 1612 and 1806 editions, whereby patria means ’place of birth, or 
from which we derive our origin’. In turn, this could refer to a village, a 
city, a region, a state, or a cultural area. Secondly, patria was the 
political-institutional system claiming the loyalty of the subjects or the 
citizens. As examples of the latter usage, Banti cites Doria’s The civil 
life (1710), and articles in the Coffe (influential periodical published in 
Milan in the second half of the eighteenth century). In addition, Banti 
specifies, for the Coffe's writers, patria could refer both to a political- 
institutional system and the community living under the laws of that 
system. Let us pursue Banti’s exploration a bit further, beginning with 
Doria.
In the passage Banti refers to, Doria ([1710] 1978: 878) tells the prince 
how to educate the people. Doria writes: ‘in the peoples instil maxims 
of virtue and moderation ... in such a way ... that the love of patria is 
not of the type that feels like liberty, but rather that it is love towards 
the prince, that is to say love of patria relative to that of the prince’. For 
Doria patria is not simply the political system to which the citizen owes 
loyalty. Patria is sharply separated from the prince. In this respect, 
Doria’s patria is akin to Machiavelli’s state (see Chabod, 1962: 46).
In the following sentence, Doria provides a further confirmation and 
clarifies the nature of the relationship between prince and patria: ‘the 
armies will be courageous, but of a courage directed only towards the 
sole love of the prince and of the patria at the condition this is led and 
sustained by the virtuous prince’. Patria is that which the prince 
governs. In stressing the subordination of the love of patria to that of 
the prince in the hierarchy of loyalties, Doria is distancing himself from 
the republican tradition, whereby citizens could revolt against the 
prince when acting on behalf of the people, as it is made clear by the 
following quote:
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The virtuous captains well instructed in the art of war, but to the 
prince completely subordinated and not busy to be loved by the 
peoples and the soldiers like the captains of the republics. And 
even if this renders the armies not as much virtuous, not being 
like those of the republics led by free and virtuous maxims, but 
only by maxims virtuous and obliging, it is necessary that in the 
kingdoms that the captains are ... always submitted to their 
prince
Doria’s thought, in essence, does not depart from the republican 
scheme. Simply, he inverts the hierarchy of loyalties by placing the 
prince above the people/patria.
The relationship between patria as a locus of political loyalty and patria 
as the place of origin becomes clearer if now turn the attention to 
Muratori’s ([1735] 1978) pedagogical treatise, Moral philosophy 
exposed to the youth. Muratori (1978: 835-6) describes the patria thus:
From it we had life, from it we had support, and because of this 
in addition to the natural mother the patria should be named 
mother ... so there can be occasions when the citizen is obliged 
to love and prefer the patria to his parents and children. ... life 
and goods sometimes must be sacrificed to save the patria ... 
notwithstanding the fact that sometimes its government does not 
seem right, ... the generous and good citizen must do it good, if 
he can. For [the patria], I say it again, is his mother
This passage shows that: first, as with Doria, for Muratori patria refers 
to that which is governed by the prince. Second, the prince has a moral 
right to claim a portion of the individual’s natural rights (life, property, 
honour) when acting on behalf of the patria, and the claim of the patria 
upon the citizen’s natural rights is grounded upon the idea that the
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patria constitutes a natural, family-like form of affiliation, as indicated 
by the metaphor of the mother.
In addition, the quote shows that Muratori’s citizen stands in a 
categorical relationship with the patria, in Calhoun’s (1997) sense of 
being direct, unmediated by other webs of loyalties. Consistently with 
these premises, Muratori’s citizen grounds allegiance to the prince on a 
contract between individuals, acting out of interest, and the sovereign:
It is from here that originate most of the kings of these lands, 
men, independent but unhappy, agreed to elect a chief and prince 
an only man or various magistrates, subjecting themselves to his 
or their will, for the persuasion and the desire of a lesser evil or a 
greater good.
Similarly to Doria’s citizen and differently from the republican 
tradition, Muratori’s citizen of the patria is not a legal subject of right. 
Muratori (1978: 853) reserves the legal right to disobedience and revolt 
to the religious subject: ‘it is a great virtue to obey and submit also to 
the leadership of an evil prince, as long as it is not contrary to the law 
of Whom is superior to good and evil’. Muratori’ scheme was 
consistent with the then dominant doctrine of divine right (Jemolo, 
1974: 49), and Muratori did not perceive as contradictory combining 
the social contract and divine right: ‘[T]he prince’, Muratori (1978: 
843) writes, ‘is put by God on the throne’.
A first transformation of Muratori’s model is operated by Amidei, who 
in a treatise published anonymously in 1764 in Florence adapted 
Rousseau’s social contract to the local requirements of a monarchy 
entangled in bitter jurisdictional controversies with the Church 
(Venturi, 1976). As it is clear since the title of the piece, The church 
and the republic within their limits, Amidei’s genius lies in rendering 
explicit the opportunities for radically altering state, public and church
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relationships opened by Rousseavian thought. ‘Every enlightened 
citizen’, Amidei (1980: 169) writes, ‘fervently desires the increase of 
his [the monarch’s] authority for the public happiness’. The crucial 
point is that Rousseau’s contract allows the monarch to do away at 
once with natural and divine laws as limitation to the exercise of 
sovereignty (in this, Amidei contrasted with the other great 
jurisdictional treatise of the period, Pilati’s O f a reform o f Italy ([1767] 
1770); on natural and divine laws in early modem Italy see also 
Meinecke, 1998: 125-7).
But let us look at Amidei’s contract in greater detail. For Amidei 
(1980: 158-159), similarly to nationalism for contemporary scholars, 
divine right is an invented tradition, created by opportunistic princes to 
justify their rule to naive subjects, but ill-suited to the contemporary 
man. In truth, the political and spiritual realms are essentially different, 
in that they are grounded on different moral systems. For example:
the conjunction of the sexes without the previous formality of 
religious ceremonies, [Amidei (1980: 167) argues], is a sin, but it 
is not a crime against the political body ... And this only example 
will serve to illustrate how much importance has keeping 
separated the religious virtues from the political virtues and the 
religious vices, which are sins, from the political vices, which I 
call crimes.
Amidei’s position on the grounds of separation of religious and secular 
realms, in essence, does not depart from Muratori’s (1749: ch. 8) 
thought on the topic, whereby crime and sins (public happiness and 
salvation) define two different types of jurisdiction (prince and church). 
More radically than Muratori, however, Amidei takes this argument to 
bear upon the origins of sovereignty, and, by implication, on the nature 
of political right. Henceforth, the church ceases to have any legal claim 
to political authority, and the legal right to disobedience and revolt is
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reserved to the governed subject, the political body. This passage lends 
Amidei’s monarch to a greater vulnerability towards the moral subject 
of right than Muratori’s prince. Let us now look at how Amidei 
addresses this problem.
Not content with rejecting divine right, Amidei pronounces himself 
against natural law, which he finds empirically wanting. ‘The 
philosophers which have written on the theory of natural right’, Amidei 
(1980: 167) writes, ‘have formed some hypothesis, which I find 
unsatisfactory, because they are founded more on their imagination 
than proved by nature’. For Amidei (1980: 167-8), originally, men were 
not linked in any association. On the other hand, Amidei argues, neither 
it can be that isolated individuals united themselves spontaneously for 
‘In nature instantaneous motions are absurd, and the association of men 
in the form of a people presupposes the existence of an aggregation in 
the state of nature’. Hence, Amidei (1980: 168-82) writes ‘The family 
was the first model of political societies ... A people, a nation is 
nothing but a general society composed of as many particular societies 
as are the families united in one body’. However, for Amidei, the 
model of the family is too contingent to be the base of right: familial 
links are dissolved when children become adults, and from then on the 
union becomes voluntary. To make the political association a 
permanent and enduring act another step is needed. And it is at this 
point ‘The will of everybody united ... , this association formed the 
social contract, ..., and the body politic came to life’. Henceforth, even 
if sometimes the body of society transfer sovereign authority to a senate 
or a person, the latter ‘belongs essentially to the body of society to 
which each member has ceded his rights, which he received from 
nature’.
Notwithstanding the initial success met by Amidei’s treatise, in the 
intervening period his ideas were to fall into disrepute, and Amidei 
himself turned to enlightened despotism (some sort of secularised
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divine right) in his later years. Amidei’s ideas came back into vogue 
with the new century, when his model was taken on, amongst others, by 
the son of a Genovese doctor, by the name of Giuseppe Mazzini.
The following discussion is based upon writings of the 1830s and 
1840s, while Mazzini was living in London, after being exiled from 
Piedmont, and expelled from Switzerland and France. Mazzini was the 
ideological leader of the democratic faction in Risorgimento’s Italy.
Mazzini’s nation/patria, like Amidei’s body politic is the result of a 
conscious act of will on the part of a collective subject, a social 
contract. For Mazzini (1831; cited by Banti: 59-60; emphasis in 
original) the Italian nation is ‘the universality of Italians, bond by a 
common pact and living by under a common law’. The concept is 
reiterated three years later: ‘you are peoples but you are not a nation ... 
you do not have a national pact, produced by the national will’. And 
again, in the On the duties o f man (1841-2), Mazzini’s theoretical 
testament: ‘The patria is not an aggregate it is an association’.
In addition, as with Amidei, the collective subject stipulating the 
association is defined by spontaneous, natural aggregations leading to 
the formation of ’. We cite again from the On the duties o f  man (1841- 
2): (cited by Banti, 2000: 64; emphasis in original): ‘The natural 
divisions, the innate spontaneous trends o f the peoples will substitute 
the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by the sad governments’.
On the other hand there are important differences between Amidei’s 
and Mazzini’s social contract. First, a change in the identity of the 
contracting subject, which, from egalitarian and universalistic, becomes 
exploitative and particularistic. For Amidei the community of extended 
kinship, the nation, defined communities of natural law, universalistic 
and egalitarian. Mazzini’s definition of the same category is 
diametrically opposed. For Mazzini spontaneous aggregations define
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unstable networks of exploitative and hierarchical relationships. 
Mazzini ([1841-2] 1971: 61) writes:
The true country is a community of free men and equals, bound 
together in fraternal concord to labour towards a common aim. 
You are bound to make it and to maintain it such. The country is 
not an aggregation, but an association. There is, therefore, no 
true country without a uniform right. There is no true country 
where the uniformity of that right is violated by the existence of 
caste privilege and inequality. Where ... there is not a common 
Principle, recognized, accepted, and developed by all, there is no 
true Nation, no People; but only a multitude, a fortuitous 
agglomeration of men whom circumstances have called together 
and whom circumstances may again divide. In the name of the 
love you bear your country, you must peacefully but untiringly 
combat the existence of privilege and inequality in the land that 
gave you life.
One of the implications of Mazzini’s definition of multitude is that the 
multitude must be ‘nationalised’ before it can exercise liberty, and the 
position of those who deny the state the right to lead the schooling 
system is illegitimate. On this Mazzini (1971: 108-10) writes:
[The] cry liberty o f teaching disinherits the Patria of any moral 
direction ... Without National Education the Nation does not 
exist morally ... ask, demand the establishment of a system of 
national education free, compulsory for all
Second, the social contract, with Mazzini, is put to a different use than 
in Amidei. Mazzini’s contract is the founding act of the nation, but, 
differently from Amidei’s social contract, does not define subjective 
rights. On the contrary, nationalist ideology was deployed by Mazzini
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against the definition of subjective rights entailed by Amidei’s social 
contract, as well as that of natural law.
The movement was deployed by Mazzini to overcome difficulties 
associated with legitimising a state schooling system with the definition 
of subjective rights associated to the social contract. Mazzini ([1841-2] 
1972: 104-5; emphasis in original) summarises the main positions of 
the debate between those advocating the leadership of the state in the 
schooling provision and those that advocate the leadership of society 
thus:
Two doctrines, two schools, divide the field of those who fight 
for liberty against despotism. The first declares that sovereignty 
resides in the individual, the second claims that it lives only in 
society, and it becomes a norm the consensus manifested by the 
majority. The first believes it has accomplished its mission when 
it has proclaimed the rights believed inherent in all human nature 
and attended liberty", the second looks exclusively to the 
association, and deduce from its constitutive pact the duties of 
each individual.
Mazzini finds both the alternative that subjective rights are grounded in 
the individual, as predicted by natural law, and the alternative that they 
are grounded in the collective will, as in the Rousseavian social 
contract, unsatisfactory. According to Mazzini (1972: 105), ultimately 
sovereignty lies neither in the individual, nor in the social contract:
Sovereignty is in God, in the moral Law, in the providential 
design that governs the world and that is revealed by the 
inspirations of the virtuous Genius and the tendency of Humanity 
in the various epochs of its life ... Sovereignty does not lie with 
the individual, it does not lie with society unless they both 
conform to ... that Law ... Either an individual is the best
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interpreter of the moral Law and governs in its name or he is an 
usurper ... The simple vote of the majority does not constitute 
sovereignty if it is evidently opposed to the supreme moral 
norms, or closes deliberately the way to future Progress.
Which, for Mazzini implies:
You must be concerned that your children learn the principles and 
beliefs leading the life of their brothers in the times when they 
live and in the land to them assigned: -what is the moral, social, 
and political programme of their Nation: - what is the spirit of the 
legislation judging their actions
In other words, Mazzini’s subjective rights become mutable around the 
nation and history. Subjective rights not only change as the result of the 
transition from a natural to a civilised state, as entailed by Amidei’s 
contract, but continue to change as the history of humanity, and that of 
the nation in particular, moves towards progress. And Mazzini deploys 
this discursive device to legitimise the development of state schooling 
systems.
At the beginning of the 1850s, about ten years after Mazzini was 
writing, the controversy on the ‘liberty of teaching’ exploded in the 
Subalpin parliament, academia and printed press, in the wake of the 
construction of the post-1848 schooling system (Gentile, 1920; 
Talamanca, 1975). Amongst others, the question was tackled by 
another political refugee, Bertando Spaventa, Neapolitan philosopher, 
while in exile in Piedmont. Between the 1850s and the 1860s, his 
writings on the topic and the theory of the state to it associated were 
taken as models by the Piedmontese liberal elite against the liberal 
opposition to the development of a centralised schooling system 
(Gentile, 1920; Borghi, 1951).
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For Spaventa there is no way to conciliate a centralised schooling 
system with liberty in absolute terms. The problem is to establish how 
much despotism is legitimate given the particular social and political 
conditions of a State. Spaventa ([1851] 1962: 5-6) describes the issue 
thus:
talking in absolute terms, all those who love liberty, and want it 
in full, cannot deny that teaching must be free. But if the question 
is placed in the field of reality and practice, if we look at the 
particular social and political conditions of a State, opinions start 
diverging ... Some want absolute liberty without restrictions, 
without limits; others want it limited ... Those who want it 
absolute ... claim that, when we want to prescribe a limit, we do 
not know where to find it, how to justify it, and we fall back on 
arbitrary judgements ... Those who want it limited ... cannot agree 
on assessing the borders
Over the following years, Spaventa developed his idea that subjective 
rights are defined by the particular political and social conditions of the 
state in a systematic theory of the state, very similar to that of Mazzini. 
For Spaventa, like Mazzini, the particularity of a state is defined by the 
nation. As he (1969: 285) puts it: ‘The nature and hence the 
particularity of the State is its nationality’. In addition, as with Mazzini, 
Spaventa’s (1969: 278; emphasis in original) state creates the free 
individual: ‘the State not only protects, but creates the particular 
interests’. And the state does so in accordance with the particular 
essence of the nation. ‘The State’, Spaventa (1969: 285; emphasis in 
original) writes ‘is the national substance, truly and really conscious of 
itself; the spirit of a people ... in its true and perfect existence’.
Spaventa, on the other hand, takes to more extreme consequences 
Mazzini’s ideas that the social contract has nothing to say about 
subjective rights by doing away with the social contract altogether. As
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an alternative theory on the origins of sovereignty, Spaventa draws 
from Hegelian dialectical history. For Spaventa ([I860] 1969: 194- 
205), the history of mankind up to the French revolution is a long 
attempt to conciliate the principles of universality and particularity of 
subjective rights. Within this context, the social contract is nothing but 
one phase of this opposition, superior to the medieval world in that it 
grants a special status to science as a means to unravel the continuity 
between the absolute and the contingent, but nevertheless entangled in 
the tension between necessity (represented by natural law) and freedom 
(represented by the arbitrary contract, similar to that of Amidei). The 
phase of the social contract is followed by that of the nation-state, 
harbinger of a new synthesis between the two principles: ‘the idea of a 
universal law of humankind in the proper and particular existence of 
the nations’, Spaventa (1969: 204) writes, ‘overcomes every previous 
discovery’.
Nationalism, the social contract and state formation
The analysis of the development of nationalist ideology carried out 
above has emphasised how, while nationalist ideology was anticipated 
by the eighteenth-century contractualistic thought, nationalist ideology 
was deployed in opposition to the conception of citizenship entailed by 
the social contract, not as an application of it. Furthermore, we saw that 
difficulties experienced by liberal thinkers and state builders in 
Risorgimento’s Piedmont with the question of the legitimacy of the 
development of a centralised state schooling system provided a context 
for the movement away from the social contract in favour of nationalist 
ideology as the dominant narrative of political legitimacy. The 
following section discusses the implications of the findings in relation 
to on-going debates on nationalism and state formation.
As argued in the previous section, Hobsbawm (1996) is incorrect when 
stating that political nationalism was precipitated by the
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enfranchisement of the working class. And yet Italian nationalism 
supports Hobsbawm’s characterisation of political nationalism as an 
ideology that developed in opposition to liberalism in the wake of the 
development of the apparatus of popular control of the modem state.
On the other hand, Hobsbawm overstates the discontinuity between 
liberalism and nationalism. Italian nationalism was a branch of liberal 
philosophy and was fundamentally shaped by its contradictions. This is 
not because liberal thinkers stmggled to adapt social reality to the 
assumptions about human nature of the social contract. Calhoun (1997) 
argues that nationalism developed because contractualistic thinkers like 
Locke and Rousseau failed to notice that the ethnic identity of the 
people is contextual, and amenable to be changed by statecraft. The 
failure to recognise this fact implied that when the model of the social 
contract was applied to real contexts, it led to the development of 
conflicting claims to peoplehood. Similarly, Balibar (1991b) claims 
that nation-building is an entailment of tensions between the nationalist 
idea that the state embodies an egalitarian and bounded ethnic group, 
and a reality of hierarchical and contextual identities.
Balibar and Calhoun characterisation of nationalist ideology and its 
relationship to nation-building is inaccurate. Nationalist conceptions of 
civil society were the opposite of egalitarian, stable and bounded. As 
we have seen, rather more like post-mercantilist notions of population, 
Mazzini conceived of the multitude as particularistic networks of 
unstable, exploitative and hierarchical relationships amenable to 
gradual improvement. One consequence of this fact is that nationalist 
ideology did not entail the erosion of ethnic particularism through the 
development of state schooling systems because nationalist ideology 
assumes that ethnic groups are egalitarian and stable, and therefore the 
state needs to constmct an egalitarian ethnic identity within society to 
render the act credible, as implied by Balibar’s and Calhoun’s 
arguments.
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The similarity between nationalist conceptions of society and post­
mercantilist notions of population, and their difference with the 
definition of society associated with the social contract, together with 
the fact that nationalist conceptions of subjective rights were deployed 
against the conception of subjective rights of the social contract, 
support Breuilly’s (1995) theory of nationalism. Breuilly (1995) argues 
in the wake of development of post-mercantilist economic thought, the 
eighteenth century witnessed the development of an increasing 
emphasis on the idea that society possess self-regulatory properties, 
beyond the control of statecraft. This movement led to the development 
of a novel set of questions on how to regulate state/society relationships 
in the light of this fact, and nationalism emerged to provide a solution 
to these dilemmas (even though Breuilly misplace the origin of the idea 
that each society is unique by imputing that to nationalist thought, as 
opposed to post-mercantilism). The finding support also Foucault’s 
(1991b; 2001a) argument that tensions between the logic of growth of 
bio-power and the theory of sovereignty were responsible for 
explaining changes in dominant conceptions of political legitimacy that 
occurred in Western Europe between the later eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the process by which the Piedmontese 
schooling system became aimed at constructing a nation. In particular, 
the chapter has challenged the view that Italian nation-building was 
precipitated by the enfranchisement of the working class and the 
unification of Italy, by showing that, with respect to schooling, nation- 
building became intense already in the Risorgimento’s years. In 
accounting for why Italian nationalism led to the development of 
policies of nation-building, I argued that nationalist ideology and 
associated conceptions of citizenship were instrumental to overcoming
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difficulties experienced by liberal Piedmont with legitimising the 
maintenance and development of a state schooling system with the 
language of the social contract. The next chapter summarises the main 
argument and findings of the thesis.
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7. Conclusion
In conclusion, I summarise the main argument and findings of the 
thesis. The stated aim of the thesis was to cast some light on the 
phenomenon of nationalism, and its relationship with the modem state 
in particular. The issue has been addressed through an analysis of the 
relationship between growth of a state schooling system and the rise of 
nationalist ideology to dominance in Piedmont between the eighteenth 
and the nineteenth centuries. The main argument put forward has been 
that nationalist ideology was instmmental to legitimise the growth of a 
state schooling system, in the wake of difficulties experienced by 
liberal Piedmont with legitimising the practice with the language of the 
social contract. What follows summarises how I developed this 
argument, and discusses its implications for the historical sociology of 
schooling and that of nationalism.
The thesis considered the impact of industrialisation, rise of the 
middle-class and state formation on patterns of growth of state 
schooling systems across eighteenth and nineteenth-century Italy, 
leading to the following findings.
The cases of Piedmont and Italy supports the claim that 
industrialisation was an important factor in precipitating the growth of 
a state schooling system. In Piedmont, the industrial take-off of the 
1830s was followed by a sudden acceleration of the pace of growth of 
popular schooling. Between the 1840s and 1850s, in the space of about 
twenty years, schooling changed from being the domain of a minority 
of boys to being attended by virtually all the children in schooling age. 
Statistics show that at the beginning of the 1840s elementary schooling 
was absent from the great part of the Piedmontese mainland, and there 
were virtually no schools for the girls. By the time of the unification 
(1861), 93 percent of the children in schooling age was enrolled. At the 
same time political and ideological intervention in popular schooling
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greatly intensified. The first periodicals dedicated to popular schooling 
were issued in the 1830s. The 1840 saw the issuing of the first 
instructions issued by the Savoyard government for elementary 
teachers, and the establishment of the first government schools to train 
elementary teachers. A standardised and integrated schooling system 
divided in elementary, secondary and further education was developed 
between 1848 and 1859, by which time schooling became compulsory.
In post-unification Italy regional patterns of schooling expansion 
exhibited a strong correlation with industrialisation. Schooling reached 
quasi-universal proportions in the industrial triangle in the north-west 
considerably earlier than in the rest of the peninsula. The association 
between industrial and schooling developments became stronger in the 
later part of the nineteenth century, when schooling became a markedly 
urban phenomenon, and the gap between the rural south and the rest of 
Italy widened, in the wake of the intensification of policies of industrial 
development.
On the other hand, the Italian evidence show that the emergence of 
state schooling systems cannot be explained solely in relation to the 
transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, as Gellner (1983) 
would have it. The growth of state schooling systems obeyed logics 
that cannot be derived in any easy way from the assertion of an 
industrial technology of production, and changes in ideological and 
power relationships accompanying the growth of state schooling 
systems cannot be dismissed as a smoke-screen for industrial interest.
First, industrialisation was not a pre-condition to experience intense 
expansion. In Naples, Modena, Tuscany, Lombardy, Venice and Parma, 
the movement towards schooling expansion became intense in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, before industrialisation. This 
aspect was particularly marked in Lombardy, where compulsory 
schooling was introduced as early as 1786. In real terms the new
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educational order took a while to take off, but the impact of the 
eighteenth-century schooling reforms was all but negligible. In the last 
twenty years of the eighteenth century, Lombardy registered twice as 
many foundations of schools as in the previous two centuries. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century, French statisticians registered that 
about 60 percent of the boys in schooling age were enrolled.
Second, the process of schooling expansion corresponded to the 
development of a particular technique of economic development, which 
was related but not reducible to industrialisation, either as an economic 
or a social phenomenon. Up until the later nineteenth century, the 
movement towards schooling expansion involved the countryside as 
much as the city, indicating that state schooling systems did not emerge 
primarily to address concerns about the social tensions brought by the 
process of urbanisation unlashed by the industrial revolution, as De 
Swaan (1988) and Smelser (1991) suggest. At the time of the 
unification patterns of diffusion of schooling within Italian regions 
were not centred in the cities. This is not because early schooling 
promoters were not concerned with economic and technological 
progress, as argued by Laquer (1976) and Meyer et al. in relation to the 
development of popular schooling in England and the U.S.. Regardless 
of whether the technology of production demanded particularly refined 
skills from the workers, schooling expansion was associated by 
enlightenment thinkers and absolutist and republican state builders to 
exploiting the opportunities opened by technology for economic 
progress. However, these objectives became strongly associated with 
industrialisation only in the course of the nineteenth century. In the 
preceding period, following the physiocratic tradition, the schooling 
system was meant to train rural, as well as city workers. Finally, the 
emergence of state schooling system was not precipitated by the fact 
that the factory, unlike the field, demanded disciplined workers, as 
claimed by Thompson (1967). Schooling promoters meant to apply
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disciplinary techniques to construct rural workers as well as factory 
workers.
Third, early industrialisation falls short of accounting for the 
exceptional growth of schooling experienced by Piedmont in the 
central part of the nineteenth century. Within Italy, in comparative 
terms, in the central part of the nineteenth century, Piedmont witnessed 
exceptional rates of growth of schooling. At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, French statistics show that enrolment rates in Turin 
were lower than in the Kingdom of Naples. By the time of the 
unification, statistics rated Piedmont as the first Italian region for 
schooling diffusion. This pattern of development cannot be explained 
solely in terms of early industrialisation. Economic historians register a 
level of industrial development only marginally superior to the national 
average in the same period.
The exceptional development of state schooling in the central part of 
the nineteenth century in Piedmont can be accounted for by the early 
enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie. The dominant position of the 
Subalpin parliament was one of schooling expansion. The schooling 
system emerging in the aftermath of the enfranchisement of the 
bourgeoisie was shaped so as to further the construction of a middle- 
class and a working class to it subordinated, as anticipated by the 
Napoleonic schooling system.
On the other hand, the argument that the development of state 
schooling systems corresponded to the rise of the bourgeoisie to 
economic and political power, as implied by Archer’s (1979) 
explanatory framework, leaves questions unresolved. First, the making 
of the middle-class developed over the long period, but the process of 
schooling expansion started gathering momentum only in the second 
half of the eighteenth century. In Piedmont, the schooling system was 
aimed at constructing the ‘bourgeoisie’, a lateral class with governing
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responsibilities of doctors, lawyers, state functionaries, at least since 
the sixteenth century. This aspect became particularly marked in the 
wake of the eighteenth-century educational reforms, when the 
absolutist state claimed direct control of the schooling system. And yet, 
in eighteenth-century Piedmont popular schooling grew hardly, if at all.
Second, the process of schooling expansion became intense before 
either the enfranchisement of the middle-class or the making of the 
industrial bourgeoisie. The presence of a marked intensification of 
processes of schooling expansion in the later part of the eighteenth 
century in Naples, Modena, Tuscany, Venice, Lombardy and Parma, 
indicates that the process predated of the rise to economic and political 
power of the industrial bourgeoisie.
Third, class analysis falls short of explaining why eighteenth-century 
Piedmont, where in institutional and economic terms the bourgeoisie 
was comparatively strong, failed to embark on a policy of schooling 
expansion.
Fourth, the Piedmontese bourgeoisie was remarkably divided on the 
question of the legitimacy of the state schooling system, and the post- 
1848 schooling reforms did not simply reflect its will.
As indicated by Green’s (1992) approach, these patterns can be 
explained by viewing the growth of state schooling systems as part of 
wider processes of state formation. In Piedmont, across the eighteenth 
and the nineteenth centuries, all the major educational reforms were 
found together with wider movements of reform of the administrative 
structure of the state.
This is not because the growth of state schooling systems was the result 
of the gradual development of the modem state. When looked from the 
long period, the growth of state schooling systems was sudden, rather
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than gradual. The size of popular schooling expanded very slowly 
between the sixteenth and the later eighteenth century. Historians 
estimate that enrolment rates in Turin at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century were about the same, if a bit lower, than in Florence four 
centuries earlier. Henceforth, popular schooling started growing at 
great pace. By 1863, statistics indicate that in northwestern Italy almost 
all the children in schooling age were enrolled.
Following Foucault’s (1991b; 2001a) perspective of bio-power, the 
uneven development of schooling across eighteenth-century Italy has 
been accounted for by associating the emergence of universal schooling 
to the assertion of post-mercantilist techniques of state formation. The 
Italian case suggests that the emergence of universal schooling was 
directly related to the assertion of post-mercantilist techniques of state 
formation. Piedmont, which reformed the schooling system in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, at a time mercantilist was dominant, 
failed to pursue a policy of schooling expansion. By contrast, Naples, 
Modena, Tuscany, Lombardy and Parma that reformed the schooling 
system in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the same time as 
mercantilism was giving way to physiocracy and political economy as 
the dominant perspective in economic thought, all pursued policies of 
schooling expansion. In addition, in the eighteenth century the process 
of schooling expansion was comparatively more intense in Austrian 
Lombardy, where the post-mercantilist model of state development was 
anticipated by cameralism.
Cameralist thinkers and post-mercantilist economists were pivotal 
figures in changing the dominant attitude towards popular schooling in 
Italy, and associated popular schooling to the construction of 
disciplined bodies and a disciplined population. In particular, in 
explaining why post-mercantilist thought led the development of 
popular schooling, we stressed the importance accorded by post­
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mercantilist economists to the contribution a well-behaved and 
industrious population in defining effective statecraft.
Key in explaining the exceptional development of the state schooling 
system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont was the fact that Italian 
nationalism became dominant earlier than elsewhere in the peninsula. 
Contrary to what is held by British and Italian historians, in Piedmont 
Italian nation-building became intense in the Risorgimento’s years, 
before the unification and the enfranchisement of the working-class. 
First, as we mentioned earlier, in the central part of the nineteenth 
century the schooling system was developing at great pace.
Second, at the same time the schooling system became aimed at 
constructing Italy. The institutionalisation of Italian nationalism in the 
Piedmontese educational system started in the 1830s, marked by the 
foundation of Deputation of History of the Patria, officially concerned 
with the history of the Sardinian States, but de facto engaged with the 
history of Italy. It was developed by the post-1848 schooling system, 
when Italian history and geography became subjects of the curriculum 
of elementary schools, and the schooling system gradually became 
aimed at furthering processes of de-Piedmontisation meant to pave the 
way for the unification of Italy, not least through the use of Italian as 
the medium of teaching.
Third, from these early stages Italian nationalism combined ethnic and 
civic elements. Italy was defined by Risorgimento’s state builders as a 
particularistic population sharing ethnic attributes, like descent, as well 
as community of interests and laws.
The main reason why nationalism led to the development of state 
schooling systems is not that nationalism rests upon the existence of 
‘fictive’ ethnic communities, which therefore need to be constructed by 
the state (see Balibar, 1991b; Hobsbawm, 1994; 2000). This
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perspective oversimplifies the relationship between nationalism and 
nation-building.
In many respects Italy was an arbitrary construction. Before the 
unification Italian identity was the domain of a few. Historians estimate 
that at the time of the unification Italian was intelligible for less than 10 
percent of the population. Italian identity had to be constructed in 
Piedmont even more than elsewhere in the peninsula. The peripheral 
role played by Piedmont during the Renaissance together with strong 
French influences meant that in Piedmont Italian traditions were even 
weaker than in the Italian core. Equally, there is no denying that the 
development of the schooling system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont and 
post-unification Italy addressed concerns about the limited diffusion of 
Italian identity.
However, in other respects Italy was the opposite of an arbitrary 
construction, it was a scientific construction. As shown by the analysis 
of the thought of Mazzini and Spaventa carried out in chapter six, 
nationalist ideologues did not assume that ethnic groups are bounded 
and egalitarian communities, as implied by Balibar’s definition of 
nationalism. Nationalist ideologues conceived of ethnic groups as 
particularistic and unstable networks of hierarchical and exploitative 
relationships amenable to gradual empowerement. This vision of 
society corresponded closely to that of post-mercantilist thought, and 
differed sharply from that of the tradition of the social contract.
Italian nationalism was instrumental to overcome tensions between the 
logic of state formation associated to this vision of society and the 
definition of subjective rights entailed by the tradition of the social 
contract. Liberal Piedmont ran into difficulties when attempting to 
legitimise the construction of a centralised schooling system with the 
language of the social contract. These debates provided a context for 
the development of the nationalist solution to state/society relations,
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and nationalist conceptions of citizenship and subjective rights were 
deployed against those of the social contract. Italian nation-building did 
not originate because nationalism was modelled after the social 
contract and the latter’s conception of society was at odds with a reality 
of exploitation and mutable and fluid identities (see Balibar, 1991b: 
Calhoun, 1997). Rather, as suggested by Breuilly’s (1995) theory of 
nationalism and Foucault’s (1991b; 2001a) perspective of bio-power, 
nationalist ideologues sought to adapt the state/society framework 
inherited from the theory of sovereignty to the logic of state formation 
informed by post-mercantilist thought.
199
200
'Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (2000) are often accused o f this sin (e.g. Calhoun, 1997: 22-3; 
Anderson, 2000: 6; Smaje, 2000: 72-3). Within the sociology o f  education the position that the 
nationalist school is instrumental to the bourgeois hegemony has been advanced by Apple (1990: ch. 4), 
with reference to nineteenth-century America.
2Smith (1991: 166-7), for instance, considers bourgeoisie, working-class, professionals, monarchy, 
aristocracy, gentry, church, merchant and intellectual stratum as all being key actors in contributing to 
the spread o f  nationalist ideology in various periods o f  European history. More recently the trend has 
been that o f  emphasising the contribution also o f  subaltern groups, such as women and peasants (e.g. 
Chatterjee, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 2001).
3Laquer (1976: 215-6) also stress a lack o f  correlation between patterns o f  Sunday school expansion 
and industrialisation between the end o f  the eighteenth and the beginning o f  the nineteenth centuries in 
England. Consistently with these data, Cipolla (1969: 68) argues that industrialisation on the whole was 
unimportant in explaining schooling expansion until the end o f  the nineteenth century, since the 
technology employed in the first phase o f  industrialisation was not particularly complex.
4Boli and Ramirez emphasis on war in accounting for the timing o f  state intervention in education can, 
on the other hand, be saved by endorsing the perspective that the growth in size o f  warfare made the 
loyalty o f  the masses a particularly pressing problem, as suggested by Colley (1992) and Mann (1993: 
ch. 11). The hypothesis o f  a connection between war and educational reform is confirmed by Piedmont, 
where the two major reforms o f  the nineteenth century (Boncompagni law, 1848 and Casati law, 1859) 
were passed during the conflict with Austria-Hungary. However, a more obvious explanation for the 
overlapping between warfare and educational reforms, certainly in Piedmont, is that the matter was 
controversial, and the wars provided the government the opportunity to pass the legislation by decree 
(without parliamentary approval and discussion).
5Mann (1993: ch. 11) also views state education as being an element o f  state formation.
6The same two reasons are advanced by Mandler (2003) to explain the comparatively low size o f  the 
English state in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, Mandler emphasises more than Green the 
impact o f early state formation.
7 It is in fact in reaction to economic functionalism that the conflictualist approach thrived in the 
sociology o f  education from the 1960s (cf. Halsey and Karabel, 1977). Empirical studies informed by 
the conflictualist tradition include Barbagli (1974), Bourdieu (1972), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Collins 
(1979) and Halsey et al. (1980). For theoretical discussions o f  these issues see Althusser (1972), 
Poulantzas (1978), Shapiro (1980) and Dale (1990).
8Archer and Vaughan mainly rely on writings by Rolland d’Erceville, Caradeuc de la Chatalois and, to 
a lesser extent, Diderot.
9,I claim for the Nation an education which depends upon nothing but the State, because it belongs to it 
in essence; because the Nation has an inalienable and imprescrible right to educate its members; 
because in the end the children o f  the State must be brought up by the State’ (Le Chatolois, 1763, cited 
in Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 153). According to Archer and Vaughan (1971: 153), Le Chatolois was 
also the first to use the word ‘national’ in connection with education in France.
I0Archer and Vaughan mainly rely on writings by Arnold.
11 For instance there is evidence that in the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie was remarkably divided 
on the question o f  the legitimacy or desirability o f  state schooling in a way that, as stressed also by 
Green (1992: 74-5), cannot be accounted for by Archer and Vaughan’s conceptual scheme.
12For a critique o f  structurionitsts approaches see Smaje (2000: ch. 2). For a defence see Parker (2000). 
13The opposition between ethnic and civic nationalism goes back to the nineteenth century, when 
Germany and France were contesting sovereignty over Alsace (cf. Zimmer, 2003: 174-5). More 
recently, the distinction has been influentially endorsed by Brubaker (1992) to describe the differences 
between French and German nationalism. A slightly different version o f  the argument is advanced by 
Hobsbawm (2000: 268-9), who identifies a transition between liberal and irrational ways o f  conceiving 
the polity between the first and the second half o f  the nineteenth century. For an application o f  the 
ethnic/civic dichotomy to education see Wiborg (2000). For a critique o f  the opposition between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ nationalism embedded in such a scheme see Chatterjee (1993) and Calhoun (1997: 3, 83-5). 
Zimmer (2003: 177) also stresses the inadequacies o f  the opposition to describe nationalism as a public 
discourse, for the two elements tend to combine. Similar remarks are made by Balibar (1991b: 96-100). 
Benner (2003) calls for a radical revision o f  the distinction by stressing how Herder, traditionally
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considered as the quintessential ethnonationalist ideologue, combines political and ethnic ways o f  
imagining the nation.
14,The clergy, the nobility, the sovereign courts, the lower tribunals, the officers attached to these 
tribunals, the universities, the academies, the financial companies, all present and, in all parts o f  the 
State, bodies in being which one can regard as the links o f  a great chain o f  being o f  which the first is in 
the hands o f  your Majesty, as head and sovereign o f  all that constitutes the body o f  the nation’ 
(Seguirier, 1776, cited in Breuilly, 1993: 89).
15,The Nation is essentially the source o f  all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body o f  man, be 
entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from i f  (cited in Breuilly, 1993: 90).
16Locke introduces an intermediate moment between the individuals and the state in the form o f  a pre­
political society. In this model, the state is a trust created by the pre-political society. Differently from 
Hobbes, for Locke the constitution o f  the state does not negate the preceding moment, rather it perfects 
it so that the political and pre-political societies co-exist (Bobbio, 1988: 74). The pre-political society 
becomes the locus o f  much that is valuable and creative in social life (Chatterjee, 1993: 228-9). This 
last element is one o f  the key defining feature o f  civil society, as it is understood in the liberal tradition: 
a sphere o f  social life where individuals can freely (outside state tutelage) engage in productive and 
cultural activities.
17More specifically, Hobsbawm (1990: ch. 3, 2000: 263-9) explains the explosion o f  state nationalism 
in Western Europe at the end o f  the nineteenth century with reference to the problem o f conceptualising 
state and society relationship after the growth o f  the administrative apparatus o f  the state upset the 
traditional frame-work. Morefields (2002) claims that in the second half o f  the nineteenth century 
English liberals started relying on organic conceptions o f  the nation-state as a result o f  the difficulties 
liberal thought has with imagining community and elaborating the grounds o f  legitimacy o f  the 
interventionist state. Chatterjee (1993: 227-34) claims that liberal conceptions o f  civil society 
(particularly with reference to Locke, Montesquieu and Hegel) suppress tensions between the idea that 
subjective rights are grounded in the individual and that they are based upon community. One historical 
trajectory informed by this tension is that o f  identifying the nation as the sole legitimate community and 
the administrative apparatus o f  the nation-state as its executor. In turn, Chatterjee (1993: 234-9) argues, 
the problematic was triggered by the progressive erasure o f  community-based identities under the 
normalising sway o f  capitalism and disciplinary power. On Archer and Vaughan (1971: 180-1, 188-9) 
see discussion in section above. Balibar (1991b: 97-8) links the emergence o f  familial metaphors to 
represent the nation to the growth o f  state intervention in the family and concomitant changing 
conceptions o f  public and private.
18Indeed, according to Hoskin (1990) Foucault is a crypto-educationalist.
19Starting from around 1979 Foucault increasingly use the term ‘government’ in place o f ‘power’ (cf. 
Foucault, 1999). According to Pasquino (1993: 79) the two terms are roughly equivalent.
20 According to Pasquino (1993) Foucault is wrong in considering the idea that the social body is 
divided into conflicting fields as a peculiar feature o f  the discourse o f  war. For him the important 
difference introduced by this discourse lies in the fact that traditionally political thought did not identify 
a possible source o f  disorder abuses on the part o f  the public authority.
lxStato degli impiegati nell’anno scolastico 1739-40 and Nota d e ’ Sign.ri Riformatori Professori ed  
altri impiegati nelle Regie Scuole di Provincia per I’anno scolastico 1771-2 in A.S.T., Economia, 
Pubblica istruzione, Magistrato della riforma: Scuole Provinciali, m.2.
22 First, in the 1863-4 statistics, and not the following one, the number o f  enrolled boys exceeded the 
total number o f  boys in schooling age (6-12). Second, Liguria, under Savoyard rule since 1815, results 
to be the third region for schooling diffusion according to the 1863-4 statistics, but only the seventh 
according to the 1861 census, which asked how many boroughs had at least one school and for the rest 
reproduced a scenario fundamentally consistent with that emerging from the enrolment rates.
230ther examples include Beccaria, the famous criminologist (1764, reproduced in Balani and Roggero, 
1976: 128): ‘Do you want to prevent crimes? Make sure that light accompanies freedom ... Whoever 
has a sensitive soul ... will be forced to bless the throne and him who occupies it’. For the Neapolitan 
economist Genovesi (1768, cited in Peroni, 1928: 291), popular schooling was necessary because it 
‘civilises the human souls, discipline them and render them more obedient’. According to the 
Neapolitan jurist Filangieri ([1780-5] 1922: 13): ‘the most effective o f  the means ... to keep the 
constitutions o f  governments still and stable is to educate the youth to loath the constitution’. The 
Regulation o f  Lombard’s schools in 1818 instructed the teachers o f  the Imperial schools thus: ‘the 
teachers must take special care to instil in the school-children gratitude towards the parents, love o f  art,
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love o f  the Sovereign, and the patria, obedience to the law, respect for the magistrates’ (cited in 
Genovesi, 1999: 40-1). See also summary o f  Leprotti below.
24Consider also the following quotation from the instructions for a head-teacher issued by the 
Piedmontese government in 1738, the duty ‘o f  the Assistants will be to watch incessantly over the 
conduct o f  the pupils both within and without the college’ (A.S.T., Pubblica Istruzione, Collegio dei 
Nobili e delle Province: m. 1, Istruzione Al Sig Preside del Collegio delle Province. La quale 
comprende altresi Le obbligazioni di ciascuno d e ’ suoi Subalterni nel medesimo). The following 
extract is from a plan o f  legislative interventions in the Piedmontese schools (1737), ‘it is necessary that 
in every city there is someone to watch over professors and pupils, ..., never allowing the introduction 
o f  any abuse, no matter how tiny’ (A.S.T., Pubblica Istruzione, Regia Universita: m. 5, Progetto di 
provvedimenti per V Universita di Torino, formato dal Gran Cancelliere Zoppi). Consider also the 
description o f  the tasks o f  the censor in Parma (1768): ‘They will explore the conduct o f  the Pupils, and 
discovering some vicious custom, or perverse character, or scandals .... will tell the Deputy, so that [the 
pupil] will be warned severely, and punished; and, in case he did not repent, he w i l l ... be expelled from 
the Royal Schools’ (A.S.T., Economia, Pubblica Istruzione, Regia Universita: m. 6, Costituzione per i 
nuovi Regi Studi di Parma: 44).
25A.S.T., Pubblica Istruzione, Collegio delle Province: m. 2 non inventariato, L ’ uffizio di Ministro del 
Reale Collegio de ’ Nobili ha li seguentipesi 
26B.M.R.T., Parliamentary papers, camera, 6/6/1848: 110.
27The curriculum prescribed by the Ratio studiorum limited itself to teaching mathematics and general 
physics under the course o f  philosophy (on the Jesuit curriculum see Scaglione, 1986: 82-94).
28B.N.T., Parliamentary papers, Camera, 10/5/1870.
29Ghibellin was the name o f  the imperial faction, opposed to the papacy, in medieval Italy.
30Art. 39, Collection o f  norms and rules o f the Kingdom o f Sardinia (1834). Reproduced In Marchi 
(1985: 54).
31 Art. 315, Casati Law, The objectives o f elementary education. Reproduced in Canestri and Ricuperati 
(1985:43).
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